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Abstract 
This thesis presents an account of the roles played by social actors in the 
implementation of unemployment policy in the UK.  Lipsky’s (1980) theory of 
street-level bureaucracy has been adopted, updated to the contemporary 
context of the managerial state (Clarke & Newman, 1997) and developed in 
the specific case of the Jobcentre.  The analysis is based on data collected 
during an ethnographic investigation of one case study Jobcentre office in 
Central Scotland.  The methods consisted of six months of direct observation, 
interviews with 48 members of Jobcentre staff, semi-structured interviews 
with 35 users and analysis of notified vacancies and guidance documents.  
The argument is that front-line workers re-create policy as they implement it.  
They do so in reaction to a series of influences, constraints and incentives.  
Users therefore receive a service that is a modified version of the official 
policy.  Users do not necessarily accept the policy that they are subjected to.  
They do not identify with the new managerialist notion of customer service 
because as benefit recipients they are denied purchasing power, choice and 
power.  Unemployment policy is not delivered uniformly or unilaterally 
because front-line staff are active in developing work habits that influence the 
outcomes of policy.  Policy is accomplished by staff in practice by 
categorising users into client types.  This is significant because staff represent 
the state to the citizen in their interaction.  Users are also active in 
accomplishing policy, whether they conform with, contest, negotiate or co-
produce policy.  Understanding what unemployment policy actually is, and 
what it means to people, depends on understanding these social processes 
by which policy emerges in practice.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Having their roots in the welfare to work policies of the USA and being 
embraced more recently by European member states, active labour 
market policies have become increasingly popular. A widespread trend 
towards active labour market policies as a response to unemployment has 
been identified (Clasen, 1999, Lødemel & Trickey, 2001, Sarfati & Bonoli, 
2002, Sinfield, 2001). Often, the impact of these policies has been 
evaluated at a macro level. By contrast, with the premise that ‘policies 
cannot be understood in isolation from the means of their execution’ 
(Elmore, 1978: 185), this thesis provides a micro level analysis of 
unemployment policy in practice. The argument is that policy does not fully 
exist until the social actors who deliver and receive policy bring it into 
being.  Implementation is not simply a peripheral matter of technicality or 
practicality, but is central to understanding the constitution of what policies 
are and what they mean to people.  The emphasis is, therefore, on how 
service delivery is accomplished and emerges in practice, through social 
interaction.  The research presented in this thesis is designed to explore 
both sides of the contemporary staff-user relationship through an 
ethnographic case study of one UK Jobcentre office.   
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It was Lipsky’s (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy (based on the 
USA in the 1970s) that sparked interest in the role of front-line workers as 
policy makers.  However, this has come to be a neglected perspective 
(Hudson, 1993), particularly, it would seem, in the UK context1.  With the 
important exception of Blackmore’s (2001, also see Finn et al., 1998) 
study of the Stricter Benefit Regime, little has been written recently about 
the street-level implementation of social security.  Research from the 
1980s (Cooper, 1985, Howe, 1990) has not been updated to the 
contemporary context of the managerial state (Clarke & Newman, 1997).  
This means that the impact of a series of significant changes in the 
funding, management and delivery of social security benefits has not been 
analysed in its implemented form.  This thesis aims to fill this gap by 
providing an in-depth investigation of the constraints, incentives and 
influences that shape staff decision making.  
 
The Jobcentre provides a particularly interesting case for an 
implementation study since the formal goals of the organisation present 
front-line staff with several tensions.  A network of Jobcentre offices exists2 
both to administer Jobseeker’s Allowance to those registered as 
unemployed and to match those looking for work with vacancies.  This 
means that front-line staff are required to police users for benefit purposes 
at the same time as assisting and enabling them to find work (Fletcher, 
1997).  Perhaps it is vacancy matching that presents the greatest source 
                                            
1 In the USA, for instance, studies have kept better pace (cf. Anderson, 1999, Kingfisher, 
1996, Miller, 1991). 
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of dilemma for front-line workers.  Should Employment Officers send hard 
to place unemployed Jobcentre users to employers?  Or should the 
employer’s wants and needs be prioritised in order to secure future 
vacancies?   
 
In addition to these questions, this study has a wider objective of 
understanding the social processes by which unemployment policy comes 
into being at the interface between citizens and the state.  As a process of 
interaction, implementation necessarily involves those who are subject to 
policy as well as those charged with its delivery.  The policy developments 
of the 1980s and 1990s have had particular consequences for 
unemployed Jobcentre users, who have been rebadged as customers but 
have been subjected to increased compulsion.  Claiming benefit for 
unemployment has become more conditional on actively seeking work 
(Clasen, 2000), with the threat of tougher sanctions.  Meanwhile, benefits 
have been devalued and their insurance base has been undermined 
(Erskine, 1997).  Despite the registered unemployed being compelled to 
seek work, the Jobcentre has lost its hold on the vacancy market, having 
come to deal mainly in low quality vacancies (Whiteside, 1995).  How, 
then, do Jobcentre users experience the service? 
 
Staff-user relationships are 'imbued with power' (Adler & Asquith, 1981), 
particularly because users are non-voluntary (Lipsky, 1980).  Unemployed 
people are situated in a relatively powerless position.  They are subject to 
                                                                                                                       
2 See Chapter Nine for an explanation of the current transitional arrangements as the 
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policies that have been designed by a set of powerful social actors.  
Politicians and civil servants, who have their own values and belief 
systems (which can be far removed from the concerns of the end user), 
formulate formal policy.  In doing so they are influenced by personal or 
group interests and respond to ideological, political, economic, historical 
and social factors (Levin, 1997).  At street-level, these two conflicting 
interests confront each other.  In this thesis, the aim is to explore these 
issues from the perspective of front-line staff and users.  How do officials 
relate to formal policy?  Do they accept rules and guidance or do they 
challenge and resist?  How do users respond to the implementation 
process?  Do they comply with what is required of them or do they attempt 
to be more active in negotiating or contesting the policy that is presented 
to them?  
 
The direction of social security policy development in the UK has also 
meant that the choice of a Jobcentre as the research setting has been 
more important than originally foreseen.  The Employment Service model 
of advice has become an exemplar for the administration of benefits to a 
very wide range of recipients, much beyond the original group of 
unemployed people that this research aimed to understand (this will be 
elaborated upon in Chapter Nine). 
 
                                                                                                                       
service moves towards being replaced by Jobcentre Plus, under the new Department for 
Work and Pensions. 
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Research Questions 
The research presented in this thesis has been designed to investigate the 
following research questions: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
What roles do front-line workers play in the implementation of current 
UK unemployment policy? 
What are the dynamics of the interaction between staff and Jobcentre 
users?  
How do users receive policy, particularly in relation to the new 
managerialist language of customer service? 
What are the implications of the implementation process for 
unemployed Jobcentre users? 
How do users engage in the implementation process at street-level?   
How does policy emerge in practice through the face-to-face interaction 
between staff and users? 
 
Outline of Chapters 
Chapter Two locates these research questions within the body of literature 
that has informed it.  The primary influence has been Lipsky’s (1980) 
theory of street-level bureaucracy, but this is placed within the wider 
context of the policy process.  In particular, policy making and policy 
implementation are considered as processes of interaction involving social 
actors.  Micro level studies of policy design and implementation are drawn 
on to build a case for the examination of contemporary UK unemployment 
policy from a street-level perspective.  The theory of street-level 
bureaucracy is outlined and the front-line staff practices of discretion, rule 
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breaking, client categorisation and rationing are explored.  Since this study 
is concerned with interaction as a two-way process, the second part of the 
literature review is dedicated to understanding the ways in which service 
users are conceptualised within the street-level bureaucracy literature, the 
user involvement literature and the co-production literature. 
 
This framework is applied to contemporary UK unemployment policy in 
Chapter Three.  The history and development of the Jobcentre is traced, 
identifying the provenance of the dual roles of benefit administration and 
vacancy matching.  This joint function is highlighted as being a potential 
source of tension for front-line workers who have to simultaneously police 
and enable users (Fletcher, 1997) whilst also managing the conflicting 
interests of employers and job seekers.   This job has become even more 
complex in the context of the managerial state (Clarke & Newman, 1997), 
in which incentive management, cost-cutting and Civil Service reform have 
influenced the work of front-line staff.  On the other hand, trends in benefit 
eligibility and work conditionality are outlined in terms of their impact upon 
Jobcentre users, who have been subjected to greater compulsion while 
the value of benefits has declined.  The active labour market policies of 
Jobseeker’s Allowance and the New Deal constitute a significant policy 
trend and the consequences of this development are outlined for 
unemployed people in the light of their new label as customers. 
 
Chapter Four describes the interpretivist approach and ethnographic 
methods that were adopted to investigate the ways in which various 
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tensions were managed by front-line Jobcentre staff, played out within 
face-to-face interaction and experienced and negotiated by users.  Direct 
observation of the interaction between staff and users, a range of in-depth 
interviews with 48 members of staff and semi-structured interviews with 35 
users were supplemented by documentary analysis of staff training and 
guidance materials and analysis of a manual count of notified vacancies.  
These methods generated rich data that forms the basis of four chapters, 
exploring how policy was re-created, received and accomplished by street-
level staff and service users.  
 
The data-based analysis is presented in Chapters Five to Eight.  Firstly, 
the staff role in implementing policy is examined to determine whether or 
not Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy is applicable to Jobcentre 
staff in the UK in the late 1990s.  Three examples demonstrate the ways in 
which these workers implement policy and how it is affected by a series of 
constraints and influences that shape their daily work practices.  Chapter 
Six then focuses on how Jobcentre users receive policy and explores 
whether or not they identify with the notion of being a customer.  Chapter 
Seven moves the argument a step further to demonstrate the importance 
of interaction.  Here it is suggested that policy is accomplished in practice 
through social processes.  The particular example shows how front-line 
staff categorise clients for administrative purposes and more subjectively 
in moral terms.  Chapter Eight shows the ways in which users are active in 
policy accomplishment, demonstrating that some users are acquiescent 
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while others are more troublesome.  Policy is shown to be contested, 
negotiated and co-produced in certain cases. 
 
Finally, the conclusion synthesises the main arguments of the thesis and 
relates these to recent policy developments.  An emerging research 
agenda is identified and conclusions are drawn about the wider 
significance of the findings. 
 
This thesis aims to make two distinct contributions to social policy 
literature.  Firstly, it hopes to contribute to knowledge of active labour 
market policies through an in-depth ethnographic account of 
implementation in one Jobcentre office in the late 1990s.  Secondly, the 
arguments presented are intended to advance understandings of the 
policy process by concentrating on the roles played by both Jobcentre 
staff and users in accomplishing policy through interaction. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Street-level Bureaucracy:   
policy implementation from front-line staff and user 
perspectives 
 
 
Introduction 
The primary concern of this thesis is with the ways in which policy is put 
into practice through the micro level interaction between front-line staff and 
users of welfare organisations.  The purpose of this chapter is locate the 
research questions of this study within an existing body of street-level 
bureaucracy literature and to identify themes that will be developed in the 
analysis that follows.  The intention is to emphasise how decision making 
and service delivery emerge in the practices of individuals and through 
social processes. 
 
This chapter begins with an outline of the development of understandings 
of policy making and implementation.  The focus then shifts to policy 
delivery, central to which is the description of Lipsky’s (1980) theory of 
street-level bureaucracy.   Three central themes will be identified as 
emerging from the analysis of front-line workers:  their use of discretion, 
the practice of categorisation and the process of rationing.  The role of 
users in the implementation process will then be elaborated on, 
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considering how their perspectives are represented in the street-level 
bureaucracy literature, investigating their involvement in the 
accomplishment of policy in practice and considering the ways in which 
users have been seen as active in policy making in terms of user 
participation and the co-production of policy. 
 
Making and Implementing Policy  
A wealth of literature has been generated on the topics of policy making 
and policy implementation, the former having dominated historically (c.f. 
Hill, 1997).  As inter-related processes, they cannot be separated cleanly 
for examination.  A major difficulty is to reconcile the theoretical and 
methodological tensions of different levels of analysis (i.e. micro, meso 
and macro) and to represent the relationship between structure and 
agency for the purposes of policy analysis.  Interpreting the processes of 
policy making and policy implementation can involve a range of different 
constructs (e.g. the state), organisations (e.g. the Employment Service) 
and individual human actors (e.g. key politicians, civil servants or 
prominent campaigners as well as front-line workers and the recipients of 
public services themselves).  This section outlines the ways in which policy 
making and policy implementation have been understood and 
demonstrates the value of investigating the interaction by which they 
emerge and are accomplished. 
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Policy making 
Theorists of policy making have tended to adopt a rational actor model of 
human behaviour to explain and predict the workings of the policy 
process.  But even Simon (1957), who provided the classic ideal type of 
policy making (involving the identification of possible options, 
consideration of consequences and values then the choice of a preferred 
solution), acknowledges certain psychological and organisational factors 
that limit the capacity for real humans to act in a perfectly rational way.  A 
more ‘realistic’ version of policy making is elaborated in Lindblom’s (1959) 
incrementalist approach, which reflects some of the reasons why policy 
making could be more accurately depicted as ‘muddling through’ rather 
than as making careful and rational decisions.   
 
Most useful for this study, however, is Levin’s (1997) micro level analysis 
of the processes of negotiation that top level politicians and civil servants 
are involved in when they make policy.  Levin contrasts his approach to 
that of other analysts (e.g. Hogwood & Gunn, 1984, McGrew & Wilson, 
1982), arguing that studies of the policy process should be recognisable in 
the framework and language used by politicians, officials and ordinary 
people, rather than having conceptual frameworks imposed upon them.  
The value of Levin’s work is that he reveals the centrality of negotiation in 
the process of policy accomplishment at the top levels of government.  He 
does not use the rational/incremental debate as his point of reference, but 
presents decision making as ‘a product of a rationale’, ‘a selective 
response to interests’, ‘the outcome of a process’ and ‘a reflection of the 
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power structure’ (1997:  29-65).  In this way he incorporates a wider range 
of influences to explain how the written version of policy is arrived at. 
 
In my view, this realm of policy making can be more usefully labelled as 
policy design.  As the next section will demonstrate, policy making 
happens throughout the implementation process, rather than as a 
separate stage (which is an implicit assumption within the rationalist 
accounts and an explicit feature of ‘stagist’ models of the political system 
like Easton’s, 1965). I follow Knorr-Cetina in believing that ‘it is through 
micro-social approaches that we will learn most about the macro order’ 
(1981:  41).  Organisations are made up of individuals and social action 
takes place through interaction.  Addressing the processes of interaction 
will therefore illuminate what is sometimes articulated as collective 
organisational action (Mouzelis, 1995). 
 
Policy implementation 
The history of the study of policy implementation can be traced back to 
Pressman & Wildavsky’s (1973) classic book, although, as Hill (1997) is 
keen to point out, implementation was investigated in a more peripheral 
way in a variety of other studies for considerably longer, before it was 
subjected to separate scrutiny.  Traditional understandings of policy 
implementation have been based on an ideal type, with perfect 
implementation as the goal, presenting implementation as a problem 
rather than an area of study or a source of understanding (Hill, 1997).  
Within this conceptualisation, implementation is seen as occurring in a 
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distinct place and time outside of the inner decision making sanctum that 
is inhabited by elite politicians and civil servants of the central state.  
Policy implementation happens after policies have been ‘made’ and 
consists of processes that involve ‘low level’ local officials who put the 
written words into action.  For example Pressman & Wildavsky (1973) 
contrast federal level mandates with the realities of later state level 
implementation in their US study. 
 
Although it has been acknowledged for some time that perfect 
implementation is unattainable (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984), and might even 
be undesirable, explanations of the policy process have continued to be 
centred on why policy in general, or certain policies in particular, are not 
implemented as intended.  Barrett & Fudge (1981) make an important 
contribution, criticising ‘top-down’ articulations of the policy process that 
see policy making and implementation as a linear process: 
 
Rather than treating implementation as the transmission of 
policy into a series of consequential actions, the policy-
action relationship needs to be regarded as a process of 
interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between 
those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom 
action depends (1981: 25). 
 
This ‘bottom-up’ approach is also advocated by Elmore, who argues that 
policy is best understood as a form of ‘backward reasoning’ (1981: 138) 
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from individuals to organisations and policy making.  This type of 
perspective has been praised for its flexibility and ability to analyse 
policies as they are rather than policies as they should be (Hill, 1997).  
Bowe et al. note that ‘policy is not simply received and implemented within 
this arena, rather it is subject to interpretation and then recreated’ (1992: 
21-22).  For Hill, essentially, ‘the implementation process is the policy 
making process’ (1997: 146).  
 
Delivering Policy 
Lipsky’s (19801) theory of street-level bureaucracy encompasses this 
reasoning and forms much of the theoretical basis for this thesis.  Lipsky 
argues that policy making can take place as much at street-level as it does 
through the traditionally accepted top down approach.  He defines street-
level bureaucrats as ‘public service workers who interact directly with 
citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in 
the execution of their work’ (1980: 3).  This includes a wide range of public 
sector workers such as doctors, police officers, social workers and benefit 
officials. Lipsky sees these actors as policy makers within an environment 
that they do not control.  The legal framework, policy context and 
organisational apparatus structure street-level bureaucrats’ work and limit 
the scope of their actions.  Despite these constraints and also because of 
them, street-level bureaucrats make policy in two senses:  in their 
                                            
1 Lipsky first coined the term ‘street-level bureaucracy’ in a short article published in 
1976, but his main exposition of the theory was in the 1980 book.  He acknowledges the 
collaboration of his colleagues Weatherley (1979), also see Weatherley & Lipsky (1977), 
and Prottas (1979) in developing the ideas. 
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discretionary decision making and through the collective effects of their 
individual actions.   
 
According to Lipsky, these officials experience dilemmas that are centred 
around conflicts in their goals.  The core tension is between serving user-
centred goals and organisation-centred goals.  Street-level bureaucrats 
are required to provide a flexible, responsive and caring service to meet 
individual needs, but at the same time they are bound by the impersonal 
and detached rules of the organisational bureaucracy within which they 
work.  The site of this dilemma is in their interaction with, and decisions 
about, users.  They are also constrained by the lack of resources for the 
extremely high demand for the services they provide (in fact Lipsky argues 
that demand for public services is unlimited and will increase with supply – 
meaning that rationing would be inevitable, a view shared by Hall, 1974:  
18).  Street-level bureaucrats therefore organise their work in response to 
these pressures in three ways: by limiting demand for services, by 
maximising the use of available resources and by ensuring user 
compliance.   
 
Lipsky (1980) portrays street-level bureaucrats as idealists who are 
attracted to working in public services because they want to do a job that 
they see as socially useful and worthwhile.  When they realise that the 
dilemmas involved in the work mean that they cannot do what they 
thought they could, they either leave or adapt.  He argues that service 
sector workers adapt by modifying their conception of their jobs, lowering 
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their expectation of what they can achieve and modifying their conception 
of the users they work with.  In response to this they develop their own 
‘routines and simplifications’ (1980:  83) as practical solutions to make 
their jobs manageable.  The main ‘psychological coping mechanism’ is to 
process people by treating individuals according to types in order to 
categorise users and differentiate between their demands. Ultimately, ‘the 
decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish and the 
devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, 
effectively become the public policies they carry out’ (Lipsky, 1980:  xii). 
 
Lipsky’s analysis should be seen in the context of debates about the 
nature of bureaucracy (Albrow, 1970, Crozier, 1964, Gouldner, 1954, 
Morgan, 1986) and professionalisation (Blau et al., 1966, Friedman, 1977, 
Vollmer & Mills, 1966, Wilensky, 1964).  The classic point of reference is 
Weber’s (1991) ideal type of bureaucracy, which provides a useful picture 
for comparison with empirical studies of bureaucracy in practice.  Weber 
presents a historically specific model of the development and domination 
of bureaucracy as a large scale organisational formation that epitomised 
predictable efficiency and rationality. The ‘bureau’ is based on written 
documents that have an official status.  It is staffed by permanent officials 
who perform formal duties within a strictly rule-bound administrative 
hierarchy and are subject to the authority of the more highly ranked 
decision makers above them.  Bureaucrats see their jobs as a vocation of 
public service and are specially trained and qualified to treat their users in 
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a standardised, unemotional, impersonal and unbiased manner - ‘without 
regard for persons’ (1991:  215). 
 
The defining features of professionals have been presented as being 
based on expert judgement (Blau et al., 1966, Friedman, 1977, Vollmer & 
Mills, 1966, Wilensky, 1964).  Professionals train to achieve specific 
educational qualifications and to establish professional knowledge and 
expertise, which in turn gives them power and authority. Their work 
involves detail and technicality and they hold high status positions that 
allow autonomous judgements and decisions.  Accountability is secured 
by ethical codes of practice and their actions are open to judgement only 
by fellow professionals.  They are not subject to bias from external 
pressures.  Professionals are dedicated to their vocation and display 
attitudes of public service.   
 
There are, therefore, several similarities and differences between 
bureaucrats and professionals.  Some of the earliest sociological analyses 
(e.g. Blau et al. 1966) assumed that they bore an inverse relationship to 
each other, i.e. the more professionalised a particular group were, the less 
likely they were to be bureaucratised.  However, this view has been 
challenged since Hall’s (1968) work and professionalisation and 
bureaucratisation can be seen to have: 
 
an elective affinity with each other . . . they jointly promote 
and reinforce a long-term trend towards a more rationalised 
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– that is abstract, codified and integrated – systems of 
surveillance and control (Reed, 1992:  207).   
 
The organisational arrangements and management practices of welfare 
bureaucracies in the UK have undergone major changes throughout the 
Twentieth Century, including the recent influence of new managerialism 
(Clarke & Newman,1997), which will be explored in the next chapter.  
Welfare organisations like the Employment Service or the Benefits Agency 
present good examples of the contemporary intersection between 
bureaucracy and professionalism, being staffed by hybrid bureau-
professionals.  These career civil servants can be described as 
bureaucrats in as much as they are administrators who apply predefined 
rules within a hierarchical organisation.  They are also part professional by 
virtue of their specialist training, acquired expertise, and ability to use 
discretion. A tension would therefore seem to exist for bureau-
professionals in their work with users since the bureaucratic model is 
based on standardisation and rule-bound activities, whilst professionalism 
emphasises decision making based on expert judgement.   
 
In the section above, several features of street-level bureaucracy have 
been identified and explored.  Before elaborating upon the key themes 
from the street-level bureaucracy literature, it is necessary to recognise 
that although this approach has been generally accepted within 
understandings of the policy process, there are several reasons for 
making an effort to renew interest.  There does not seem to be any major 
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objection to Lipsky’s (1980) version of events, although there has been 
some criticism that the book sensationalised the issues (Hasenfeld, 1985).  
Rather, the prevalent feeling seems to be that processes of 
implementation do not really matter.  By the early 1990s street-level 
bureaucracy had come to be regarded as a neglected perspective 
(Hudson, 1993).  Policy makers and academic analysts seem to continue 
to operate on the basis that policies are implemented more or less as 
intended, or if modification does occur it is neither significant in scale nor 
important in consequence.  The problem is that without empirical research 
we cannot know whether or not these assumptions are true.  In order to 
examine the implementation of UK unemployment policy in the late 1990s, 
this thesis draws on a range of street-level bureaucracy literature covering 
a variety of services in several countries.   In particular, the front-line 
practices of discretion, categorisation and rationing emerging will be 
highlighted and investigated.  
 
Discretion 
A key theme to emerge from Lipsky’s analysis, and to be explored in this 
thesis, is that of discretion.  Lipsky sees discretion as a by-product of the 
need for human judgement in the delivery of welfare services.  The 
following section explores this issue in greater depth, by first concentrating 
on formal discretion then moving on to examine informal discretion and the 
social processes by which both are exercised. 
 
Formal Discretion 
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The starting point for discussions of formal discretion in human services 
has often been Davis’ definition: 
 
A public officer has discretion wherever the effective limits 
on his (sic) power leave him free to make a choice among 
possible courses of action and inaction (1969:  4). 
 
However, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a ‘non-discretionary’ 
decision could be made (Smith, 1981:  47), so in some senses wherever 
there are decisions there is discretion.  Once the ubiquity of discretion is 
acknowledged (Handler, 1992), it becomes difficult to accept Davis’ initial 
proposition that a sharp divide exists between rules and discretion.  It is 
also apparent that discretion comes in different forms.  Jowell perceives 
this as a continuum between high and low degrees of discretionary 
freedom (1973: 179), whereas Dworkin distinguishes between strong 
discretion (where the official has power to set the standard) and weak 
forms of discretion (in cases where standards are pre-defined by a higher 
authority) (1977: 31).  Either way, the key point is that discretion is a 
relative concept (Sainsbury, 1992).  
 
A further difficulty in differentiating between rule-bound activities and 
discretionary decisions is that discretion actually exists within the formal 
rule structure.  Harlow & Rawlings have shown that ‘embedded discretion’ 
is present in legislation and guidance documents where implementing 
officials are required to form opinions about standards, for instance in 
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relation to what is ‘reasonable’ or ‘exceptional’ (1984:  298).  The workers 
who put the rules into action must therefore make independent subjective 
judgements as well as interpreting rules (Hill, 1997:  184).  
 
This has led to concerns, which came to a head in the 1970s in the UK, 
over the extent of discretion that should be afforded to social welfare 
officials.  If ‘discretion like the hole in the doughnut, does not exist except 
as an area left open by a surrounding area of restriction’ (Dworkin, 1977: 
31), then there has been considerable debate over how big the hole 
should be (Adler & Asquith, 1981, Thomas, 1974).  Davis (1969) himself 
advocates the minimisation of discretionary powers in favour of more 
directive structures and checks in order to guarantee fairness and 
systematic treatment. Conversely, the limits of complex and formulaic rule 
structures have been criticised by writers such as Titmuss (1971) who 
have argued that individual needs cannot be met through a strict 
predefined system of impersonal rules, not least of all because 
considerable questions can be raised over the legitimacy of the official 
rules. It has been argued that to secure administrative justice it is 
necessary to guarantee fairness, equity and accuracy, in both the process 
and the outcomes of social security decisions (Sainsbury, 1992, Mashaw, 
1983).  This would include the official being prompt, impartial and 
accountable, and the person subject to the decision being involved in the 
process.  Of course, ensuring procedural fairness can only deliver ‘just’ 
outcomes in the terms that have been predefined; substantive justice is a 
separate issue. 
 21
 Informal Discretion 
Prottas (1979) identifies an existing excess of complex rules, which leaves 
front-line workers unable to follow all of them equally or simultaneously (a 
situation made worse by unclear or conflicting organisational objectives 
and severe funding restrictions). Competing demands and limited time 
leads workers to develop ‘zones of relative indifference’ and to respond in 
different ways to ‘core’ and ‘lesser’ organisational rules (1979: 100).  This 
includes inventing and creating discretion where there was none, within 
the prescriptive system that they work.  Increasing the number of rules and 
confining their application cannot, therefore, eliminate the propensity for 
front-line workers to apply discretion.  So within welfare systems there are 
areas that are discretionary in a formal sense (for instance the Social 
Fund), and there are policies and practices that are not officially 
recognised as involving discretionary decision making, but nevertheless 
involve the informal application of discretion (Sainsbury, 1992).  Discretion 
exists where officials make choices, but because officials are social actors 
they can choose to reinterpret or disregard some of the rules (in some 
cases this can even mean breaking the law, see Skolnick, 1966).  The 
rules, whether they allow discretion or not, are open to manipulation. Hill 
argues that ‘the extent to which rule following allows discretion merges 
imperceptibly into the witting or unwitting disregard of rules’ (1997: 182). 
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Rule Breaking 
Rule breaking emerges from the street-level bureaucracy literature 
(Lipsky, 1980, Prottas, 1979) mainly as a rational response to the 
constraints and pressures of a particular working environment.  There are 
certain aspects of the organisation of service delivery that increase the 
necessity or likelihood that front-line staff will become involved in rule-
breaking activities.  Blau (1963) and Cohen (1965), for instance, identify 
some situations in which officials modified or adjusted rules and even 
fabricated records as a response to the pressure to meet performance 
targets.  In contravening the official procedure or rule of law workers 
undermine the formal goals of the organisation.  However, another effect 
might simply be to enforce the objectives more efficiently or effectively.  
Rule breaking behaviour can therefore still remain consistent with the 
overall objectives of the organisation or policy. 
 
There is, however, an alternative explanation for rule-breaking behaviour.   
Borrowing from one aspect of the sociology of work literature (cf. Beynon, 
1975, Burawoy, 1979, Roy, 1960), it has been argued that organisational 
rule-breaking can constitute an active form of worker resistance2.   
 
Some of the ways lower-level workers can withhold co-
operation within their organisations include such personal 
strategies as not working (excessive absenteeism, quitting), 
aggression toward the organisation (stealing, cheating, 
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deliberate wasting), and negative attitudes with implications 
for work (alienation, apathy). Workers may take advantage 
of collective resources to act non-co-operatively by forming 
trade unions or by exercising rights under collective 
bargaining agreements or civil service regulations (Lipsky, 
1980:  17). 
 
This is because those lower down the organisational hierarchy have 
interests that conflict with their supervisors, managers and power elites3.  
When translated into the context of social policy implementation, staff 
resistance might even be seen as a political act of resistance against the 
dominant ideology that moulds the policy agenda and dictates the 
conditions of delivery.  Young (1981) elaborates on this point, arguing that 
implementation can only be understood in terms of front-line workers’ own 
definitions of the situation.   
 
Given their subordinate position within the policy system, 
these definitions will often fail to match those of the policy-
makers; not only will they have divergent appreciations of 
problems but they will often attribute problematic status to 
rather different phenomena (1981:  44).  
 
                                                                                                                       
2 It is important to note that rule following (e.g. ‘working to rule’) can actually constitute a 
form of resistance (Grint, 1998:  104). 
3 Marxists would, of course, view this as an endemic feature of the capitalist labour 
process (see Braverman, 1974). 
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Young carries on to argue that policy outcomes will only match those 
intended to the extent that the policy makers and front-line workers ‘inhabit 
a common assumptive world’ (1981:  46).  Given the inherently unequal 
power relations present within organisational and policy hierarchies (which 
can been viewed in relation to wider social divisions such as class, 
gender, ‘race’ and ethnicity), this would seem unlikely.  Viewed in this light, 
it seems inevitable that front-line workers will be proactive in developing 
semi-autonomous practices of rule-breaking and policy modification.  
Questions are therefore raised about the frequency, patterns, extent and 
impact of these work habits, particularly since the subject of the work is 
people rather than inanimate objects (e.g. sheets of metal, Beynon, 1975).   
As Lipsky puts it: ‘in street-level bureaucracies the objects of critical 
decisions – people – actually change as a result of the decisions’ (1980:  
9, similar themes have been explored in the sociological literature about 
emotional labour, c.f. Hochschild, 1983). 
 
Hvinden (1994) shows some of the more positive effects of occasional 
‘rule-bending’ on both users and staff.  In his comparative study of welfare 
services in Scotland and Norway, he found that more ‘deserving’ 
claimants, for instance older and frailer people, were more likely than 
young able-bodied people to benefit from rule-bending at the margins of 
policy delivery (e.g. travel expenses).  Among those likely to receive 
preferential treatment were people known to the staff who were thought to 
be honest and trustworthy (1994:  122).  Hvinden argues that: 
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Rule-bending offered the staff an opportunity to demonstrate 
responsiveness and allowed them the possibility of being 
reasonable and flexible, within a scheme that most of the 
time put strong restrictions on their autonomy.  Probably the 
main function of rule-bending was its positive effect on staff’s 
occupational self-respect and sense of pride; they reduced 
the feeling of being just cogs in a large bureaucratic 
machinery (1994:  123).   
 
Categorisation 
Of central concern to this study is the application of discretion through 
face-to-face interactions with users.  In this section the focus is on the 
ways that staff judgements lead to different people being categorised in 
different ways, which in turn creates variation in policy outcomes.  The 
arguments presented in this thesis also draw on some of the insights from 
the symbolic interactionist tradition in sociology (see Charnon, 1995, Prus, 
1996).  The value of this perspective for understanding policy in practice is 
that it acknowledges the intersubjectivity of the social world.  As an 
interpretative approach, symbolic interactionism recognises the 
importance of different perspectives and relations.  Interaction is viewed 
as a joint process that involves accomplishment and negotiation.  
Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical approach has been influential in this 
study, viewing the social world as a stage within which individuals are 
social actors who present themselves in certain ways for particular 
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purposes.   The following sections consider some of social processes 
involved in policy implementation. 
 
People-processing 
When users first approach public service bureaucracies they submit 
themselves to ‘becoming a client’ (Lipsky, 1980: 105, Prottas, 1978: 294).  
As part and parcel of laying claim to the service or benefit, users must 
provide information about themselves that is then reduced down to a set of 
qualifications for the purpose of ‘slotting’ them into one of a range of 
standardised categories (Prottas, 1979: 291).  This is necessary because 
in order to deal with people’s differing needs en masse, they must be 
treated as ‘types’ rather than as individuals.  Complex people are therefore 
transformed from people into clients, as such they are processed as 
‘artificial entities’ (Prottas, 1979: 3).  In this way front-line staff engage in 
‘people-processing’ activities (Prottas, 1979). In sorting clients into 
categories staff are involved in constant judgements and decision making.  
This decision making takes place in relation to the predefined eligibility 
rules, but is also influenced by subjective factors, for instance if someone 
is perceived to be morally ‘deserving’  or ‘worthy’ (Lipsky, 1980:  23, also 
see Cooper, 1985, Howe, 1990).  This process of categorisation has 
‘profound implications for both the client and the organisation’ (Prottas, 
1979:  5) because it amounts to a widespread ‘unsanctioned exercise of 
discretion’ (ibid. 124).  Staff therefore resolve the dilemmas of their work 
by  ‘do[ing] for some what they are unable to do for all’ (Lipsky, 1980:  
151).   
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 Crucially, these routines, by which policy is altered, are developed through 
interaction with users (Lipsky, 1980:  84). Workers develop routines 
primarily in response to ‘occupational and personal biases, including the 
prejudices that blatantly and subtly permeate the society’ (Lipsky, 1980: 
85).  They develop their own rules about how to treat ‘an X’ or ‘a Y’.  So in 
some ways this reformulation of policy is presented as inevitable and 
uncontrollable.  In this way staff continue to organise their activities around 
rules, some made by the organisation and some they have developed by 
themselves or in collaboration with their co-workers (see Kingfisher 1996 
for a more detailed analysis of co-workers). 
 
A similar process is that of ‘triaging’ (Lipsky, 1980), which is the 
classification of people into groups according to how easily they can be 
helped and how likely it will be that they will benefit from the service 
provided.  This in turn leads to those users with the best chances of 
success, as defined in bureaucratic terms, to be ‘creamed off’.  Lipsky 
notes that although this process forms a basic part of the way that street-
level bureaucrats cope with their work, it is a destructive practice of 
discretionary judgement that is subject to routine abuse (1980: 106).  
Ultimately, some users are favoured over others, whose disadvantage is 
then compounded (Handler, 1992). 
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People-changing 
Related to these concerns are the processes by which front-line workers 
seek to alter the behaviour, activities, beliefs or attitudes of their users. 
Such ‘people-changing’ (Hasenfeld & Weaver, 1996) is a more active 
version of ‘people-processing’ and can be said to constitute an 
accomplishment of policy through the face-to-face interaction of staff and 
users.  Miller (1991) and Anderson (1999) have developed analyses of 
various strategies used by employment officers in dealing with users in 
their USA studies.  Both focus on the ‘rhetorical activities’ of persuasion 
(described by Anderson, 1999, as ‘witcraft’) used to manage disputes and 
enforce preferred courses of action (e.g. convincing users to participate in 
particular training courses or dissuading them from pursuing certain job 
opportunities).  As part of his analysis, Anderson (1999) also examines 
how the conflicting interests of employers and unemployed people are 
balanced by the employment agency staff who have to serve both in their 
everyday work.  One particular difficulty that Anderson identifies is the low 
quality of job opportunities within a deregulated labour market, which 
made employment officers’ jobs even tougher.  Work like Miller’s and 
Anderson’s brings us closer to viewing policy as filtered through street-
level bureaucracy in terms of ‘interactional accomplishment’ (Anderson, 
1999: 236).  Although both authors focus on the rhetorical practices of 
staff, rather than users, there is an important recognition that putting policy 
into practice depends on a two-way negotiation between social actors who 
are situated within hierarchies and are bound by power relations.   
 
 29
Despite workers having ‘a tremendous advantage in the personal element 
of control in interactions’ (Prottas, 79:  30), much ‘facework’ with users, 
involves efforts to establish rapport as ‘a more emotionally satisfying tenor 
for their encounters’ (Anderson, 1999: 228).  Street-level bureaucrats 
seem to have a preference for avoiding conflict and made efforts ‘to 
optimise maintenance of situational meanings and identities.’ (Anderson, 
1999:  228), including enabling users to ‘save face’ (Goffman, 1963).  It 
was the resistant users who became subject to more extreme forms of 
coercion (Anderson, 1999: 229, see Miller & Holstein, 1995 for an in-depth 
analysis of disputes within a welfare organisation). 
 
Rationing 
One use to which categorisation is put is to ration access, benefits and 
sanctions within welfare organisations.  Rationing, like discretion, has 
formal and informal variants.  Formally, limits are imposed on the 
distribution of welfare benefits and services through the administrative 
arrangements that dictate who is eligible to what in which circumstances 
and for how long.  It almost goes without saying that the particular 
character of the system, the priorities that are set and the funding that is 
made available, are influenced by the moral and ideological beliefs of 
those social actors who design policy (Levin, 1997).  
 
Stigma (c.f. Goffman, 1963) can be a powerful rationing factor, even at the 
pre-application stage Stevenson (1973).  Users might be deterred from 
applying for public services because of the formal rationing that is imposed 
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by central and local level policy makers4.  From the Poor Law onwards, 
policy designers have been aware of the possible financial savings that 
can be made by creating a system that deters potential applicants 
because making a claim involves psychological costs (Fraser, 1984, Dean, 
1991).  Stigma has remained a constant feature of social security and 
social welfare services (Jones & Novak, 1999).  Negative stereotypes of 
benefit claimants have been perpetuated through government statements 
and media controversy (e.g. benefit ‘scroungers’ and ‘cheats’).  The 
prevalence of such ‘moral panics’ (Cohen, 1972) cannot fail to effectively 
bar some people from claiming the benefits and services that they are 
legally entitled to (Oyen, 1980).  
 
However, a second layer of rationing takes place through the 
implementation of policy at street-level.  In part, front-line workers apply 
the rationing that is dictated by the formal rules of the organisation.  But 
because their work involves judgement and discretion, front-line staff also 
act of their own accord to ration informally the services they provide.  
Lipsky (1980) takes this latter form of rationing as his focus, pointing out 
that street-level bureaucrats’ actions are often officially unsanctioned, 
unintended and unanticipated (although it could be argued that 
organisations are aware of front-line rationing and endorse it by creating 
the circumstances that make it necessary and overlook the distributional 
biases that result from, Hill, 1997).   
 
                                            
4 Fimister & Hill, 1993, provide some examples of the ways in which local rationing has 
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At street-level, as well as at the policy design stage, social actors make 
decisions and act to limit access to services, levy costs and dispense 
rewards.  One of the main reasons that Lipsky believes front-line workers 
to be policy makers is that they have ‘considerable discretion in 
determining the nature, amount, and quality of benefits and sanctions 
provided by their agencies’ (1980: 13) and they are able to operate 
relatively autonomously from the authority of their organisation.  A street-
level bureaucrat is therefore ‘almost always a judge as well as a server’ 
(Lipsky, 1980: 74).  Several resources are open to manipulation.  Lipsky 
identifies five main types of costs:  monetary, psychological, time, queuing 
and information. These costs can be experienced by users as ‘real’ or ‘felt’ 
(Prottas, 1979).  
 
Although welfare services are usually free to those most in need, penalties 
can be imposed on potential beneficiaries through associated financial 
costs.  For instance, Gibson et al. (1985) found that even expecting people 
to ‘come and get’ a publicly funded service, biased distribution against 
those experiencing poverty because of the monetary cost of travelling to 
the office.  Even relatively small charges can discourage people from 
making use of services, particularly if they are on the margins of poverty 
(for instance people who have incomes that are slightly higher than the 
eligible level who have to pay NHS prescription charges). 
 
                                                                                                                       
been imposed by central government through budget cuts as a deliberate strategy to 
achieve retraction of service provision in an era of welfare state retrenchment in the UK. 
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The structuring of psychological costs as deterrents has been identified 
above.  Front-line staff can exacerbate the psychological and emotional 
costs of seeking services further.  
 
If the entire contact with a public agency has elements of a 
public degradation ceremony, the street-level bureaucrat is 
in a position to mitigate or exaggerate the impact of that 
ritual.  Although the context of the interaction with the street-
level bureaucrat can leave little doubt in the client’s mind of 
his or her status, the human element cannot be ignored.  To 
be held in ‘structural contempt’ is unpleasant; to also be 
treated contemptuously by another person is something 
much worse (Prottas, 1979: 129). 
 
The fear of humiliation might mean that people who need the service are 
demotivated to apply for it.  The face-to-face interaction can realise these 
fears and cause emotional costs of embarrassment or ‘loss of face’ 
(Goffman, 1963) to users once they have entered the bureaucratic 
process.  Lipsky argues that such costs can be imposed both in lack of 
respect (e.g. being forced to wait), in being asked degrading personal 
questions (e.g. about sexual behaviour) and the assumed level of fraud 
and dishonesty.  Prottas agrees, arguing that front-line workers can 
change costs for different users ‘by varying stance, attitude, and tone’ 
(1979:  10).  This can result in withdrawals of demands and the creation of 
more agreeable demands. 
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 Time is an important resource ‘that may be extracted from users as a cost 
of service’ (Lipsky, 1980:  89).  Symbolically, forcing users to wait before 
they can receive the service conveys a sense of dependence and 
powerlessness.  Street-level bureaucrats can therefore punish users by 
delaying responses or causing inconvenience (even the requirement to 
complete multiple long forms can impose a time cost before people 
become users of the service), and can similarly reward users by 
processing their case more quickly than usual (ibid.  89-90).  A common 
form of time rationing is to expect users to wait in a queue.  This makes an 
imposition on the user, implying that he or she has ‘nothing else to do with 
their time’ (ibid. 95) and can be stigmatising.  
 
Finally, information can be controlled and rationed.  It can be used to 
confuse or create barriers for some prospective users (for instance 
through procedural complexity, Hall, 1974), or be given to privilege others 
and help them to get the most out of the system.  Useful information can  
be denied to some users, whilst others gain the benefit of the official’s 
expert knowledge.  The esoteric nature of the great volumes of specialist 
legislation and guidance makes ‘the rules’ inaccessible to most staff and 
almost entirely incomprehensible to the great majority of people who have 
cause to use the particular service (Oyen, 1980:  49).  
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Gatekeepers 
Certain workers play an important gatekeeping role5.  Prottas (1979) views 
all street-level bureaucrats as gatekeepers, but it is of note that those 
furthest down the hierarchy and most junior, often have the key positions 
such as receptionist.  Without in-depth professional training these workers 
might be even more likely to apply categorisations and stereotypes.  
Those individuals who represent organisations as the first point of contact 
can ration services in ways that are discriminatory (for instance Deutscher 
found the main informal methods of rationing conducted by a housing 
intake officer were ‘race’, family formation and personal presentation, 
1968: 44).  As Hall (1974) suggests: 
 
Frequently, as a result, services are received not by those in 
greatest need (by any definition) but by the most vocal, the 
most persistent, the most articulate, those better able to 
understand the workings of the bureaucracy, the better 
educated and so on (1974: 17-18). 
 
Users and the Implementation of Policy 
Traditional perspectives on policy making and implementation (outlined 
earlier in this chapter) view users as passive recipients of policy that is 
made by powerful central politicians and civil servants and implemented 
by peripheral lower-level workers. Within ‘stagist’ accounts of the policy 
process (e.g. Easton, 1965), policy making and implementation are seen 
 35
as distinct and hierarchical.  Policy receiving is a separate sphere that is 
largely removed from the policy process, except for the political demands 
made by pressure groups that might act as an input to the cycle of policy 
making.  Studies of street-level bureaucracy (elaborated on above) have 
sought to redress this imbalance by bringing the processes of 
implementation to centre stage, recognising that policy making is not 
confined to the design phase.  In doing so, the interaction between staff 
and users has received greater attention.  Although it is the role of front-
line workers as policy makers that has been the focus, inroads have also 
been made to better understand the role of users in the implementation of 
policy and in the policy process more generally.   
 
People who use services have moved from being regarded as docile 
welfare subjects, to being seen as active players in the accomplishment of 
policy at street-level.  It is these processes that this thesis takes as its 
focus, for two main reasons.  Firstly, the intention is to understand the 
meanings that face-to-face interaction with front-line staff holds for users 
and to analyse users’ perspectives of the services they receive (these 
services and policy itself having been modified by staff during the 
implementation process). The second associated aim is to unpack the 
dynamics of the staff-user relationship in order to examine users’ 
participation in policy making at the point of contact with a welfare 
organisation.  The following sections explore issues that arise from 
                                                                                                                       
5 This concept has been particularly well-developed in the housing literature (e.g. 
Deutscher, 1968, Lidstone, 1994) 
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existing literature on users within the street-level bureaucracy framework 
and users’ involvement in policy making.  
 
Users and street-level bureaucracy 
Lipsky’s (1980) key point in relation to the users of street-level 
bureaucracies was that they are non-voluntary. Users depend on the 
service provided and must comply with the demands made by officials in 
order to receive what they need.  The poorer the user, the more 
dependent he or she will be on the service, particularly if it is providing 
income maintenance or other essential goods or services.  The costs of 
exiting the interaction are therefore very high for users, leaving them 
dependent on sustaining the relationship with staff (Lipsky, 1980, Handler, 
1992, Kingfisher, 1996). Users can only impose certain ‘low-level’ costs 
upon the workers they deal with (Lipsky, 1980:  57).  Beyond forgoing the 
emotional satisfaction of helping grateful people, officials have traditionally 
had little to lose by failing to satisfy users (Lipsky, 1980).  This impacts 
heavily upon the character of the interaction between staff and users.   
 
The staff-user relationship is a power relationship (cf. Lukes, 1974).  
However, staff also depend on users to a certain extent.  Staff are 
dependent upon users in the sense that user compliance is a necessary 
part of the implementation process.  Theoretically, if users did not turn up 
and at least submit themselves to the bureaucratic processes necessary 
to receive welfare, then those agencies would not survive and the people 
who are employed in them would have to look for work elsewhere.  In 
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practical terms, it is users’ compliance that staff depend upon for the 
smooth functioning of their work.  Prottas argues, therefore, that ‘the 
relationship between the street-level bureaucrat and the user is one of 
mutual dependency, but the client’s dependency is more obvious and 
perhaps more painful (1979:  10).  Hasenfeld makes a logical progression, 
asserting that ‘the client’s dependency on the official is directly 
proportional to the client’s need for the services controlled by the official 
and is inversely proportional to the availability of services elsewhere’ 
(1985:  625).  Therefore, ‘clients’ consent is continuously being managed 
by public agencies’ (Lipsky, 1980:  57).   
 
Users and the Accomplishment of Policy 
The street-level bureaucracy literature, therefore, alludes to the ways in 
which policy is a social process accomplished through interaction between 
staff and users (see above).  This staff-user relationship must also be 
seen in the context of wider social, economic and political inequalities of 
wealth, power and status.  Officials have an authority that ‘renders the 
relationship between the decision maker and the person who is subject to 
the decision a hierarchical one and one which is imbued with power’ (Adler 
& Asquith, 1981:  26).  Wider social forces and patterns of inequality 
impact upon the interaction between users and staff and influence both the 
way that policy is accomplished and the effects that it has on those at the 
receiving end: 
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Both the powerful and the powerless carry into the 
relationship their respective characters and self-conceptions, 
their root values, nurtured through immediate as well as past 
social relationships. Who they are and where they come from 
– class, ‘race’, childhood, education, employment, relations 
with others, the everyday structures of their lives, their very 
different social locations – crucially affect their languages, 
social myths, beliefs, and symbols – how they view 
themselves, their world, and others – which produce vastly 
different meanings and patterns in their encounters (Handler, 
1992:  343). 
 
Handler (1992) usefully demonstrates how power can be enacted through 
the staff-user interactions of public service organisations.  He argues that 
users’ and officials’ interests are fundamentally opposed (because of their 
socio-economic background, their access to resources, personal 
capabilities and skills and because of the functions of the organisation).  In 
order to deliver policy the exercise of a degree of power is therefore 
required.  In practice, power is made manifest through user acquiescence 
as well as through conflict.  Drawing on Lukes (1974), Bachrach & Baratz 
(1962) and Gaventa (1980), Handler argues that certain courses of user 
action are precluded by wider forces that contribute to a ‘manipulated 
consensus’ (1992:  336). This creates a social situation in which those 
using the service are disinclined to resist for several possible reasons - 
because there is no opportunity to lodge a grievance, because non-
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compliance has been delegitimised by the dominant group, because they 
feel powerless and believe that they have no choice but to go along with 
what is being required of them, or because they have been defeated in 
previous attempts to redefine a similar situation.  Staff gain user co-
operation through the ‘mobilisation of bias’ (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962) 
which ‘systematically benefit[s] certain groups at the expense of others’ 
(Handler, 1992:  336). 
 
As ‘boundary workers’ (Prottas, 1979, Kingfisher, 1996), street-level 
bureaucrats mediate the relationship between citizens and the state 
(Lipsky,1980: 4).   The decisions they make can have a great impact on 
people’s lives, especially for those users who experience poverty (Lipsky, 
1980: 6).  The modification that policy undergoes as part of street-level 
implementation, therefore, has several consequences for users.  The 
processes of categorisation and rationing bias the distribution of services 
and benefits in ways that advantage some users and disadvantage others.  
For instance, having to wait for services can impose ‘status degradation’ 
upon users (Hasenfeld & Steinmetz, 1981), making them feel humiliated, 
dehumanised or subject to control.   
 
Street-level bureaucrats ‘dominate interactions within a setting that 
symbolises, reinforces and limits their relationship with clients’ (Lipsky, 
1980: 117).  They have the power to cause users inconvenience, neglect 
and personal abuse without incurring retaliation from users.  Users will 
always be blamed for refusing to continue interacting with street-level 
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bureaucracies (1980: 56).  Lipsky argues that the only costs that users can 
impose are non-compliance and anger, which can be sanctioned by 
workers.  The only limited strategies that Lispky identifies are for users to 
act in ways that will ingratiate them with the worker.  Lipsky argues that 
users are also isolated from one another and therefore have little 
knowledge about other people in the same situation.  This predisposes 
them to think of themselves as being responsible for the situation they are 
in and makes them less likely to look for explanations rooted in the wider 
social structure (1980: 118).   
 
Contact with welfare bureaucracies can therefore be a very significant 
experience for individuals.  Prottas argues that ‘for the applicant the 
interview with the worker is a rare occurrence and frequently an emotional 
one’ (1979:  20).  There is also evidence that users react differently when 
they are confronted with the experience and processes of becoming a 
user and that generally they have a weaker range of tactics than staff, with 
which to respond (Hill, 1997).  In his study of unemployed benefit 
claimants in Northern Ireland, Howe (1990) identified  two different 
responses to bureaucratic processing.  One group of users were  
‘reluctant’ to claim benefit and were compliant in an attempt to prove that 
they were deserving, choosing to avoid disrupting the routine of being 
processed by not asking questions that they wanted answered and not 
claiming for benefits they were entitled to.  Howe describes the second 
type of user as ‘assertive’ because they did not accept a deligitimised user 
status.  Whilst maintaining respect for authority and being generally 
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compliant with the bureaucratic process, these users attempted to assert 
their rights to gain access to what they were entitled to.  A clear picture 
emerges from Howe’s ethnographic study of users as active social actors, 
some having greater access to power resources than others, making them 
more or less able  ‘to negotiate more favourable results with officials 
(Hasenfeld, 1985:  625).  In this thesis, I intend to further this approach by 
considering the ways in which users are active in their interaction with 
front-line staff.  Users, like workers, can break rules and employ strategies 
in interaction. 
 
Users and policy making 
Having established that users are involved in the implementation process 
through the accomplishment and negotiation of policy, it is important now 
to consider two further areas of literature that have explored users’ roles in 
the policy process.  The first distinct body of writing examines service 
users’ involvement in policy making, whilst the second section is 
concerned with the concept of ‘co-production’.  
 
User  participation 
One of the main ways that users’ contributions to the policy process have 
been noticed is through the pressure exerted by user groups or 
campaigning organisations who operate of their own accord or on behalf 
of those affected by social policy.   The roots of user participation in public 
policy development can be found in community development initiatives in 
land use planning in the 1960s, when  a legal requirement was made for 
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the public to participate in planning (Beresford & Croft, 1992).  In the UK, 
interest in user participation in public policy has boomed, encouraged by 
those with political power who have emphasised individual choice and 
consumer-style rights (for instance through a series of Citizens’ Charters) 
and fuelled by the emergence and proliferation of user movements making 
demands for change in policy and practice in the fields of health, welfare 
and social care (Beresford & Turner, 1997, Beresford, 2002). 
Beresford (2002) identifies two distinct models of user involvement:  
consumerist and democratic.  He argues that the consumerist model has 
developed in relation to the mixed economy of welfare and new 
managerialism advanced by the New Right and sustained under New 
Labour.  Consumerist methods of participation retain the role of providers 
in controlling the policy agenda and delivery arrangements (including 
decisions about whether or not to seek user involvement and what to do 
with the results of it).  Techniques for user involvement are akin to market 
testing of welfare products.  The democratic model presents an alternative 
way of viewing user participation. It is this form of user involvement that is 
campaigned for by user movements of various sorts, including disabled 
people and users of social care services (Campbell, 1996, Oliver, 1996).  
The democratic model advocates political action explicitly targeted at 
bringing about change by influencing those who design and deliver policy.  
The concern is ‘with people having more say in agencies, organisations 
and institutions which impact upon them and being able to exert more 
control over their own lives’ as ‘part of broader political and social 
philosophies which prioritise people’s inclusion, autonomy, and 
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independence, and the achievement of their human and civil rights’ 
(Beresford, 2002:  97).  The ultimate goal of democratic user involvement 
is the development of user-led and user-controlled services. 
The user participation literature is important for this thesis because it 
provides very strong evidence that service users are actively engaged in 
the policy process.  Conflict exists between those who receive services 
and those who design and deliver them, because social policies do not 
always meet the needs and wants of those they are designed for.  These 
conflicts and tensions are played out by some actors within the formal 
political arena (calls for user-led services being the best example of this), 
but most importantly for this study, they are also made manifest in the 
face-to-face interaction between service users and staff, who represent 
the state to the citizens who confront them.   One particular issue for this 
study is the way that policies are contested, resisted and accomplished in 
the sites where policy happens.    
 
Co-producing Policy 
Co-production is a similar concept to user participation in that it recognises 
the potential for service recipients to be more actively involved in setting 
policy agendas and delivering services. The notion of ‘co-production’ has 
been developed by authors in the USA (Curtis et al., 1991, Pammer, 1992, 
Parks et al., 1981, Sharp, 1980, Warren, 1987, Whitaker, 1980, Wirth, 
1991) and  applied more recently to social service delivery in Europe (e.g. 
Hupe, 1993). The term ‘co-production’ was originally coined by Whitaker 
(1980) to mean an alternative model of service delivery, within which 
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citizens and government workers should have a ‘conjoint responsibility’ 
(Sharp, 1980:  105) for creating and delivering public services. These 
authors contrast their preferred co-production model with the dominant 
method of public service administration, which sees officials as having the 
sole responsibility to provide services that are then consumed by the 
public.  Whitaker, and those who have followed a similar train of thought, 
present co-production as a solution to some of the problems of policy 
implementation.  Within their prescription is the recommendation that 
citizens should actively contribute towards service delivery.   
 
The problem with this conception of co-production is that it glosses over 
the dynamics of official-user relationships and downplays the different 
purposes to which public policy might be put.  The proposed version of 
citizen participation is based on the good will of those at the receiving end 
of services, who would be required to extend their compliance even further 
to make efforts to contribute to an unspecified ‘public good’ (Curtis et al., 
1991: 645).  Government officials and users are assumed to have shared 
goals that can be better achieved through joint working.  In this way, the 
vision of a policy solution is divorced from the realities of implementation 
and the power dynamics of the official-user relationship. The value of the 
argument is that it takes a step towards recognising that services are not 
merely produced separately by government officials and delivered to users 
as a ‘finished product’ (Whitaker, 1980:  240).   
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I propose to explore the concept of ‘co-production’ later in this thesis in a 
different and less ambitious way, without the connotations of a preferred 
delivery model. The intention is to identify instances where users negotiate 
actively with staff to secure different policy outcomes to those that were 
intended by the written version of policy.  In this way the term can be used 
to encompass a social process of negotiation that is related to the notion 
of accomplishment (explored above).  Kingfisher (1998: 127) has written of 
‘co-production’ in a similar sense, although she considers the co-
production of policy as a social process that happens jointly between co-
workers and does not include the influence of the users themselves. 
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, the processes of policy making and policy implementation 
have been outlined, arguing that policy making takes place beyond the 
realm of policy design.  The policy process involves a wide range of social 
actors.  At every stage in the process policy is negotiated and 
accomplished through interaction.  At street-level, front-line workers are 
active in reinterpreting and modifying policy as they implement it.  Policy is 
made as it is implemented and is therefore  filtered through the work 
habits of front-line staff. The bureau-professionals of contemporary welfare 
organisations exercise discretion (formally and informally) in their 
decisions about users.  These street-level bureaucrats follow 
organisational rules, but also break them and invent their own ‘routines 
and simplifications’ for making their jobs more manageable.  One 
application of discretion is in categorising users as they are processed.  
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This categorisation is also put into practice in a more directive sense to 
change user attitudes and behaviour or persuade users to take particular 
courses of action.  Categorisation can be used to ration services, both in a 
formal and in an informal sense. 
 
These processes are significant because they have important 
consequences for users, operating to structure the opportunities, benefits 
and sanctions available to individuals.  Exploring the social processes by 
which policy is accomplished and negotiated between street-level staff and 
users can illuminate the policy process.  It is important to acknowledge the 
ways in which users’ perspectives can be incorporated into the analysis of 
implementation, rather than viewing policy delivery as a unilateral activity 
firmly within the domain of the civil servant. In particular, users can be 
identified as active agents who contribute to policy making and policy 
implementation through their compliance, acquiescence and, albeit limited, 
expressions of resistance.   
 
In this thesis, I will apply and develop these ideas to better understand 
both staff and user perspectives of the implementation of unemployment 
policy in a UK Jobcentre, giving equal weight to both viewpoints.   In a 
case study of one local office, the contemporary staff-user relationship will 
be explored.  This will facilitate an analysis the role of front-line staff in the 
implementation of policy, to consider the interaction between staff and 
users in the accomplishment of policy, to understand the meanings that 
receiving policy has for users, to explore the implications of the 
 47
implementation process for users and to acknowledge their role in the 
accomplishment of policy. 
 
The following chapter outlines the policy context in which this research 
was conducted.  This context is very different from the conditions in which 
the notion of street-level bureaucracy was invented and developed, which 
was primarily 1970s USA.  The intention is to explore the accomplishment 
of policy at street-level in the context of new managerialism in the late 
1990s in the UK. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The Policy Context:   
UK unemployment policy and the role of the Jobcentre 
 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of the policy context 
within which staff-user interaction is played out (post-fieldwork policy 
developments will be considered in the concluding chapter).  The historical 
development of the formal functions of the Jobcentre will be mapped out, 
plotting the changes in past and present roles.  Trends in benefits for the 
unemployed will then be examined, showing the move towards more 
active labour market policies.  A number of major changes will be 
highlighted in order to demonstrate the provenance of the present 
character of the staff-user relationship.  Changes and developments in the 
institutional organisation of employment services and the administration 
and delivery of services to the unemployed have taken place in varying 
economic conditions and have been influenced by social, political and 
ideological forces (c.f. Whiteside, 1995:  68).  This has impacted upon the 
way that front-line staff do their jobs and the way that users receive benefit 
and assistance in finding work.  
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The History and Development of the Jobcentre – Past and 
Present Roles 
The history of the Jobcentre can be traced back to the various private, 
charitable and quasi-public labour bureaux that operated in the late 
Nineteenth Century.  It was around this time that unemployment was 
specifically named as such and began to attract government intervention 
(Burnett, 1994).  In the early Twentieth Century permissive legislation 
allowed local authorities to set up labour exchanges and unemployment 
registers.  These existing agencies were then brought under central 
government control in 1909 when the Labour Exchanges Act was passed, 
which also empowered the Board of Trade to develop a National 
Exchange system (Showler, 1976:  21).  In the very early stages, the 
exchanges operated without any role in the provision of public relief, 
concentrating firmly on vacancy placements. From the outset there was 
disagreement and uncertainty over the objectives of the exchanges, 
particularly in relation to whether registration of the unemployed should be 
voluntary or compulsory. The eventual outcome was that the exchanges 
would be staffed by civil servants, rather than industrialists, and would go 
hand-in-hand with the unemployment insurance scheme, when it was 
enacted in 1911.  The dual role of policing benefits (through the 
application of work tests) and enabling the unemployed to find work was 
therefore cemented in with the bricks.  However, it was envisaged that 
exchanges would deal first and foremost with employment and ‘work 
people’ (Price, 2001:  2), rather than unemployment and the unemployed.  
The intended purpose was to facilitate the flow of labour, serving 
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employers as much as those looking for work.  In the original scheme 
there was no compulsion for the unemployed to register with exchanges 
(Thane, 1982:  93).  
 
By the time war broke out in 1914, there were 423 exchanges in the UK, 
dealing with more than two million workers a year (Thane, 1982: 93). In 
1916, the Ministry of Labour replaced the Labour Department of the Board 
of Trade and labour exchanges were renamed as employment exchanges 
(Showler, 1976: 22).  This came in response to wartime labour shortages 
and served to increase and direct the labour supply of men and women.  
The depression of the inter-war years and the different policy objectives 
pursued by the Conservative and Labour governments of the time 
increased the workload for exchange staff and had a detrimental effect on 
the capacity for job placing (Showler, 1976: 23, Garside, 1990).  The 
system was criticised in the 1930s for failing to provide sufficient vacancies 
and for an over-reliance on temporary staff (criticisms again levelled at 
Jobcentres in the late 1990s (c.f. Finn et al., 1998).  The Royal 
Commission on Unemployment Insurance (1931-2) recommended that 
there should be a separation of the job matching and benefit 
administration roles conducted by officials within the exchanges.  This 
recommendation was not implemented at the time, the minds of policy-
makers instead being focused firmly on the crisis of the insurance funds, 
which were on the verge of collapse because they had been over-
stretched by both the high number and long duration of claims that had 
been unanticipated when the scheme was designed (Showler, 1976, 
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Whiteside, 1991, Fraser, 1984).  At this time, exchanges became 
associated primarily with the administration of relief as ‘the place to sign 
on for dole payments rather than a place to find work’ (Aldrich et al., 2000:  
92) – a reputation that proved hard to shake off in the following decades.  
 
The very high levels of unemployment were only brought under control 
when  World War II was underway.  The exchanges were once again 
requisitioned for the purposes of military mobilisation and to increase the 
supply of labour at home to bolster the war effort.  Emergency powers in 
1939 and 1940 greatly increased the jurisdiction (and the workload) of 
exchange staff, who were involved not only in the administration of military 
labour, but also the regulation of civilian employment and recruitment.  
This all came without the expected resources, resulting in problems of 
understaffing and the physical deterioration of buildings (Aldrich et al., 
2000: 93).  Compulsory registration was extended to those in employment, 
including some groups of women.  Many women were expected to 
contribute to Auxiliary Services or engage in national service and schemes 
were established to encourage those with disabilities to participate in 
training with a view to reintegration into the labour market (Price, 2000).  
Once again, there were calls for a public system of job matching to 
operate unencumbered by benefit administration activities. 
 
The Control of Engagements Order 1945 allowed exchange services to 
continue to be focused on the control of labour for the national interest in 
peacetime (Showler, 1976: 24).  For a short period after the war, 
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exchange staff could transfer military staff into civilian jobs, a task made 
easier by the compulsory notification of vacancies (which continued until 
1956) and the requirement for employers to recruit only through exchange 
offices.  The Employment and Training Act 1948 then superseded the 
Labour Exchanges Act 1909, although there was no significant shift in 
what employment exchanges were intended to do beyond the extension of 
the training function.  Discussions of post-war reconstruction had included 
proposals to split assistance offices and national insurance offices.  The 
outcome was that formal responsibility for unemployment insurance and 
assistance was passed on to the Ministry of National Insurance, but in 
practice the exchanges maintained their dual role (Price, 2000). The reach 
of government was reinforced further with the commitment to full 
employment and an adherence to the principles of Keynesian demand 
management.  The Public Employment Service (PES) was afforded a lead 
role in providing information about vacancies. 
 
By the 1960s, however, the job matching function of the PES was starting 
on a downward track and only around 15 per cent of the registered 
unemployed found jobs through the exchanges (Finn & Taylor, 1990: 9).  
Funding cuts affected the specialist services first – Professional and 
Executive Register offices were reduced, the Technical and Scientific 
Register was closed and the Nursing Appointments Service ceased to be 
a separate service (Showler, 1976:  26).  This contraction of vacancy 
services pushed the PES harder in the direction of providing 
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predominantly for the unemployed, making the service more residual and 
less well respected by those looking for work and employers. 
  
In 1966, there were several developments.  The Adult Occupational 
Guidance Service was set up to provide careers advice to adults in a 
similar way to the Youth Employment Service for young people, which was 
already well established.  Some exchange offices were moved from back 
street offices into town centre sites. Area managers were introduced and 
new posts were created to develop links with local employers.  Exchange 
staff were given more in-depth training about the local labour market and 
the PES was expanded further.  These measures were intended to 
enhance the vacancy function of the exchanges over benefit 
administration, but failed to transform the service (Showler, 1976: 27-28).   
 
In fact the OECD review of UK manpower (sic), published in 1970, was 
highly critical of the UK employment service, judging exchanges to be too 
devoted to benefit administration at the expense of vacancy placement 
(techniques for which were thought to be underdeveloped, dealing 
disproportionately with vacancies at the unskilled end of the market) 
(Showler, 1976:  30).   In the light of this, the PES underwent a 
fundamental restructuring to become the Employment Services Agency, a 
relatively autonomous organisation, which was to operate alongside the 
Training Services Agencies under the auspices of the new national 
Manpower Services Commission (Department of Employment, 1972a and 
b).   
 54 
 
 This time a radical modernisation programme was embarked upon, a 
fundamental part of which was the splitting of the administration of 
unemployment benefit from the main employment service, which was 
intended to break with the dole queue image of the past (DfE, 1972).  The 
PES became a more specialist service dealing with a wider range of 
vacancies for job seekers in and out of work, returning to the original aim 
of the exchange system (ESA/MSC, 1974).  Organisationally, this meant 
employment exchanges were divided into Jobcentres, designed to provide 
advice, information and guidance, and Unemployment Benefit Offices 
(UBOs), to deal with benefit claims - a task made less labour intensive with 
the introduction of postal payments and the use of computerised 
payments.  State-of-the-art Jobcentres (the first opened in Reading in 
1973) were to be situated in prime sites with self-service vacancy displays, 
whereas UBOs retained their back street image.  The two functions of 
enabling people to find work and policing benefit claims therefore became 
strictly demarcated, especially since the staff for UBOs and Jobcentres 
were recruited and trained separately. The new Jobcentres were also to 
be governed using fresh management methods (Showler, 1976:  38).  To 
this end a set of performance objectives and targets were set in 1973, 
designed to provide incentives to increase the number of vacancies, 
placings and training applications (Price, 2000:  165).  General services 
were to be supplemented by more specialist services for people with 
disabilities, young people, older workers, the long-term unemployed and 
professional and executive workers (Professional and Exectutive 
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Recruitment services became a separate agency for which employers had 
to pay fees, the idea being that it would eventually become self-sufficient).  
The whole programme sought to deal with labour market restructuring in 
anticipation of future demand, rather than just targeting the unemployed 
(Whiteside, 1995).  
 
Just as Jobcentres began to become established in the mid 1970s, 
international economic events combined with the problems of a declining 
manufacturing base to produce a potent mix (Lowe, 1999).  The reaction 
produced unemployment that was set to grow on an unprecedented scale.  
Despite these challenging conditions, the competitive new Jobcentres still 
managed to secure a much larger proportion of the vacancy market – so 
much so that the Federation of Personnel Agencies began to see 
Jobcentres as a threat (Price, 2000). By the late 1970s, Jobcentres were 
hailed as a great success, although the gains made by the most 
disadvantaged users have been questioned (Showler, 1976: 34).   
 
During the 1970s, full employment was abandoned as a policy objective, 
and was increasingly replaced by the goal of controlling inflation as 
monetarism became accepted as the new economic orthodoxy (Whiteside, 
1995: 52).  Unemployment doubled in 1979 and tipped over the three 
million mark by 1985.  The strained relationship between the objectives of 
ensuring a supply of labour to employers and providing assistance to the 
unemployed surfaced again.  The MSC reported that: 
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. . . for many job seekers, especially the least skilled, the 
individual help that can be given is strictly limited so long as 
unemployment remains high.  In many circumstances it is 
more productive for the Jobcentre to devote effort to securing 
more vacancies than to increasing advisory work (MSC, 
1979: 29, cited in Finn & Taylor, 1990:  10). 
 
There were difficulties, however, because contrary to its original aim the 
MSC came to deal with unemployment crises in a temporary manner, 
rather than providing a general solution to labour market problems.  The 
MSC reverted to a residual role and the Jobcentres fell foul of the same 
fate as the labour exchanges had before them.  Their influence on 
placement was lost and Jobcentres came to be the source of mainly low 
paid jobs that employers could not otherwise fill (Whiteside, 1995: 66).  
The Conservatives paraded training schemes as the solution, their other 
main strategy for dealing with mass unemployment being to ‘massage the 
unemployment count’ (Finn, 2001:  74). 
 
In 1987, policy was reversed as the Employment Service was formed to 
amalgamate the activities of the Jobcentre and the former Unemployment 
Benefit Service (Fletcher, 1997). Staff were once again expected to 
combine assisting people to find work with policing benefit claims 
(Fletcher, 1997, Finn & Taylor, 1990).  Costly prime sites for Jobcentre 
offices were no longer felt necessary.  In 1988 the MSC was abolished, 
the Professional and Executive Recruitment Service was fully privatised 
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and the delivery of training provision was also transferred out of state 
control through Training and Enterprise Councils in England and Wales 
and Local Enterprise Companies in Scotland. Following a large expansion 
of private employment services in the 1980s, it was decided to freeze the 
ES share of the vacancy market. The role of the public employment 
service has remained complementary to other forms of job placement, 
rather then competitive with them, ever since.  
 
The Employment Service was given Executive Agency status in 1990.  As 
one of the largest semi-autonomous ‘Next Steps’ agencies (see HMSO, 
1989), the ES led the way in applying business principles to public service 
(Horton & Jones, 1996) and ‘disrupting traditional civil service practices 
and values’ (Foster & Hoggett, 1999: 20).  These traditional principles and 
practices of civil service bureaucratic administration had been highly 
praised, particularly during the post-war period,  for efficiency, rationality, 
fairness and impartiality (see previous chapter). Much had changed 
internally within the civil service, including a ‘white blouse revolution’ 
(Anderson, 1989, Savage & Witz, 1992), involving the feminisation of low 
grade, poorly paid, routine clerical work.  More generally, the value of 
bureaucracy as a mode of service delivery had been undermined by a 
range of critiques from across the political spectrum including neo-
Marxists, feminists, anti-racists, the poverty lobby and most influential of all 
– the neo-liberals.  Bureaucracy was reinterpreted by the Conservative 
governments (1979-1997) as inefficient, wasteful and outdated.  The ‘crisis 
of welfare’ was therefore also ‘a crisis of the organisational regime’ 
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because centralised state bureaucracy was ‘an institutional articulation of 
social democracy’ (Clarke & Newman, 1997:  17).  Within the new social, 
economic, political and ideological settlement, the vogue was for 
managers and business values (of the particular sort advocated in the 
excellence literature, see e.g. Peters, 1987, 1993), whose status and 
legitimacy was lifted above both bureaucrats and professionals (Butcher, 
1995, Clarke & Newman, 1997, Flynn, 1993).  According to Clarke & 
Newman (1997), the ‘managerial state’ was born during the 1980s and 
1990s.   
 
New managerialism (Clarke & Newman, 1997) has impacted upon the 
Employment Service in a range of ways, in terms of both rhetoric and 
reality (see Keen & Scase, 1998, for comparison with local government).  
During the late 1980s and 1990s the ES came under continuing pressure 
to reduce its operating costs and obtain better ‘value for money’, 
consequently a tier of management was removed (Fletcher, 1997).  
Market testing, contracting out and cost reviews were among the 
techniques introduced to help secure efficiency savings.  It has been 
argued that these reforms have created a blurring between public and 
private spheres (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994), in which power has been 
dispersed - meaning the ‘simultaneous shrinking of the state and the 
enlargement of its reach into civil society (through its engagement of non-
state agents)’ (Clarke & Newman, 1997:  29).  When applied to the 
Employment Service this has meant ‘the delivery of employment and 
training services [are] being dismantled’ (Finn, 2001:  77).  There is a 
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danger that low priority user groups, particularly the hardest to place, will 
become subject to service provision that is distanced from the 
accountability of democratically elected government.  According to Tonge: 
 
The long-term unemployed may represent ‘problem’ clients.  
The state’s willingness to ‘hive-off’ responsibility for training 
the unemployed to the private sector has amounted to a 
quasi-privatisation (Tonge, 1999:  226). 
 
New managerialism also extended the role of annual performance targets, 
which became more specific, being set at national, local and even section 
level (Finn & Taylor, 1990).  Pollitt argues that such incentive based 
management techniques represent a shift towards ‘a neo-Taylorist 
management process’ (1993:  56), the workers being ‘a new generation of 
front-line employment advisers who have the task of turning abstract 
incentives and opportunities into real day-to-day choices’ (Finn, 2001: 77).  
Horton & Jones argue that for staff this has meant increases in ‘insecurity 
of employment, redundancy, job intensification and worsening terms and 
conditions’ (1996:  34, also see Heery & Salmon, 2000, Foster & Hoggett, 
1999, Gagnon, 1996, du Gay & Salaman, 1992, McIntosh & Broderick, 
1996).  There is greater reliance on casual workers, employed on very 
short temporary contracts, with little training, low status and poor pay.  
Such developments can threaten the core values of service delivery.  
Those officials who have most face-to-face contact with users are no 
longer guaranteed the staples that previous generations of bureau-
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professionals took for granted, for instance in-depth training, expertise, 
salary and security of contract.  It is possible to infer that under such 
working conditions, front-line employees as well as managers might be 
less committed to the public service ideal (c.f. Keen & Scase, 1998, 
McIntosh & Broderick, 1996).  Hill argues that these sorts of adjustments 
in the structure of the delivery of services can transform the policies 
themselves since ‘the rules of the game may change the outcome of the 
game’ (1997:  136). 
 
These outcomes are felt by those who use public services.  It is not only 
the rules of the game that are repositioned, but also the relationship 
between user and official, and consequently between citizen and state.  
New managerialism realigns these relationships and reconstructs the 
public, citizens and users as consumers (Clarke & Newman, 1997). Clarke 
& Newman identify three contrasting representations of citizens within new 
managerialist discourse: 
 
While the citizen as taxpayer (and ratepayer) was being 
subjected to excessive levels of taxation to pay for the 
welfare state, and the citizen as consumer was being denied 
effective choice in service provision, the other citizen – the 
one dependent of welfare services and benefits – was being 
demonised as a ‘scrounger’, using public handouts to avoid 
responsibility (1997:  14). 
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Business principles are said to offer customers more choice and the 
unemployed are provided with a Jobseeker’s Allowance Charter to 
guarantee certain levels of service delivery.  But the newly modelled 
pseudo-customer is not and cannot be a customer in the purest sense.  
Customers of unemployment benefits are not voluntary (Lipsky, 1980, see 
previous chapter) because they depend on the essential services and 
benefits provided by the state (either directly or in a contracted out form) to 
meet their basic needs.  In the case of the long-term unemployed, social 
assistance is paid by the state as a matter of last resort.  There are 
therefore very few alternatives, if any exist at all.  In such circumstances 
the only choice is to take or leave whatever is offered.  Furthermore, 
reforms have not been customer led or customer focused, explicit cost-
cutting has instead formed the rationalisation.  If ‘users’ are represented in 
the formal policy arena as ‘customers’ then the logical progression would 
be for needs to become translated into preferences and rights dissolved 
down into a residue of choices.  Powerful discourses of managerialism 
push consumerism forward to stand in direct conflict with notions of 
entitlement (either earned, in the case of insurance-based unemployment 
benefit or needed, in the case of assistance-based income maintenance).  
In this study, these developments will be examined critically to determine 
the impact of the new language of the customer on the implementation of 
policy (through the management imperative for front-line staff to deliver 
customer service) and the way that users think about the service they 
receive. 
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Current role of the Jobcentre1
The tension between enabling people (whether unemployed or employed) 
to find work and policing benefits has persisted throughout the Twentieth 
Century.  In 1998, the Employment Service Annual Performance 
Agreement stated that the aim of the ES was: 
 
To contribute to high levels of employment and growth, and 
to individuals leading rewarding working lives, by helping all 
people without a job to find work and employers to fill their 
vacancies (Employment Service, 1998: 1).   
 
This aim was to be fulfilled through six objectives and their respective 
targets: 
 
• To help people into work by providing appropriate 
advice, guidance, training and support either directly 
or in partnership with others. 
• To concentrate efforts on helping people improve 
their employability and move from welfare to work 
particularly if they have already spent long periods 
without a job. 
• To involve people with disabilities in the world of work 
by helping them to find and retain jobs and 
                                            
1 Current at the time when the fieldwork was conducted in 1998.  See Chapter Nine for 
more recent policy developments, including the replacement of Jobcentres by new 
Jobcentre Plus offices. 
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encouraging employers to open more opportunities to 
them. 
• To set out clearly the rights and responsibilities of 
people who claim Jobseeker's Allowance and ensure 
that throughout the period of their claim these rights 
and responsibilities are fulfilled. 
• To provide a courteous and professional customer 
service to all jobseekers. 
• To deliver these services cost effectively.  
(Employment Service, 1998: 2-3) 
 
The formally stated goals of the Employment Service therefore emphasise 
the function of assisting people to find work, with benefit administration 
appearing as secondary.  It is evident, however, that this unhappy 
marriage has continued to be problematic, not least of all because of the 
increasingly disciplinary spirit that unemployment policies have adopted in 
recent years.  The following section outlines the trends in benefits for the 
unemployed and identifies potential pressures that this might create for 
those delivering policy at street-level. 
 
Trends in Benefits for the Unemployed – Towards Active Labour 
Market Policies 
Developments in benefit administration have run parallel to changes in the 
role of the public employment service.  The present system can be most 
meaningfully related to the system of income maintenance established as 
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part of the post-war settlement, although it is acknowledged that the 
reforms had much in common with their peacetime predecessors.  The 
National Insurance Act 1946 was the centrepiece of the new social 
security system.  It created a flat-rate benefit for the short-term 
unemployed, based on the contributory principle of individual earned 
entitlement.  Although Beveridge intended benefit levels to cover basic 
necessities, the value of payments was never derived from calculations of 
the minimum costs of living (Brown, 1990:  30).  Unemployment Benefit 
has therefore never provided even for the most basic level of subsistence, 
having been considered as one of the most austere of the post-war 
reforms (Tomlinson, 1998:  74).  The National Assistance Act 1948 
created a complementary safety net for those who had exhausted their 
National Insurance (NI) contributions or had insufficient to qualify.  
However, the door to social assistance has always been guarded by a 
fierce means test.  It was only those fortunate enough to have accrued a 
full quota of NI contributions who could go down the Unemployment 
Benefit route, even then the means test could only be avoided if there was 
no need to claim for dependants’ allowances.  The resulting  magnitude of 
means-testing rendered the formal distinction between insurance and 
assistance benefits largely academic (Brown, 1990).   
 
Questions over entitlement criteria and the rates of benefit have continued 
since the scheme was established.  The only major modification between 
1946 and the 1980s was the introduction of the earnings-related 
supplement and earnings-related contributions in 1966, which increased 
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the value of benefits for some workers (Ogus & Wikeley, 1995:  67).  In the 
1970s, there were no major changes to entitlements to unemployment 
related benefits, but an ‘alphabet soup of programmes’ was generated 
(Sinfield, 1981:  98).  The prevailing neo-liberal ideology of the 
Conservative era (1979-1997) brought these issues into sharper focus and 
along with economic factors (for instance the conditions to cut public 
expenditure imposed by the IMF after bailing Britain out in the 1970s) 
created a powerful force for change (Glennerster, 2000).  Reviews were 
conducted of both assistance and insurance based benefits and pressure 
to reform the system built with the rocketing levels of unemployment in the 
1980s.   
 
Access to benefits for the unemployed was tightened and the ‘availability 
for work’ rule was imposed more rigorously.  In 1982 (under the Social 
Security Act 1980) earnings-related additions to unemployment benefit 
were abolished, meaning that benefits were paid at a flat rate, while 
contributions were graduated.  The value of benefits was also reduced 
because unemployment benefit was made taxable (Robertson, 1986).  
This, combined with the legacy for year-on-year devaluation of benefits 
because of price-indexing, led to a slow decline in the value of benefits in 
relation to standards of living (Clasen, 1994, Hills, 1997:45).  
 
Young people as a group were particularly disadvantaged by changes to 
social security in the 1980s.  Virtually all 16 and 17 year olds were 
disqualified from claiming benefits.  They were barred from claiming 
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Income Support unless they could prove that they were experiencing 
‘severe hardship’.  In effect 16 and 17 year olds were also prohibited from 
the Unemployment Benefit scheme because of the increase in the number 
of NI contributions required (previously one year’s worth of contributions 
earned benefit entitlement but this was increased to two years of 
contributions by the 1988 legislation).  Adults between the ages of 18 and 
24 were also discriminated against, having their rates of Income Support 
reduced to a lower rate.  The publicly provided security net was therefore 
pulled out from under the feet of the young, causing serious and long-
lasting effects (Jones & Novak, 1999).  
 
In the late 1980s, the Stricter Benefit Regime was enforced to create 
further savings (Blackmore, 2001).  Staff were directed to use the existing 
framework of legislation in a more disciplinary way and new measures 
were introduced to police Unemployment Benefit claimants.  In 1989, the 
requirement for claimants to prove that they were ‘actively seeking work’ 
added to this pressure.  Access to benefits was therefore becoming tighter 
and more conditional upon availability to work and job seeking activity, 
whilst the value of benefits continued its gradual decline (see above).  For 
ES staff: 
 
these developments reinforced the perception that the 
primary role of the ES was to reinforce and police the 
jobseeking activities of the unemployed and to encourage 
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and increasingly require them to take the low paid jobs being 
generated in a deregulated labour market (Finn, 1998:  109). 
 
Active Labour Market Policies 
The first birth pangs of workfare developed alongside these changes in 
benefit administration.  In 1986 Restart interviews were introduced, 
meaning that unemployed people had to attend special interviews every 
six months to reassess their benefit claim, retest their eligibility and be 
referred to participate in a range of compulsory programmes.  These same 
trends continued into the 1990s, when UK governments began to make 
more of a concerted effort to pursue the types of active labour market 
policies that secured international acclaim long ago (c.f. Clasen, 2000, 
Lødemel & Trickey, 2001, Sarfati & Bonoli, 2002).   
 
The UK has borrowed most heavily from the USA form of ‘work first’ 
workfare programmes, but has also learned a great deal from Australia 
(Theodore & Peck, 1999).  European member states have more recently 
turned to different forms of active labour market policy as the solution to 
unemployment.  This has been no accident.  Active labour market policies 
have been enthusiastically promoted and defined by supra-national bodies 
like the European Union, OECD and World Bank (Clasen et al., 2001:  43), 
despite the over-simplistic assumption that they provide an alternative to 
‘passive’ income maintenance2 (Sinfield, 2001). 
                                            
2 There has been an international clamour to present ‘active’ labour market policies, but 
these remain wrapped up together in an ill-defined bunch, the language of their 
presentation justifying their existence and value.  In their shadow, ‘passive’ policies are 
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 Two main developments along this line have occurred in the UK since the 
mid 1990s. The first step, in 1996, was the change from Unemployment 
Benefit, an insurance based benefit payable for one year (after which 
users could apply for social assistance in the form of Income Support), to 
Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA).  JSA is peculiar in that it has two forms.  
Contributions-Based Jobseeker's Allowance is the equivalent of the old 
Unemployment Benefit but is only available for a maximum of 26 weeks. 
Income-Based Jobseeker's Allowance is a means-tested benefit available 
for an unlimited period, replacing Income Support for the unemployed.  By 
1995, more than three quarters of unemployed claimants were already 
having to claim means-tested benefits in addition to their insurance-based 
Unemployment Benefit (Erskine, 1997).  The conversion to Jobseeker's 
Allowance ensured that means-testing was rolled out further and that the 
insurance principle continued to be undermined. In this respect the UK is 
distinct from other northern European countries, where much higher 
proportions of unemployed people receive insurance-based benefit (Kvist, 
2001:  205).  Benefit rates were brought in line with the old Income 
Support levels, meaning that young people aged 18-24 with full 
contributions records lost out and 16 and 17 year olds were formally 
excluded from claiming benefit as unemployed (although Severe Hardship 
payments continued). 
                                                                                                                       
rendered useless, or at least undesirable.  Sinfield (2001) argues that the lack of 
systematic analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each type of policy allows 
this false distinction to continue unchecked.  By ignoring the wealth of evidence that 
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 The introduction of JSA also brought with it significant changes in the way 
in which benefit for the unemployed was administered. For the first time, 
users were required to sign a contract, a Jobseeker's Agreement, stating 
the precise steps to be taken to secure employment. ES staff were 
afforded greater discretionary power to compel Jobseeker's Allowance 
claimants to take specific action to enhance their job search activity by 
issuing Jobseeker Directions, for instance to dictate how unemployed 
people should dress for interviews, how they should style their hair or how 
they should behave in their dealings with prospective employers.  
Fortnightly re-registering for benefit, more informally known as ‘signing on’, 
became more ‘active’ and requirements were introduced for users to log 
their efforts to find work on a ‘Looking for Work’ form, to be presented for 
inspection at every Jobcentre interview.  Claiming benefit therefore 
became more closely linked to actively seeking work conditions, which 
were enforced with tougher benefit sanctions.  Benefit administration 
became more disciplinary.  Some view this as perverse extension of the 
policing role aimed at punishing the poor (Novak, 1997, Jones & Novak, 
1999).  For Jobcentre staff it created even greater tensions in balancing 
policing and enabling roles (Fletcher, 1997). 
 
Jobseeker's Allowance was followed in 1998 by the New Deal, Britain’s 
welfare-to-work scheme.  This time it was New Labour who were at the 
helm of active labour market policies.  Despite their supposed ‘post-
                                                                                                                       
points to the negative experience and poverty in unemployment, policies continue to be 
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ideological’ Third Way position, the direction of policy change followed the 
co-ordinates set by the previous Conservative governments.  In power 
New Labour embraced the Jobseeker's Allowance regime that they had 
made such vitriolic condemnation of in opposition.  The comparatively 
well-funded and much hyped New Deal programme was less innovatory 
than it first seemed (Tonge, 1999).   
 
With the introduction of the New Deal, it was young unemployed people 
who once again bore the brunt of the reforms.  18-24 year olds who had 
been unemployed for six months or more were first to be compelled to 
participate in the programme, which was financed from the revenue of a 
windfall tax on the privatised utilities.  These users are required to attend a 
series of Gateway interviews, during a period of up to four months.  Young 
people must then accept one of four options: a job (for which an 
employer’s subsidy may be available), training, a work placement in the 
voluntary sector or an Environmental Taskforce placement. However, it 
was realised quite early on that not all regions would be able to offer all 
four options and that young people might be required to attend options 
other than their preferred one (DfEE, 1997).  Despite this, the refusal to 
co-operate is to result in the application of a special New Deal sanction, 
meaning that benefit is withdrawn entirely for between two and four weeks.  
In the Chancellor’s words: ‘there is no fifth option’ (Gordon Brown, quoted 
on BBC News, 1998). 
 
                                                                                                                       
designed in ways that further disadvantage those who are subject to them. 
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It is this extension of compulsion that has increased the existing tension 
between enabling and policing clients.  The new Personal Advisers (PAs) 
must balance the contradiction of providing user-centred interviews, aimed 
at providing positive advice, guidance, support and solutions that are 
tailored to the individual unemployed person’s needs, whilst 
simultaneously threatening the toughest benefit sanctions to date. After 
discussing a young person’s employment aspirations, PAs can still offer 
little more than possible access to the lower end of the flexible labour 
market (Tonge, 1999).  
 
The New Deal also exists in various mutated forms for other user groups 
(see Millar, 2000 for further detail), which is significant because it 
represents a broadening of scope in active labour market policies, much 
beyond anything conceived of by the previous Conservative governments.  
Since June 1998, it has been compulsory for claimants who are aged 25 
and over and have been unemployed for more than two years to 
participate in the New Deal. Less is offered to this group, who are usually 
denied the Gateway period of advisory interviews.  There are only two 
options to ‘choose’ from: a job (which may be subsidised for 6 months) or 
up to 52 weeks of full-time education and training whilst claiming JSA.  
The New Deal offers very little that is new to this group, the only 
concession for which is that the over 25s are not subject to the tougher 
New Deal sanctions, although the threat of existing JSA sanctions still 
applies.  This means that those over the age of 25 will not have benefit 
withdrawn for refusing to participate in a training option. They will, 
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however, still incur a benefit sanction of two to four weeks for reasons 
such as being dismissed from a training option for misconduct.  In addition 
to these compulsory New Deal programmes, a variety of voluntary New 
Deal schemes are also in operation for lone parents, people with 
disabilities, partners of the unemployed and Jobseeker's Allowance 
claimants over the age of 50 (the most recent New Deal programme, 
introduced in April 2000, c.f. Millar, 2000). These have involved smaller 
numbers of participants and  have varied in their success (measured in 
terms of ‘sustained’ employment of 13 weeks). 
 
The delivery of the New Deals has also involved greater reliance on 
private and voluntary service providers, eroding the direct training function 
of the ES, and raising important issues over accountability and quality 
assurance.  It has been noted that: 
 
A new political consensus seems to be emerging in the UK 
around the once-controversial principles of compulsion, 
privatisation and localisation in welfare-to-work programming 
(Theodore & Peck, 1999:  504). 
 
Conclusion 
During the Twentieth Century, several changes have taken place in the 
organisational arrangements of employment services and the benefit 
eligibility requirements for unemployed people.  These changes have been 
shaped by wider social, economic and political events and influences.  
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Several tensions have been identified in the formal role of the Jobcentre, 
and the labour exchanges that preceded them.  Firstly, there has been a 
persistent conflict between the roles of benefit administration and vacancy 
matching. At various times these functions have been conjoined, split and 
spliced together again (as in the current pattern of provision).  When 
enacted in the staff-user relationship, this tension becomes centred 
around whether staff should be primarily concerned with policing benefit 
claims or assisting and enabling users (whether registered unemployed, 
non-registered unemployed or already in employment) to find work 
(Fletcher, 1997).  
 
A secondary tension is evident within the realm of job matching.  Here, the 
key dilemma for officials is in whether they should match people to jobs in 
the interests of the employer or in the interests of the user.  The problem is 
that if the Jobcentre provides a matching service on employers’ terms then 
the best qualified, most skilled users with the longest and most recent 
experience should be referred to employers, therefore disadvantaging 
those users who most need assistance from the service that is meant to 
be specifically designed to help them.  On the other hand, if a job 
matching service places users who are least desirable to employers, the 
risk is that employers will go elsewhere to fill their vacancies.  Since the 
state has accepted a responsibility (to a greater or lesser extent 
throughout the Twentieth Century) for ensuring that unemployed people 
are brought back into the wage relationship, front-line staff therefore 
occupy a unique space where they are expected to act simultaneously on 
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the behalf of employers and the unemployed. The inherent tensions 
between capital and labour are played out in the public employment 
offices where staff also represent the state to the citizen. 
 
These tensions are increased by the trends that have been identified in 
unemployment policy.  The emphasis on active labour market policies (i.e. 
Jobseeker’s Allowance and the New Deal programmes) focuses attention 
on getting the long-term unemployed into work and raising the 
‘employability’ of those furthest from the labour market.  Users are 
expected to prove their engagement in actively seeking work, the 
conditions for which have become tighter, on threat of sanctions, which 
have become harsher.  This means that high levels of compulsion, paired 
with a lightly regulated labour market and a growth in part-time precarious 
and low-skilled jobs, creates the situation in which unemployed people are 
forced to take work that they would not otherwise consider, and is unlikely 
to offer a living wage (Forde & Slater, 2001).  The failure to secure an on-
going supply of high quality vacancies has left Jobcentres haunted by the 
dole queue image of the past (Aldrich et al., 2000). 
 
The character of the staff-user relationship has also been affected by the 
rise of new managerialism (Clarke & Newman, 1997).  Major changes 
have occurred since the Employment Service became a ‘Next Steps’ 
agency in 1990.  The daily work of front-line staff has been altered by the 
increasing emphasis on cost-cutting, contracting out and incentive 
management through the development of performance targets, which 
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have become much more detailed and specific.  A greater reliance on 
casual staff has changed the public face of the Jobcentre.  Users have 
also become reinterpreted as customers and there have been attempts to 
make services more customer-orientated.  However, these pseudo-
customers are deprived of meaningful choice since they depend on the 
service for income maintenance and there are strict penalties for users 
who do not comply with the procedures and processing that take place 
within the Jobcentre.   
 
In this thesis, I aim to explore the ways in which these tensions are 
managed by front-line Jobcentre staff, played out within face-to-face 
interaction and experienced and negotiated by users.  The following 
chapter describes the methods and methodology that were adopted for the 
ethnographic research that this thesis is based on.   
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Chapter Four 
 
Methodology 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The findings presented in the following chapters are based on an 
ethnographic case study (see Yin, 1994) of one Jobcentre office.  During a 
total observation period of six months a range of qualitative and 
quantitative data were collected.  The interaction between Jobcentre users 
and front-line staff was directly observed during 74 visits.  Interviews of 
varying length and depth were conducted with 48 members of staff.  35 
unemployed people participated in semi-structured interviews.  Information 
was also collected about the vacancies advertised in the office and 
documentary analysis was conducted on staff guidance materials.  In this 
chapter, these methods will be described in detail and the rationale for 
choosing this approach will be set out.   The methodological discussion 
will centre on the advantages and disadvantages of these methods and 
the practical and ethical issues raised during the research process. 
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An interpretivist approach to social policy research 
The primary concern in designing the research methods was to access the 
understandings that social actors held of the processes involved in 
accomplishing policy.  This objective necessitated an in-depth qualitative 
approach.  From an interpretivist standpoint (cf. Atkinson et al., 1988: 234-
5), the intention was to understand the different meanings and 
interpretations that social actors had of the implementation of 
unemployment policy and the Jobcentre as a particular social context.  In 
this respect, symbolic interactionism provided a useful conceptual 
framework for understanding the ways in which people construed this part 
of their world and related to social interaction with others. Central to this 
approach was the recognition that reality is socially defined and 
constructed (Charnon, 1995: 37, Berger & Luckman, 1967).  The research 
process itself exists in the symbolic order and is based on interactions 
between social actors (Silverman, 1989: 102).  The descriptive, in-depth 
and reflexive study of social processes and interaction at a micro level 
aims to understand how members construct symbolic order meanings in 
their everyday lives.   
 
Observations and in-depth interviewing were the most appropriate 
methods for accessing in-depth knowledge about the meanings of 
unemployment policy for those working in and using the Jobcentre.  The 
advantages of such qualitative methods are that they allow for the 
refinement and elaboration of images and concepts to interpret cultural 
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significance and advance theory (Ragin, 1994: 83). The whole ‘self’ of the 
researcher is the research instrument.  Qualitative researchers: 
 
emphasise the immersion of the researcher in a research 
setting and the effort to uncover the meaning and 
significance of social phenomena for people in those settings 
(Ragin, 1994: 91). 
 
This does not mean, however, that the researcher can ‘step into the mind 
of another person, to see and experience the world as they do themselves’ 
(McCracken, 1988: 9) because each individual has a different frame of 
reference for understanding the world.  There is no one ‘true self’ of 
another person that it is possible to find. The self is a changing entity that 
individuals do not usually fully understand, or have the capability to 
express so that another individual can understand.  Researchers can only 
hope to interact in a social setting where they are aware that there are 
differences in the way that people think and the way that people perceive 
what is around them.   
 
The main advantages of an ethnographic approach are that the data are 
very rich and detailed (McCall & Simmons, 1969: 2).  The researcher’s 
intimate involvement in the social setting means that the data collected 
can be closely bound to theory.  Learning about the participants’ situation 
from their viewpoint and in their language gives access to the concepts 
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that are most meaningful to them in their everyday life (Burgess, 1984: 
79).  Direct observation in particular, provides the opportunity to view the 
different versions of events that are available (Burgess, 1984). 
 
Sensitive information, both in the form of personal experiences that are 
difficult to talk about and in the sense of insider accounts of things being 
done that should not be, are better dealt with through an in-depth 
approach. Because the researcher is very close to the context, he or she 
is able to avoid misleading or meaningless questions, and can ease 
themselves into the situation and avoid delicate situations that other 
research methods cannot guard against. The fieldworker has the 
opportunity to absorb a lot of what seems irrelevant at the time, but later 
turn out to be extremely valuable, and is more likely than those using other 
methods to get a the situation as the informant sees it (McCall & Simmons, 
1969: 23).  
 
An Inductive Approach 
I have attempted to adopt an inductive approach to the research process, 
which aims to be as free as possible from pre-conceived ideas and 
judgements which can strait jacket research (Ragin, 1994, Denzin, 1970).  
This means beginning  with sensitising concepts that provide the 
springboard to start research, which can then turn in any direction, 
allowing the research problem to be reformulated as the research goes 
along. Valentine best describes this starting point as ‘remaining open but 
 80
without the dishonest and unworkable assumption of a blank mind’ (1986: 
127). The research process adopted bears a resemblance to grounded 
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1968, Strauss & Corbin, 1990). A grounded 
theory approach has not been adopted as such, with its specific formulae 
for data collection and coding.  I have instead been influenced by their 
general inductive approach:  ‘One does not begin with a theory, then prove 
it.  Rather, one begins with an area of study and what is relevant to that 
area is allowed to emerge’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 23). 
 
Data Collection 
The ethnographic approach to investigation one case study Jobcentre 
office comprised of a mix of observation, interviewing, documentary 
analysis and the collection of information about displayed vacancies.  
These methods were used to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
processes and meanings of the activities within the Jobcentre. The 
fieldwork was carried out in an office in Central Scotland during a six 
month period (74 visits in total).  The fieldwork was split into two phases.  
Phase one consisted of one half-day visit per week (1st May to 24th August 
1998).  Phase two extended these half-day visits to five days a week, 
Monday to Friday (4th September to 4th December 1998).  The visits 
ranged in length from 30 minutes to eight hours.  Fieldwork visits usually 
lasted for approximately four hours. 
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Access 
Access was formally negotiated very early on in the project.  A cold call 
letter was sent to one office, where a senior member of staff responded by 
arranging an intial meeting.  Written approval was received in December 
1997, soon after the meeting.  The agreement was for a six month period 
of observation, in-depth interviews with staff and users and access to 
Employment Service documentation.  Unfortunately, during the period of 
fieldwork the Employment Officer who had been the main gatekeeper in 
agreeing this access was transferred to another Jobcentre and the 
manager who had endorsed the approval was promoted to another office.  
The replacement manager was more hostile towards the research in 
general and denied specific access that had been granted originally for 
formal, semi-structured, staff interviews, documentary analysis of staff 
guidance and training materials.  Near the end of the fieldwork, the new 
manager also requested that I sign the Official Secrets Act 1989.  This had 
not been required earlier and represented a significant shift in the terms of 
agreement.  Restrictions brought about under the name of official secrets 
have affected researchers in the past and seem destined to become more 
common in the future as a result of the new managerialist extension of 
service delivery through new non-governmental agencies (Cook, 1996: 
55).  I have, out of respect for ethical principles, been careful to avoid 
putting any Jobcentre worker in a compromising position regarding official 
secrets.  Neither have I knowingly contravened the Official Secrets Act 
1989.  
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These difficulties and changes to the initial agreement bear testament to 
the ongoing nature of access negotiations.  They are not agreed once and 
for all but re-negotiated as time goes by.  In addition to the formal access 
agreements with the management, access was also negotiated with each 
of the staff members individually, along with gaining consent from each 
head of section and all of the unemployed people who were being 
interviewed by staff or by me as part of the research. 
 
Observation 
It was essential to the research design that the interaction between 
Employment Service staff and Jobcentre users be observed first hand.  
The fieldwork involved direct observation of life in the case study office.  
The staff in this office were organised in different sections.  There were 
reception staff on ground and upper floors, who were the first point of 
contact for new users.  Upstairs, a team of Employment Officers dealt with 
Fresh Claims interviews. Downstairs there were teams of staff in the 
following sections:  Vacancies and Matching, Signing and Response to 
Displayed Vacancies and New Deal. The management team was made up 
of two Corporate Services staff and the office manager.   
 
Official interviews between staff and users were observed and detailed 
notes were taken. Permission to tape record these had been denied from 
the outset. The transcripts were, nevertheless, very detailed.  The 
researcher’s fieldwork diary included notes of other types of interaction 
(staff to staff and user to user) as well as reflections on these ideas, notes, 
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questions and emerging themes were recorded at the time or later.  These 
formed the basis of very detailed transcripts. 
 
This section reflects on the observation approach and locates the method 
of direct observation within the wider ethnographic tradition.  The 
participant observation literature is full of a lot of assumed agreement 
about what participant observation means, which has not been 
accompanied by precise definition.  Those who have attempted 
explanation of the term usually characterise it as a combination of 
techniques that includes some degree of observation of, and involvement 
in, a particular social setting (cf. McCall & Simmons, 1969).  Ethnography, 
anthropology, participant observation and fieldwork are all terms that are 
often used interchangeably (cf. Schwartzman, 1993, Spradley, 1980; 
Fetterman, 1989).  The common ground between these four terms is that 
they are used to describe ways that cultures, or particular aspects of 
cultures can be understood and described.  Actually doing participant 
observation, ethnography or anthropology seem to be quite similar.  For 
instance, Barley’s (1986) anthropological study of symbols in Dowayoland 
used much the same principles and techniques as Miller’s (1989) 
ethnography of a Work Incentive Programme, or Taraborrelli’s (1993) 
participant observation study of carers. 
 
For clarity it is useful to attempt to disentangle the terms at least to some 
degree. Ethnography is the term used for a method that can involve 
participant observation, but doesn’t necessarily, for instance ethnographic 
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studies can be based on in-depth interviewing and not on observation or 
participation in a social setting.  Ethnography is used by anthropologists 
and sociologists to describe the method of learning about another culture 
or sub-culture in-depth, and first-hand (Burgess, 1984).  Ethnography is 
considered to be the art (or the science, depending on viewpoint) of 
describing a particular culture (Fetterman, 1989).   
 
Although the branches of anthropology and sociology are intertwined 
around ethnography, the roots of the disciplines can be separated out.  
Anthropological studies were traditionally in the mould of Malinowski’s 
(1922) work, which considered a whole society in a far off land, relying 
heavily on descriptive material about a very different, more exotic, ‘other’. 
More recently anthropological studies have shifted the focus to aspects of 
Western society, beginning particularly in the USA.  Schwartzman (1993) 
considers this in terms of ethnographies of organisations and highlights 
the unrecognised role of ethnography in the Hawthorne studies of the 
1920s.  Ethnographic studies within sociology, on the other hand, are 
traceable back to the work of the Chicago School (also closely related to 
social psychology), which tended to function in a wider sphere, using data 
to generate theory (cf. Blumer, 1969, Becker et al., 1961, Hughes, 1971).   
 
Participant observation is the collective name for methods used to learn 
about a culture or one small aspect of a particular culture or sub-culture.  
Participant observation involves a long-term immersion in the culture, 
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using techniques of observation and participation in a culture as well as in-
depth interviewing and documentary analysis (McCall & Simmons, 1969).  
These techniques are governed by principles of ‘Verstehen’ (Weber, 
1970), or subjective interpretation.  Participant observation is also referred 
to as ‘field observation’, ‘qualitative observation’ and ‘direct observation’ 
(Lofland & Lofland, 1984).  Jorgensen (1989) considers participant 
observation as a methodology consisting of principles, strategies, 
procedures, methods and techniques.  Participant observation is used in 
order to understand the perspective of the ordinary participants in that 
setting.   
 
The research methods for this project are best located within this literature 
as a focused ethnographic approach, rather than ‘an ethnography’ in the 
more traditional, particularly anthropological, sense.  This combines in-
depth interviewing with shorter informal interviews and a sustained period 
of observation, focusing on the interaction between staff and users 
throughout, in order to learn from people, rather than just studying them 
(Spradley, 1980:3). 
 
Field Roles  
Within participant observation there are different roles that a researcher 
might adopt. Gold (1958) details four roles of field observations that vary in 
the degree of personal involvement that the researcher has in the social 
setting: complete participant (covert), participant-as-observer (very similar 
to complete participant but researcher and informants are aware that they 
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are involved in a field relationship), observer-as-participant (one-visit 
interviews and brief formal observation) and complete observer (not 
involved in social interaction with informants at all).  My role in the 
Jobcentre can be described as a ‘direct observer’, which would be situated 
somewhere between observer-as-participant and participant-as-observer.  
This role is more closely aligned with Spradley’s (1980) ‘moderate’ 
participant, combining being an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’ with the 
likelihood of becoming more involved the longer the time spent in the field.  
I was never a participant in the sense of being either involved in the work 
that the staff did or being governed by the rules that the registered 
unemployed were.  The office setting prevented complete participation 
since I was not a worker as others have been (Anderson, 1999, Miller, 
1991, Kingfisher, 1996).  This means that the account provided has come 
from an outsider’s perspective.  This has the advantages of affording the 
opportunity for observation and reflection unencumbered by work related 
activities and concerns.  Worker’s accounts are very good at describing a 
worker’s view of the situation (cf. Anderson, 1999, Miller, 1991) but may 
lose out on a more balanced view that considers the users’ views as well.  
Not being a full participant also reduced the risks of over rapport 
(Silverman, 1989). 
 
Field Relations 
Olesen & Whittaker (1970) consider how far the researcher is accepted by 
people in the research setting and how quickly rapport is established.  
They recognise that the ‘phases through which role-making passes in the 
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course of interaction in fieldwork are stages of definitions by investigator 
and actors around the research roles and also around life roles’ (1970: 
381).  Life roles relating to age, sex, social class influence the research 
relationships and acceptance by individuals (Olesen & Wittaker, 1970, 
Burgess, 1984). Each phase represents a distinctive segment of the role 
making process and each is relevant for ‘the establishment of mutual 
awareness, consensus on role meanings, and management of the 
ongoing interaction, as well as for data gathered’ (Olesen & Whittaker, 
1970: 383).  Mutual awareness, however, may in fact just be assumption 
of shared meaning or the shared acceptance of unspecified assumptions. 
 
Olesen & Whittaker’s (1970) description of four phases in the process of 
acceptance role making is useful in understanding the processes that I 
went through when I entered the research setting.  Firstly, ‘surface 
encounter’ describes the brief period of initial contact with new people, 
where contact is made with the researcher in terms of research and life 
roles.  Olesen & Whittaker (1970) argue that because people do not 
generally have a deep understanding of research purposes and roles they 
are likely to rely on the researcher’s life roles as guidance for interaction. 
The sooner the informant can learn and relate to the researcher’s life roles 
the sooner they will move on to the next stage.  The second stage is 
‘proffering and inviting’, during which there is mutual exchange between 
the researcher and informants. This involves ‘offering definitions of one’s 
self and the other while simultaneously asking for definitions of one’s self 
and the other from the other party’ (1970: 384).  Informants often ‘coach’ 
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and ‘sponsor’ researchers during this phase. Thirdly, the ‘selecting and 
modifying’ stage involves ‘reciprocal selection of meaningful insight and 
viable portions of the researcher roles and life roles of participant and 
observer’ (ibid. 385).  The final role is one of ‘stabilising and sustaining’.  
These phases occurred simultaneously and overlapped during my 
research, being continually modified.  
 
Even in the final days of fieldwork, I was still meeting new people and 
negotiating access and establishing roles. Janes (1961) found that it was 
not differences between his social class and those of the people he was 
studying that determined the extent to which rapport was achieved, as he 
had expected, but it was the stage in ‘community role’.  Janes (1961) plots 
the development of field roles according to time spent in the field, 
beginning with newcomer and advancing on through provisional 
acceptance, categorical acceptance, personal acceptance (the stage 
where rapport is reached) and finally, imminent migrant.  The goal of each 
phase, for Janes, was to achieve rapport. 
 
Burgess (1984) contributes to this discussion by arguing that several roles 
are adopted throughout an investigation, rather that one role being 
adopted once and for all.  Similarly roles are renegotiated throughout the 
research with different informants.  Burgess (1984) considers the different 
roles according to the different people in the research setting, i.e. some 
people accepting a researcher more quickly and to a greater extent than 
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others.  Some of the research participants in the Jobcentre were willing to 
sit and talk for hours about their work, while others seemed reluctant to 
talk at all.  I had more in common with certain individuals than others in 
terms of life roles, interests and attitudes. 
 
The researcher’s attributes and attitudes also have an influence on which 
data is collected and how it is interpreted.  Participant observation is not 
about objectively trying to study a group of people, it is about subjectively 
studying a social setting of which the researcher is part.  The life roles and 
ascribed characteristics of the researcher, therefore,  have a great 
influence on the individual researcher’s experience of the field. The kind of 
person that the interviewer is, however, can often be more important to 
interviewees than the value of the research itself (Hammersley & Atkinson, 
1997: 83). The individual character of the researcher can make it possible 
in some circumstances to transcend differences in life roles to establish 
rapport.  The researcher has to exercise control over the relationships that 
are established for research purposes (Burgess, 1984: 92).  Establishing 
the essentials of trust and rapport will depend to a great extent on the 
manner in which the researcher interacts with the people in the research 
setting.  Certain attitudes are required from the researcher.  The minimum 
essentials would seem to be a non-judgemental attitude towards any 
information offered by individuals, awareness of how other person might 
be feeling, sensitivity to their needs and when they want to talk or would 
prefer not to, as well as a sense of humour.  Hornsby-Smith sums it up as 
the need for ‘social sensitivity and charm’ (1993: 54) and Scott considers 
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the embodiment of such characteristics in a ‘personable young woman’ 
(1992: 169).  I managed to establish rapport with most of the participants 
by employing an attitude of politeness and good humour.  Relations with 
staff and users in the field were generally quite positive.  People did not 
seem to mind me observing them and workers did not seem to view me as 
a threat to them.   
 
The site of much of the negotiation of acceptance and gaining of rapport 
and trust with staff was the tea rooms for smokers and non-smokers.  The 
process of being accepted into the research setting does not happen 
automatically, but was something that had to be actively pursued.  I 
deliberately spent time in the tea rooms chatting with staff members about 
things that often had nothing to do with the research. 
 
A defining moment in gaining trust came when one staff member gave me 
one of the swipe cards that enabled access to the restricted back stairs 
instead of the public stairs.  As well as demonstrating the trust that I had 
gained, using the card gave me increased use of the office and staff space 
because I could come and go as I pleased without being dependent on a 
staff member to let me in or out.  A particular advantage was that I could 
then get into the office in the morning before the public were allowed in 
and have privileged access to the backstage activity (c.f. Goffman, 1959). 
 
Although many official interviews between staff and users were observed, 
every interview that took place during the fieldwork period did not have an 
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equal chance of being observed.  Certain staff members, particularly those 
in positions of power, restricted access for observations.  When I first 
asked the head of the New Claims section if I could observe some 
interviews that afternoon she replied: 
 
SM 2:  There’s nothing suitable till a quarter to four.  
 
She was not willing for me to sit in on any of the interviews that were 
happening in the two hour period before then.  Similarly, an adviser who 
had been allowing me to sit in on the Review interviews he was 
conducting that morning explained that he had not come to get me for his 
previous appointment because: 
 
SM 25: I didnae think it was appropriate for you to sit in because I 
was going to have a go at her. 
 
It is difficult to discern to what extent and in which ways staff modified their 
behaviour because they were being observed and having their actions and 
words noted. It is inevitable that researchers will influence the situation 
they are studying, even a silent observer changes the way people interact 
and those being observed tend to present their culture either in an overly 
favourable light, only transmitting the things they think that the researcher 
thinks are important or hide things deliberately (Silverman, 1989: 45).  For 
several observations one Fresh Claims adviser had been conducting 
interviews ‘by the book’.  One day he commented: 
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 SM 10: I cannae be bothered doing these [interviews] properly 
anymore. 
 
After this he reverted to his usual practice of modifying official policy, for 
instance he stopped turning the computer screen around so that users 
could see what he was doing. 
 
Impression Management 
One difficulty of ‘passing’ in a social situation is that there is usually a 
great deal of assumption in conversations, because people cannot explain 
everything they mean all of the time.  In the research situation it is these 
very assumptions that are the subject of interest.  The skill required is to 
be able to get at the information whilst still ‘passing’.  It is for this reason, 
among others, that participant observers often take on the role of  
‘interested incompetent’ (Rock, 1977: 199) or ‘marginal native’ (Freilich, 
1970), that lies somewhere between ‘martian’ and ‘convert’ (Lofland, 
1971) and feels like being a ‘poor stupid sociologist’ (Olesen & Whittaker, 
1970: 389).  This role provides for the social and intellectual distance 
necessary to promote analytical thought (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1997: 
115).  Another advantage is that it makes informants feel obliged to 
explain things that seem obvious to them (Fielding, 1993). My role as 
‘student’ was valuable in these terms, also allowing me to be seen as less 
of a threat.  
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I dressed smartly in order to fit into the office environment, which definitely 
had an impact on being accepted by staff members, but also influenced 
how users saw me.  The fact that I did not wear an outdoor coat or jacket 
in the office instantly marked me out from the Jobcentre users, especially 
since the majority of the fieldwork took place in the winter.  Socialising with 
staff and interacting with them as they worked facilitated an ease of 
relationship that made me seem more like a member of staff than a user.  
Frequent writing activity added to this impression and it was evident that at 
least some of the users and interviewees had thought that I worked there. 
 
It was in the back stage (Goffman, 1959) of the tea rooms that I became 
aware of myself as a social actor learning to cope in a new setting. It was 
not until half way through the research, however, that I became aware of 
one of the rules of the large non-smokers’ tea room that I had flaunted.  In 
the beginning, I always sat with the worker who had been the main 
gatekeeper during the access negotiations.  As a smoker he always sat in 
the smaller tea room with the other smokers.  I eventually ran out of 
excuses to keep going to the smoking tea room, especially since everyone 
there knew I didn’t smoke.  I started to frequent the larger tea room for 
non-smokers.  Most of the staff members used this room and I did not 
know any of them very well to begin with. My strategy was to take tea 
breaks and lunch with the staff member that I had last been talking to.  It 
had not occurred to me to differentiate between male and female workers 
until I came to the uncomfortable realisation that I was the only woman 
who ever sat at a table with the men.  This may have had implications for 
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how well I was accepted by the female workers who seemed to value their 
group identity.  On the other hand it probably gave access to 
conversations that I wouldn’t have been privy to if I had always sat with the 
women. 
 
Balance of power 
It has been demonstrated that a researcher’s life roles and personal 
attributes have important implications for establishing rapport.  In addition 
to this they also raise issues about the balance of power between the 
researcher and the participants or interviewees.  Feminist writing on 
research methods has contributed a great deal to these understandings. 
Although my research does not adopt a feminist standpoint the issues 
raised are useful, and important considerations for any research.   
 
The basis for these feminist arguments is that women can share a ‘special’ 
relationship because they are oppressed by the dominant culture on the 
grounds of gender.  This assumes, however that women can be treated as 
one homogenous group and becomes problematic when other factors like 
ethnicity, class and age are more apparent as status markers.  
Ramazanoglu argues that ‘women are not all equally oppressed in the 
same ways’ (1989: 433).  Douglas (1992) argues particularly in the case of 
ethnicity that black women experience racism as of paramount 
importance, over gender awareness.  It is also important to note that what 
are labelled as feminist research methods are not restricted to use by 
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women.  In Labour, Life and Poverty  (1949), Zweig was a male 
researcher who adopted an involved stance towards interviewing working 
class men, many of his interviewees commenting on having discussed 
matters with him that they had not broached with anyone else (just as 
Finch’s (1984) and Oakley’s (1981) respective interviewees did). 
 
How the interviewer and the interviewee present themselves will depend 
on the position of power they have.  The most common situation is that the 
interviewer is in the role of legitimised power, while the interviewee is 
relatively powerless.  Scott observes that ‘traditional research both 
objectifies and renders invisible its subjects, especially women’ (1992: 59).  
In my research, I felt that the Jobcentre workers were actually in a greater 
position of power than I was as a researcher, because I was constantly 
dependent on them allowing me to do the research, through daily access 
negotiations. Amongst the staff interviewed, there were more and less 
powerful men and women.  Most of the junior workers, who had low grade, 
low pay, low status and were often on short temporary contracts, were 
men.  It was at the point of writing about the study that I became more 
powerful than the staff members.  
 
The interviews with unemployed people had a different balance of power 
because the participants had less power and social standing.  Contrary to 
feminist arguments it was the Jobcentre users, who were often male, that I 
considered to have least power.  The women who were interviewed 
happened to be more assertive and had previously been employed in 
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more professional jobs than most of the male interviewees.  This is a 
consequence of the rules for claiming unemployment benefits.  Women 
who have caring responsibilities are less likely to register as unemployed 
as are women whose partners work (not least of all because they are 
probably aware that they are unlikely to receive benefit because of their 
partner’s earnings).  There are likely to be disproportionate numbers of 
professional, as opposed to unskilled or semi-skilled, women claiming 
Jobseeker’s Allowance.   
 
I made every effort to treat all of the research participants with equal 
respect.  I was not aware of any discernable difference in establishing 
rapport along gender lines.  In fact, almost all of the most active research 
participants happened to be men.  The class and ethnicity backgrounds of 
both staff and users were relatively similar to my own.  All the participants 
were white (in an area with approximately 0.002% ethnic minority 
population in the 1991 Census). 
 
Staff interviews 
Informal interviews were carried out during observation visits with 48 
members of staff. These ranged in frequency, length, depth and content.  
There were two distinct groups of workers in the Jobcentre, those 
employed by the Jobcentre and those employed by the Benefits Agency. 
The Benefits Agency staff did not have any formal interaction with users, 
although they did answer occasional queries by telephone or in person.  
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The majority of the informal interviews were therefore conducted with 
Employment Service staff.  Four informal interviews were carried out with 
Benefits Agency staff.  
 
Staff interviews varied greatly.  Some focused on descriptions of how the 
Jobcentre operated, while others were devoted to views about work and 
attitudes towards users.  Some of the informal interviews were comments 
made before and after I observed the interaction between workers and 
users or while I was waiting with a particular worker for their next 
appointment.  The longest of these informal interviews lasted for an hour 
and a half. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with four staff members at 
their desks.  An interview schedule was used to guide these (see 
Appendix One).  Although access had been granted to interview more staff 
members on this basis, it was subsequently denied.  Staff interviews were 
noted and later transcribed in the same way as observational data.   
 
Staff Characteristics 
Sex 
Two thirds of the staff were female and a third were male.  The Fresh 
Claims section had almost equal numbers of men and women.  The 
Vacancies and Matching Section had seven women and three men.  In the 
Fortnightly Interventions and Response to Displayed Vacancies Section 
there was a disproportionate number of women (ten to four).  The New 
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Deal Section had a similar ratio with five women to one man.  Corporate 
Services was equally split and the manager was a woman. 
 
Age  
There was a wide range in staff ages  (see Appendix Three).  The 
youngest was 21 years old and the eldest 58.  Six of the staff were aged 
25 or under.  A further seven were under the age of 30.  This means that 
roughly a third of the staff were under 30 years old.   
 
Each section of the Jobcentre had a different age profile.  The Fresh 
Claims section had six staff members who were aged 30 or under.  Most 
of these people were employed to take claims for Jobseeker's Allowance 
and held management grades.  The youngest (at 21 years old) was a 
temporary receptionist. Fortnightly Interventions and Response to 
Displayed Vacancies also had six people aged 30 or under.  Here, 
however, was the largest concentration of younger workers of lower 
grades on temporary contracts (which were extended to permanent 
contracts while I was there).  All of those aged  30 or under in this section 
were on or near the bottom of the pay scale.  The Vacancies and Matching 
section only had two workers aged 30 or under, one of which was a lower 
graded temporary worker.  The New Deal section had two under 30s, who 
were lower graded temporary workers.  The Corporate Services section 
had only one worker under 30, who was on a permanent contract but was 
a lower grade. 
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Grade 
The Employment Service pay band system began with Pay Band 9 (PB9). 
The next grade up was PB8.  These workers carried out administrative 
and reception tasks, provided information about jobs and dealt with 
reregistering for benefit. The grades after that were Management Pay 
Bands (MPB 7 and above, with MPB3 being the highest grade in this 
Jobcentre, held by the manager).  Appendix Three shows the distribution 
of different grades in the different sections of the office. 
 
To summarise, the section with the greatest proportion of junior grades 
(and younger, more inexperienced workers) was the Fortnightly 
Interventions and Response to Displayed Vacancies Section.  This was 
the section where staff had most frequent contact with the greatest 
number of unemployed people because it is these staff that conduct 
Fortnightly Reviews (signing on) and deal with enquiries about job 
vacancies.  It was, therefore, these staff that are most likely to shape 
user’s perceptions about the Jobcentre.   
 
It was also clear that the work done by those holding management grades 
was distinctive.  Staff of MPB7 grade were all Employment Officers who 
interviewed people at Fresh Claims stage.  New Deal staff were MPB6 
grade, the highest apart from the office manager. 
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 Interviews with unemployed Jobcentre users 
35 Jobcentre users were interviewed, all of whom were unemployed.  The 
interviews were semi-structured, based on an interview schedule (see 
Appendix Two), which evolved as questions were rephrased and 
reordered.  The interviews with unemployed people were tape-recorded 
and notes were made of reflections and observations about how the 
interviewee had behaved or about dominant themes that emerged from 
discussion.  The interviews were conducted during a concentrated period  
(10th November to 3rd December 1998) near the end of the fieldwork. 
because I wanted to ask them about positive and negative aspects of the 
interaction they had with staff and their views of the service generally.  If I 
had done this too early on in the process then I ran the risk of either 
cutting off lines of communication with the staff or being put in a position of 
taking sides in a dispute or discussion.  I could imagine the scenario, for 
instance, of observing an official staff interview with a user that I had 
interviewed and the user saying ‘I told her all about it and she agrees with 
me’.   
 
These interviews took place in a small interview room on the ground floor 
of the Jobcentre.  The advantages of interviewing users in the Jobcentre 
office included good sound quality and convenience for the interviewer, 
allowing a large number of interviews to be conducted without significant 
gaps or time delays.  Personal safety was also better secured in a public 
office environment, especially since the interview room was fitted with a 
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panic alarm.  The most significant disadvantage was the difficulty of 
convincing interviewees of my autonomy from the Jobcentre and assuring 
them that what they said would not be fed back to the staff there.  
Interviewees may have felt inhibited by the office environment.  Other 
potential interview sites were considered but time did not allow for 
travelling to conduct interviews in people’s own homes.  Another option 
would have been to interview users in a public place.  This was rejected 
on the grounds that it may have made some of the interviewees, 
particularly those who were less confident or found it difficult to articulate 
their thoughts and feelings, more self-conscious, especially considering 
the use of a conspicuous tape recorder.  The sound quality of such taped 
interviews may also have been compromised.  However, interviewees 
participated in the interviews actively and seemed to feel able to express 
their views openly. 
 
The Jobcentre interview room did not necessarily assure personal safety, 
especially since two of the interviewees seemed to be under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs.  Staff members made various comments about the 
users I interviewed including fears for my safety and checks that I did 
know where the panic button was under the desk.  After interviewing one 
particular user, who was perceived by workers as difficult, seven staff 
members asked me if I was all right.  Similar concerns were raised after 
interviewing another unemployed man: 
 
SM 22: He’s mental like. 
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 SM 9: He’s got a bit of a drink problem actually.  . . .  I wasnae too 
sure about you taking him into a room. 
 
Potential interviewees were approached at various points in the Jobcentre 
office directly after they had formally interacted with staff in a variety of 
circumstances to ensure a range of experiences: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• Age 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Review points after signing on; 
Review points after interviews for e.g. 13 weeks, six months, a year and 
18 months; 
Response to Displayed Vacancies after enquiring about job vacancies, 
Fresh Claims after making a claim; and 
New Deal after a New Deal interview. 
 
Quotas were followed to ensure that the sample was loosely 
representative of Jobcentre users in the local area.  There were quotas 
for: 
Sex 
Postal claimants  
People participating in the New Deal  
Long-term unemployed; and 
Jobcentre users not registered unemployed. 
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These quotas were not mutually exclusive.  They were fulfilled in all but 
the last category.  All of those who agreed to be interviewed happened to 
be registered as unemployed, despite approaching people at the 
Response to Displayed Vacancies point, which was the place where 
Jobcentre users who were not registered as unemployed were most likely 
to be.  Not everyone who was approached agreed to being interviewed, 
but some of their responses are equally telling of their views about the 
Jobcentre: 
 
UP36: I only use it to get my stamp paid.  It’s a waste of time.  
There’s no jobs or anything. 
 
Sex  
26% of the unemployed interviewees were female and the remaining 74% 
were male.  This followed proportionally the sex distribution of Jobseeker's 
Allowance claimants at the time of the research, according to data from 
the Employment Information Unit (© Office for National Statistics, 1998).   
 
Age 
A wide age range was ensured.  Of the 35 unemployed people interviewed 
12 were under the age of 25 (the youngest of this group being 19 and the 
eldest 24).  A further 12 were aged between 25 and 39 and the remaining 
11 were aged 40 and over (five of these being aged 50 or over).  
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Postal Claimants  
The Jobcentre where the research was carried out covered an area that 
included rural villages.  Compared to other Jobcentres there was a greater 
proportion of Jobseeker's Allowance claimants registering to receive 
benefit by post.  14% of interviewees were therefore from rural areas, 
signing on by post.  86% of these came to the office to register for their 
benefit.  Only one of the interviewees signing on by post was long-term 
unemployed. 
 
New Deal 
Because the arrangements for those participating in the New Deal were so 
different from those for other registered unemployed people, I also 
ensured that a few people on the New Deal were interviewed.  This too 
was done on a quota basis, according to the proportion of New Deal 
participants registered at the office.  For this study that amounted to two 
unemployed people, who were also long-term unemployed and therefore 
also counted towards that quota. 
 
Duration of Unemployment 
13 of those interviewed were long-term unemployed according to the 
Employment Service definition of being registered unemployed for six 
months or more.  Five had been unemployed for two years or more.  The 
longest time that any of the interviewees had been unemployed for at the 
time of interview was six years.  Some interviewees were unemployed for 
the first time, while others had been unemployed several times in the past.  
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 During the interviews, it became apparent that the clear-cut administrative 
categorisation between the short and long-term unemployed was not 
entirely representative of the experience that some interviewees had of 
unemployment.  Some users had been unemployed for longer than they 
had been registered unemployed. There were others who had been 
unemployed longer than they had claimed benefit, for instance one man 
had been unemployed for three months but had only been claiming benefit 
for four weeks.  A confusion also existed between time spent out of work 
and claiming disability benefit and time spent actually registered as 
unemployed.  The two periods were distinct administratively but merged 
together for users who experienced it as a continuous period of 
joblessness. 
 
UP 13: Well I’ve been unemployed for quite a long time.  Well, 
no, sometimes it’s wi’ illness cause of my leg. 
 
Others were short-term unemployed at the time of interview but had 
previously been counted as long-term, e.g. one interviewee had only been 
unemployed for one month at the time of interview but had been 
unemployed for a year in the past.  There were also those that had been in 
employment only for short periods between periods of unemployment.  
Unemployment was a recurring problem for them, but this revolving door, 
from unemployment to insecure employment and back again, was not 
reflected in the official statistics or in the quota sampling method.  
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 There are also complications when considering the differentiation between 
employed and unemployed because two of the people interviewed were 
working for less than 15 hours while claiming Jobseeker's Allowance.  If 
the International Labour Organisation definition had been used instead of 
the claimant count as the measure of unemployment, these people would 
be counted as employed.   
 
All of the long-term unemployed interviewees happened to be men.  Four 
of the long-term unemployed interviewees were under the age of 25, five 
were aged between 25 and 40 and four were aged over 40.  Five of the 
respondents had been unemployed for one and a half months or less.  
One had only been unemployed for one day. 
 
Of the short-term unemployed, 16 had been unemployed for less than 
three months.  This included people who had been unemployed for a very 
short time, only a day or a week.  Six had been unemployed for more than 
three months but less than six.   
 
Usual Occupation 
Interviewees were asked about their experiences of unemployment.  This 
usually included discussion of their usual occupation, the type of work they 
had done before and the type of work they were looking for.  This 
information is difficult to quantify for a variety of reasons.  Some people did 
not discuss in detail, or were vague about, the exact type of work they had 
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done in the past or were looking for.  Some people had ideas about the 
type of industry or sector where they would like to work but didn’t provide 
an actual job title.  
 
From interviewees’ descriptions of the work they had done and the work 
they were looking for it was also sometimes difficult to discern at which 
level they had been working.  An example of this was a 50 year old man 
who described his occupation as ‘construction work’ but had a degree 
qualification.  There were also people who were looking for work in a new 
field or who had gained qualifications e.g. a degree but were looking for 
work as a waiter. A simple description of interviewees’ usual occupation 
therefore masks a complex area. 
 
The interviewees had various past work experiences, ranging from one 19 
year old man who had never worked since leaving school without 
qualifications, to one 59 year old woman who had been based in one bank 
all of her working life.  Interviewees had a range of occupations, which will 
be related to the construction of their Jobseeker's Agreement in Chapter 
Eight.  Four of the interviewees stated their usual occupation as unskilled, 
10 as semi-skilled, 10 as skilled and 11 were professionals.  There was 
also great variation in the levels of qualifications held by the unemployed 
interviewees.  Some had degree qualifications while others had no 
qualifications at all.   
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 Documentary analysis 
The original research design allowed for documentary analysis of internal 
training and guidance documents.  This could have enabled systematic 
analysis of the correlation between the official guidance and street-level 
practice and might have provided greater insight into the formal 
constraints on the work done by front-line staff.  Although this was agreed 
in writing before the research began, I was not allowed access to these 
materials when I requested them.  I did, however, manage to collect and 
analyse publicly available documents from the Jobcentre and copies of the 
forms most widely used.  In addition to this staff members occasionally 
gave me material that I could use freely. One document that provided 
valuable insight was a copy of the staff guidance for Signing On interviews 
(see Appendix Four and the discussion in Chapter Five).  I was also 
allowed to look at some things that I could not keep, copy or discuss.  
 
Vacancies 
The details of vacancies displayed on the boards were recorded every day 
during the second phase of field work.  This provided a profile of the jobs 
that the Jobcentre dealt with during a three month period, which could in 
turn be related to the local labour market.  For each vacancy the job title, 
hours, type of contract (temporary or permanent), rate of pay, whether the 
job involved shift work or stated that flexibility was required (with regard to 
the hours of work) and the reference number were recorded.   
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The information was collected for every card displayed including those for 
the armed forces, training, jobs in other areas and hand-written notices.  
The vacancy reference number was then cross-referenced with the hand-
written records kept by the Vacancies Section that provided information 
about how many vacancies each card on the board represented at the 
time it was accepted as a notified vacancy.   The job reference numbers 
were then checked against the printout from the Labour Market System, 
showing which vacancies were ‘live’ each day.  This provided a method of 
triangulation that made it possible to tell which of the vacancies had been 
displayed and which had not, as well as a more reliable independent 
calculation of the number of notified vacancies in that office. The Greater 
Manchester Low Pay Unit (2000) have noted that the vacancy cards 
advertised on some Jobcentre boards do not tally with the official notified 
vacancy count.  My access was privileged in that it allowed me to cross-
reference the vacancy references, to include ‘unofficial’ hand-written 
vacancies within the manual count and to better understand the ‘behind 
the scenes’ staff activity that produced the official count.  An unforeseen 
advantage of recording this information was that it also gave me 
something constructive to do and be seen doing at the times when it 
wasn’t suitable for me to either conduct interviews or observe interactions 
between staff and users. 
 
Analysis 
The data collected from observation, staff interviews and interviews with 
unemployed people was all fully transcribed. The next stage in the 
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analysis process was to import these files into a software package for 
coding.  Using a computer for this purpose was warranted by the large 
volume of data collected (a total of 925 pages of transcription) and the 
complexity of the ethnographic field notes.  
 
Despite earlier criticisms that the use of computers can force or distort the 
research (Richards & Richards, 1992 and 1998) it is now widely accepted 
that specialist software can legitimately aid the analysis process.  I chose 
to use QSR NUD*IST Version 4, because, having seen other researchers 
use it, I was convinced that it would be a valuable data management tool.  
The main advantage of using a computer to aid analysis was speed of 
coding and the use comprehensive search facilities (cf. Coffey et al., 1996) 
which allowed for a more systematic consideration of the emerging 
themes.   
 
The coding process was complicated by the fact that there were two types 
of data.  The first type of transcript was the field notes, which consisted of 
a mix of observations of interactions between staff and users, informal 
interviews with staff and observations of staff interaction with other staff 
members or employers, as well as my own notes about e.g. the 
surroundings and reflections on the interactions.  The second type of data 
was the transcripts of the taped interviews with unemployed people.  The 
two types of data were therefore quite differently structured and focused.  
Despite this, there were salient themes from both types of data that 
corresponded to each other and therefore justified the decision to analyse 
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them together in the same NUD*IST project, rather than separately.  Each 
transcript was coded within the NUD*IST project to facilitate data 
management and analysis. 
 
Rigor 
Validity and Reliability 
Reliability and validity are concerns belonging to the positivist tradition, 
which do not rest easily within an interpretative perspective (cf. Kelle & 
Laurie, 1995). The application of rigor to these ‘softer’ data has been the 
subject of much debate and concern (Kelle & Laurie, 1995), culminating in 
warnings against the perils of ‘dangerously impressionistic’ results from 
within the qualitative tradition itself (Silverman, 1989: 11). 
 
Accounts of validity and reliability from qualitative researchers (e.g. 
Silverman, 1993, Lincoln & Guba, 1985) tend to present these as 
necessities for legitimacy and credibility in the established scientifically 
based research community, rather than as essential to the actual 
methods.  This need to prove the value of qualitative methods has led to 
the adoption of concepts based on the assumptions of quantitative 
research.  Agar (1986) is among those unwilling to accept these logico-
deductive standards because: 
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Ethnography is neither subjective nor objective.  It is 
interpretive, mediating two worlds [audience and group 
studied] through a third [ethnographer] (Agar, 1986:  19). 
 
The debate about validity and reliability of qualitative methods therefore 
centres around beliefs about the ‘truth’ of a social setting.  Qualitative 
researchers like Friedrichs & Ludtke (1975), who have been influenced by 
positivism, see the fundamental problem of participant observation as 
subjectivity, which they consider to be a source of error.  Silverman, 
however, argues that researchers should be more concerned with 
understanding their world in its own terms rather than adjudicating 
between participant’s competing and undercutting versions (1993: 105), 
which reduces the researcher to what Garfinkel (1967) calls an ‘ironist’.  
Symbolic interactionism is concerned with how encounters are 
accomplished rather than debunking an ‘untrue’ account.  In fact deviant 
cases can enhance the reliability and inclusiveness of a theory (Silverman, 
1989: 21).  There is also the difficulty that ‘most respondents have 
difficulty giving a full account of what they believe and what they do.  Long 
ago their beliefs became assumptions and their actions became habits’ 
(McCracken, 1988: 23).  
 
Qualitative researchers advocate various techniques. Lincoln & Guba 
(1985) offer four steps towards ‘trustworthiness’ (1985: 290), while Kirk & 
Miller (1986) recommend six different validity and reliability checks.  I find 
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Hammersley’s ‘subtle form of realism’ the most useful solution to these 
dilemmas: 
 
1. Validity is identified with confidence in our knowledge 
but not certainty. 
2. Reality is assumed to be independent of the claims 
that researchers make about it. 
3. Reality is always viewed through particular 
perspectives; hence our accounts represent reality 
they do not  reproduce it (1992: 50-1). 
 
Triangulation 
Data and method triangulation are often encouraged (Denzin, 1970: 186).  
Triangulation involves sampling between and within cases and using 
different methods to ‘get a better fix’ on the subject of study (Ragin, 1994: 
100). Interviewing staff members as well as unemployed people, along 
with observation could be considered as a form of triangulation by those 
such as Denzin (1970) who advocate such a process. This approach, like 
attempts to minimise observer bias, are positivist based, assuming that 
there is one version of reality that research reaches as a true totality by 
assessing the validity of participants responses (Silverman, 1989: 105).  
Fielding & Fielding (1986), however, note that 'theoretical triangulation 
does not necessarily reduce bias, nor does methodological triangulation 
necessarily increase validity' (1986: 33).  Fielding & Fielding argue that it is 
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desirable for theories and methods to be combined in order to increase the 
breadth and depth of the analysis but not, as Denzin (1970) argues, to find 
one ‘truth’. 
 
Multiple sources of data can be valuable in understanding the 
phenomenon but since interpretivism admits to no one reality, but rather 
various versions of it filtered through and created by different social actors, 
the technique cannot be useful for finding ‘the truth’.  Since my intention 
was to compare different perspectives of the same phenomena 
triangulation was not used. 
 
I do believe, however, that conducting fieldwork that uses a range of 
methods over an extended period of time in a setting with a lot of 
participants limits the scope for a false picture to be deliberately shown 
(McCall & Simmons, 1969: 2). Indeed, Goffman (1989) advocates 
interacting with people in groups of two or more in order to avoid seeing a 
deliberately distorted version of the way things ‘usually’ are.  Denzin 
(1970) considers it more reliable to have more than one researcher, to 
ensure ‘investigator triangulation’. Contrary to this, I count it as a benefit 
for rigor, that there was one researcher, providing continuity of 
observation, technique and interpretation.   
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Safeguards  
Continuity has been ensured through systematic note taking of 
observations and recordings of interviews.  Questions were designed and 
reflected upon with reliability and validity in mind.  The semi-structured 
interviews with unemployed people and the four conducted with staff 
members used the same, or very similar, questions (depending on the 
context) in an order prescribed by the interview schedules. In practice 
some issues followed on from each other and disrupted this order but this 
is considered to be positive, especially since it meant that the interviewees 
were able to have input into the structure of the interview which benefited 
the natural flow of the conversation. 
 
The use of QSR NUD*IST allowed for more rigor in the analysis process 
than coding by hand would have (cf. Richards & Richards, 1992). Coding 
could be carried out more systematically because checks could easily be 
made to see how other data was coded.  Nodes could be examined and 
the coded text was traceable back to the original transcript and therefore 
the context in which remarks were made, thus providing an internal audit 
trail. Searches could be carried out quickly and easily for certain words or 
phrases, therefore providing evidence of how frequently and in which 
contexts they were used. It was not possible to conduct ‘inter-rater 
reliability’ as Silverman (1993: 148) advocates.  This involves different 
analysts coding the transcripts to ensure that the categories chosen were 
correct. Coding was applied in a standardised manner to every transcript. 
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 Fielding & Fielding identify two main problems with the way in which 
qualitative research is presented: 
 
A tendency to select field data to fit an ideal conception 
(preconception) of the phenomenon, and a tendency to 
select field data which are conspicuous because they are 
exotic, at the expense of less dramatic (but possibly 
indicative) data (1986: 32). 
 
This study has attempted to avoid one of the pitfalls that ethnographic 
street-level bureaucracy studies have been criticised for – that is that they 
sensationalise relatively infrequent events or consequences at the 
expense of adequately contextualising or explaining the mundane features 
of the interaction (Hasenfeld, 1985:  623). 
 
To avoid these faults transparency has been aimed for in the reportage of 
how the research was done and of the findings.  Field notes were carefully 
written to produce a ‘faithful account’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) of the 
observations and the evidence used to substantiate theoretical points has 
been clearly noted where it was typical and where it represented an 
extreme example.  I have avoided making spurious connections. 
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Ethical Concerns 
As a member of the British Sociological Association, I have followed the 
BSA  guidelines for ethical practice.  Guidance has also been taken from 
Spradley’s (1980) discussion of ethics in observation research.  The main 
principles that were honoured were those of informed consent and 
anonymity and confidentiality, each posing its own problems and 
dilemmas.  Another consideration is that the research involved gaining 
information, and ultimately writing about, people who have a less powerful 
social position by virtue of being unemployed.  This is a concern because 
they may not want to be portrayed in certain lights or have labels applied 
which they may be reluctant to identify with (Corden, 1996).  Care has 
therefore been taken to ensure that the views of those involved in the 
research have been represented in writing about it.  Research participants’ 
interests, both staff and users, have been put first in order to protect their 
welfare, dignity and privacy, as Spradley (1980) advises. 
 
Informed consent  
When I first approached the Jobcentre, I outlined in a letter the details of 
how the research would be conducted and what purposes it would be put.  
This was circulated to all staff members so that they would be aware of 
why I was there.  Before conducting informal interviews with staff, or 
observing official interviews that they were involved in I made sure that 
they were aware of why I was there and what I was doing.  I always asked 
for their consent. 
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Once staff had given informed consent (this usually involved a supervisor 
and the individual staff member allowing access for each instance) for me 
to observe their interviews with users, the users themselves had to be 
approached.  I was keen that each user should have as full an explanation 
as possible of the research in order to give consent.  In reality the 
appointments were so tightly spaced that a long explanation would have 
infringed on the time scales that were worked to and changed the flow of 
the interaction that took place. Participant observation aims to learn about 
the setting while causing as little disruption as possible (Burgess, 1984).  
 
One example of this was one day when I observed people signing on.  
These interactions usually only lasted one or two minutes and there was 
always a queue of people waiting.  I was given permission by the section 
supervisor to observe these interactions only on the condition that I was 
not to interfere with them or distract staff.  It was not possible, therefore, to 
ask these unemployed people for their consent.  This was justified 
because the interactions were so short the data gathered did not unduly 
intrude on their personal lives and no information was gathered about 
them personally.  
 
In longer official interviews the workers who were conducting them 
introduced me, to minimise my impact on the interaction. The workers 
always asked the user for consent, but not always in the way I wanted 
them to.  Some staff members gave a full account of my presence but 
there were occasions when I was introduced as ‘someone sitting in’, ‘an 
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observer’ or in the worst cases as ‘a colleague’.  Explanations of how the 
data would be used were also scant in these instances.  No user ever 
objected to me observing their official interview, but this was not surprising 
if they aligned me with staff and felt powerless and denied choice (see 
Chapter Six). 
 
In the interviews with unemployed people a full explanation of what the 
research was about, where I was from, and how the information would be 
used, was always given.  I gave each person a letter that contained this 
information as well as my contact details.  I always checked again that 
they were happy to proceed with the interview.   
 
Anonymity and confidentiality 
All names and identifying characteristics have been changed to protect the 
anonymity of the research participants.  Pseudonyms have been used and 
each research participant has been assigned a code for quotes.  SM1 
means Staff Member one, and UP1 means Unemployed Interviewee one. 
The location of the Jobcentre studied has not been divulged and details or 
features that could make it identifiable have been altered.  The privacy of 
all those who were involved in the research has been respected and 
personal details have been kept confidential.  Transcripts and documents 
containing names (staff lists for instance) were kept in a secure place.  
Information that was deemed to be sensitive, or comments that 
interviewees wanted to be off the record, were not recorded in field notes 
and have not been discussed. 
 120
 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the ethnographic approach that has been 
adopted to understand the meanings that interaction between Jobcentre 
staff and users held for them.  An interpretative stance, informed 
particularly by symbolic interactionism, has guided the choice of qualitative 
methods, namely a mixture of observation and in-depth interviewing with 
staff and users, along with analysis of documents and notified vacancies.  
This chapter has also considered the methodological issues surrounding 
such an approach and the practicalities that the research involved.  The 
next four chapters will present the results that these methods have 
yielded.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Re-creating Unemployment Policy 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter considers the role played by front-line staff in the 
implementation process.  The question is:  can Lipsky's theory of street-
level bureaucracy be applied to explain the practices of front-line 
Employment Officers in the changed context of new managerialism in the 
late 1990s?  Rather than viewing Employment Officers as impartial 
implementation ‘tools’ or empty vessels through which official policy can 
flow, it situates them as actors within a social context and acknowledges 
that they are active in interpreting and responding to the official policy that 
they provide as a service.  Front-line Jobcentre staff also play a role as the 
mediators between citizens and the state. The interaction that they have 
with clients therefore has implications not only for the way in which the 
service operates, but for the ways in which clients view the state.  
 
This chapter provides three examples of the in which Employment Officers 
re-create official policy.  The first example demonstrates how front-line 
staff develop routines to deal with the pressures presented by fortnightly 
signing on interviews.  The second highlights the way staff behaviour was 
modified in response to performance targets for job placements and the 
third illustrates how staff reacted to a new policy, the New Deal for 18-24 
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year olds.  For each example the official policy will be outlined, followed by 
a description of front-line practice, then an explanation of the pressures 
that led to discrepancies between the two. 
 
Example One - ‘Signing On’ 
Official Policy 
‘Signing on’ interviews are routine interactions that demonstrate the way in 
which street-level workers re-create the service that they provide.  Clients 
who have registered for Jobseeker's Allowance must attend the Jobcentre 
at regular intervals, usually every fortnight, to sign a declaration that they 
still satisfy the conditions for claiming benefit.  These interviews constitute 
the most frequent interaction that users have with staff and are therefore 
crucial to the way in which unemployed people view the Jobcentre.  ‘Active 
signing’ was introduced as part of the Jobseeker's Allowance regulations 
in 1996 (CPAG, 1996: 7).  This meant that signing on interviews were 
made longer and included an assessment of the client’s record of what he 
or she had done to find work in the previous fortnight.   
 
Signing on interviews were formally referred to as ‘Fortnightly 
Interventions’.  They are designed to last for at least five minutes (seven 
minutes for long-term unemployed people) as prescribed by the 
Jobseeker’s Allowance legislation and guidance (CPAG, 1996).  The 
official guidelines (see Appendix Four) for signing on detail nine stages 
that the interviewer is meant to progress through (Employment Service, 
1998b).  In brief the stages are: 
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1. Greeting. 
2. Aim/Purpose – an explanation of the purpose of the interview. 
3. Access Client Record – a check to make sure user's details are correct 
and there is no outstanding action. 
4. Review Client Jobseeker's Agreement. 
5. Evaluate Client Jobsearch Activity – a check what the client has done 
and follow up on previous submissions, including taking action for 
‘Refusal of Employment’. 
6. Conduct Labour Market System Jobsearch – a computer check for 
suitable vacancies or a comment if nothing suitable was found. 
7. Close Jobsearch Review. 
8. Payment Activity – initiating benefit through the computer system. 
9. Close intervention. 
 
A system of penalties was in place to enforce client compliance with the 
regulations.  Users were officially meant to be referred to adjudication, with 
the possible outcome of a benefit sanction if, for instance, they did not 
attend their interview at the appointed time. 
 
Front-Line Practice 
The first way in which Jobcentre staff deviated from the official policy was 
in the terminology they used for these interactions.  Rather than using the 
official term for ‘Fortnightly Interventions’ staff (as well as users) referred to 
the interviews as ‘signing on’.  This resistance to the use of new 
terminology was evident from staff at the signing points. 
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 SM 20: We’re called an ‘interventionist’.  I don’t know who dreamt 
that one up! 
 
The signing on interviews were typically much shorter than the prescribed 
length, usually lasting around two or three minutes.  These interactions 
were brief and perfunctory for both parties and it was not unusual for the 
pleasantries of polite conversation to be dispensed with entirely.  The 
following example is of a client signing on. 
 
SM 14 : Can I help you? 
 
Male Client: I’ve come to sign on. 
 
SM 14: (Did something on the computer.) Right.  Are you wantin’ to 
sign there? (Gave him form to sign.) 
 
Male Client: (Signed it then stood up immediately and left.) 
 
Several of the stages of the interview, such as such as stage two 
(explaining the purpose of the interview, see above), were missed 
completely.  Other stages were pared down.  Stage one, for instance 
(‘Greeting: hello; good morning/afternoon; apologies if kept waiting; good 
eye contact; smile; ice breaker’, Employment Service, 1998b), became: 
‘Can I help you?’ There was no apology, because being kept waiting was 
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seen as a routine part of signing on, no smile and no 'icebreaker'.  Staff 
acknowledged the discrepancy between official guidelines and actual 
practice: 
 
SM 8: You’re really not interested in having a long conversation 
with them, while the queue is up to the door. 
 
SM 17: Some just come in and throw their cards at you.  They don’t 
say anything and they don’t even look at you.  You speak to 
the side of their face because they’re looking away. 
 
SM 8: They’re like they cannae be bothered.  I think ‘well I cannae 
be bothered either then.  Will I just not bother processing 
your money?’ 
 
The ‘active signing’ prescribed by the Jobseeker's Allowance regulations 
was administered in a remarkably inactive way by front-line staff.  There 
was a tendency for staff to focus on the necessary parts of benefit 
administration rather than making efforts to help find people work.  Job 
searches were not conducted during the interview unless users specifically 
requested it, which was rare.  Policy was similarly recreated in other 
sections of the Jobcentre since job searches were neglected during a 
range of interviews.  At times staff conducted job searches in advance of 
the signing on procedure, which involved making judgements about which 
users to check for and which not to.  If the job search was not conducted 
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with users present then they did not know whether it had been done at all.  
In short, despite the emphasis placed on enabling users to find work in the 
formal goals of the Jobcentre and in the official guidance, signing on was 
much more about administering benefit than helping people to find work. 
 
Pressure 
The gap between official policy and implementation by Employment 
Officers is partly attributable to the pressures under which staff work.  
There were complaints from staff of being under ‘a lot of pressure’ (SM 15) 
and ‘always battling against time and the next person is in’ (SM 13).  
There were time limitations to the interviews, which were tighter when 
there was not a full complement of staff in the office. 
 
SM 38: It’s very high pressure. . . .  There’s all sorts that’s supposed 
to get done that doesn’t get done. 
 
SM 18: You’ve not got enough time to go through everything.  You 
just go through the form and by the time you’ve done that the 
next person is waiting. 
 
Time constraints limited the interaction between staff and users to 
question and answer sessions, with users expected to provide very 
personal information on cue. The main purpose was to complete forms 
and windows in the computer screen.  In fact, many of the interactions in 
the Jobcentre were shaped by the structure of claims forms and the 
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architecture of the computer programmes used by Employment Officers.  It 
is significant that the part of the work that was most likely to be neglected 
was the part that was not form-based.  Paperwork added to the time 
pressures and was given as a reason why staff had to stay late in the 
evening or come in early in the morning to catch up with their work. 
 
Signing on interviews were influenced by the established patterns of 
interaction with limited time available due to the pressure of other people 
waiting in the queue.  There was usually a constant stream of people 
waiting in front of the desks, making both staff and users keenly aware of 
the need to finish the interview as quickly as possible.  More than 22 
people had to sign at each desk in each hour of signing.  Even if they 
came in equal time slots, which they did not, this equated to less than 
three minutes for each interview.  One of the Employment Officers at the 
Signing Points noted: 
 
SM 22: We need more time.  There’s not enough time to do it 
properly.  They just come in and sign and then they’re away 
again.  We’re meant to spend time with them and do a job 
search but you never get time to do it. 
 
As a response to these pressures staff redefined what it was that they 
were aiming to achieve during the interview.  These goals were more 
modest than the official purpose and focused on certain aspects of the 
service delivery while other aspects were either ignored or reduced in 
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scope.  One of the primary activities that front-line workers were engaged 
in was therefore the rationing of services.  This took place in terms of 
limiting time, limiting what was done during interviews (especially 
neglecting the job search part of the work) and facilitating access to jobs. 
This bears out findings from earlier research, for instance Cooper’s (1985) 
study of a Supplementary Benefits Office found that more than 90 per cent 
of staff said they had insufficient time to complete tasks, a third rating this 
as a serious problem. Hvinden (1994) also provided evidence of welfare 
service staff concentrating on processing cases rather than assisting 
people. 
 
At signing times those who came late to sign on or who did not 
demonstrate that they were actively seeking work were, according to the 
Jobseeker's Allowance regulations, supposed to be referred to 
adjudication.  One reason why this rarely happened was the paperwork 
required for this procedure.  One Front-line worker explained: 
 
SM 33: There’s seven pieces of documentation that you need.  You 
need a copy of the vacancy, their Jobseeker's Agreement.  
You need statements from the client.  You can’t just say ‘I 
spoke to them and they wouldn’t take it’.  You have to have 
everything in writing.  Also it has to be a job that’s offering 
over 24 hours a week for it to be a ‘refusal of employment’.  
So we tell them that and that it’ll have to be referred to 
adjudication and that that might mean that their benefit gets 
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affected.  So they’re going to get angry or storm out.  We 
would have to tag it for the next time and try to get something 
in writing, otherwise you’re not going to have a chance to get 
it.  That’s why not a lot of us are doing it.  It’s a hassle. 
 
The above examples demonstrate that unemployment policy in practice is 
as much about what front-line staff do not do as it is about what they do.  
Blackmore (2001) has criticised policy analysts for being alarmist about 
the consequences of tighter regulations under the Stricter Benefit Regime, 
which were implemented in the mid 1990s.  At street-level, he argues, 
those guidelines were not introduced to the extent that was feared and 
therefore did not disadvantage users as much as had been expected (Finn 
et al., 1998).  What is perhaps more concerning is that the procedures that 
were designed to protect users’ basic rights and those designed to enable 
them to find work were not necessarily implemented either.   
 
Example Two - Job Matching 
Official Policy 
The official goal of the Jobcentre was to enable people to find work and 
recent active labour market policies have been aimed at facilitating labour 
market entry in a more directive way, linking claiming benefits more closely 
with actively seeking work conditions.  Matching users to job vacancies 
was therefore intended to be a central part of staff activity and has been 
specifically  prioritised in recent years.  Job matching was meant to be 
carried out as part of the routine interviews with users e.g. Fresh Claims, 
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Signing On, Reviews and Response to Displayed Vacancies. It has been 
officially estimated that Jobcentres in the UK administer a third of all 
vacancies.  The system operated by employers telephoning in vacancies 
which were then inputted by the Jobcentre staff to the LMS computer 
system then printed off as cards to be displayed on the vacancy boards.  
There was a formal system of validation to ensure that all vacancies were 
properly administered through the computer system.   
 
Front-Line Practice 
However, it has already been indicated that staff did not always match 
users to jobs during routine interviews because of the lack of time and an 
emphasis on form-based work.  Matching users to jobs implies a process 
of sifting, screening and ‘creaming’ the best applicants in the interest of 
the employer (Anderson, 1999).  Lipsky (1980) uses the term ‘triaging’ to 
describe a form of categorising people into groups according to how easily 
they can be helped and how likely it will be that they will benefit from the 
service provided.  This happened in various ways in the different sections 
of the Jobcentre. 
 
The office mainly advertised vacancies that had been notified to them 
directly, rather than from other offices.  This was because they did not 
want other vacancies ‘to compete with our own’ (SM 24).  Employers were 
also discouraged from advertising vacancies by other means, in local 
newspapers or through agencies.  The office held a few copies of the local 
newspaper.  This was the only source of vacancies other than those 
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advertised on the boards that was available to users.  There was not a 
range of newspapers or recruitment magazines to consult and there was 
no Internet access.  This meant that Jobcentre staff were restricting the 
applications to those that they could control, thus preventing some people 
from applying for certain jobs.   
 
Rationing Vacancies 
Lipsky identifies a series of ways in which access to public services can be 
rationed by street-level bureaucrats, including time-limiting services, 
withholding information and queuing (1980: 87-99).  These forms of 
rationing were evident in the Jobcentre. The starting point for this 
discussion of vacancy rationing is to acknowledge that not anyone can 
apply for any vacancy advertised in the Jobcentre.  
 
Staff rationed vacancies through restricting access to information about 
particular opportunities.  Indeed some job or training vacancies were only 
open to specific user groups, e.g. New Deal or Training for Work, for which 
users had to have been registered unemployed or be in a certain age 
group to qualify. The information on Jobcentre vacancy cards (see 
Appendix Five) was much less detailed than other methods of vacancy 
advertisement, for instance a standard newspaper advertisement.  The 
vacancy cards only displayed the job title, rate of pay, hours of work, 
duration of contract and a very brief description of the main duties. Users 
were not given direct access to other basic details of the post, the closing 
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date for instance.  Significantly the employer’s name, company and the 
exact location of the job were almost always withheld.    
 
Analysis of the job vacancies available during the three month period (8th 
September 1998 – 4th December 1998) showed that even the very basic 
information was not always complete on the vacancy cards.  The terms of 
employment were not always specified: 13% of local vacancies, 29% of 
jobs in other areas and 13% of jobs abroad did not state whether they 
were for full-time or part-time work.   2% of local jobs, 2% of jobs in other 
areas and 4% of jobs abroad did not state whether they were permanent 
or temporary positions. 
 
The rate of pay was not stated for 19% of local vacancies, 39% of jobs in 
other areas and 17% of overseas jobs.  The most common alternatives to 
stating a specific rate of pay were to advertise as ‘depends on age or 
experience’, ‘TBA’ or ‘negotiable’.  It is questionable, however, how much 
scope there might be for a part-time cleaner or kitchen porter to negotiate 
his or her wages with an employer.   Other alternatives to stating the rate 
of pay were to promise ‘good’, ‘excellent’, ‘competitive’ or trade rates.  
There was a likelihood for certain sales vacancies to be marked as 
‘commission only’ or ‘commission plus bonus/expenses’.  These 
descriptions of the rate of pay were insufficient to allow users to make an 
informed decision about how much time the job would take and how much 
money they would earn from it.  This meant that users could not know 
whether the job would mean they would have to apply for a different type 
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of benefit or if they would be able to afford their daily living costs without 
any reliance on benefits, or if they would be in a worse position financially 
if they had that job. 
 
Withholding this type of vital information places the unemployed person at 
a disadvantage and in a position of weakness in relation to both the 
Jobcentre staff who control such information and the employers who 
provide the vacancies. The employer’s position of power is reinforced and 
legitimated by Jobcentre staff who ration access to vacancies. Users had 
to wait, sometimes for long periods of time even to obtain basic 
information about vacancies they might be interested in. Unemployed 
people were dependent on staff members to divulge further information 
about vacancies which is held on the computer system. In some cases no 
exact rate of pay or hours of work were held on the LMS either, but in 
most cases the Employment Officer was privy to much more information 
about the vacancy than the unemployed person who was interested in it. 
Staff might judge an individual to be unsuitable for a vacancy and withhold 
information about it from them. Enquiring about vacancies advertised on 
the boards can also be a risky venture for unemployed people, who may 
be required or pressurised by staff to apply for it.   It is possible that a 
refusal to apply for such a vacancy once further details have been secured 
could be treated as a ‘Refusal of Employment’, which can mean a benefit 
sanction for the unemployed person.  
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Age restrictions were clearly stated on 4.2% of local vacancies.  These 
restrictions almost always discriminated against younger workers e.g. 
‘aged 18 plus’ or ‘aged 25 plus’.  A minority of cards for overseas 
vacancies stated that applicants must be ‘aged 30 plus’.  It was very rare 
for such age restrictions to have an obvious logical reasoning behind 
them, one exception being a vacancy for bar staff which advertised for 
staff to be ‘aged 18 plus’.  Other restrictions were that applicants should 
be experienced or time-served (particular for trade jobs).  1.4% of 
vacancies (a proportion which may have increased since the time when 
this research was conducted) were restricted to New Deal users, a further 
0.7% were marked ‘C’, meaning that they would be considered for New 
Deal but were also open to other users. This is a reflection of the operation 
of the New Deal scheme, within which staff pursued particular vacancies 
for their users, exclusively as New Deal vacancies.  This has an 
implication for the labour market because jobs were being restricted from 
other potential applicants.  This means that concentrated efforts to widen 
opportunities for the New Deal user group might actually constrain job 
opportunities for other people who are not registered on the New Deal, 
regardless of whether they are as disadvantaged as those on the New 
Deal.  0.6% of vacancies were for ‘self-employed’ positions (usually sales 
agents positions) and four jobs were restricted to female applicants. 
 
Another restriction was the number of jobs that could be enquired about at 
any one time.   There were slips available for users to note the job 
reference number and take the enquiry to a member of staff, either at the 
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Response to Displayed Vacancies (RDV) section or, if they were 
registered unemployed, to their signing point.   Both of these sections of 
the office were very busy and usually had a queue of people waiting.   
These slips only had enough space for four job reference numbers but 
people usually enquired about more than four vacancies. 
 
There was a tension for staff in serving the interests of unemployed people 
at the same time as the interests of employers.   Similar to Anderson’s 
(1999) findings from his ethnographic study of a State Employment Office, 
Jobcentre staff had to consider their reputation with employers and this 
affected how they treated users. To manage this dilemma staff targeted 
users to be submitted for vacancies.  One adviser described why he would 
not submit a man who had been unemployed for 10 years for a vacancy. 
 
SM 10: You wouldn’t be fair to the employer subbing someone like 
that for a job.  I mean we’re providing a service to the 
employer as much as to the unemployed person.   
 
In this case the member of staff was re-creating policy to provide more of a 
service to the employer than to the unemployed user. Staff action could 
therefore actually contribute to certain types of users remaining inactive in 
the labour market.  In this way the front-line staff could actually make 
decisions on the employer’s behalf or for what they perceived to be the 
employer’s interest.  This constitutes a challenge to the aim of enabling 
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people to find work and also blurs the lines between the role of the 
employer and the role of the Jobcentre.  
 
Submissions Limits 
Jobcentre staff therefore played an important role as gatekeepers for 
vacancies.  In this way they structured access to the labour market.  Users 
gained access to further information about jobs and to the means of 
application (e.g. the employer’s details or an application form) through 
interaction with staff.   This process was not necessarily a successful one 
and Employment Officers could grant or deny access to jobs or training 
vacancies in a number of ways, for different reasons.    
 
Vacancies had very different meanings for staff and users.  For staff they 
were a routine part of their daily activities, while for users they represented 
the hope of providing them with the job that would reinstate them with the 
status of a worker and release them from the stigmatised role of being 
unemployed (see Chapter Six).  Restrictions on applying for vacancies 
that prevented them applying for job or training opportunities therefore led 
to disappointment. 
 
One source of frustration for users was when they enquired about a job 
advertised on the boards, only to find that it had already been closed.   
Vacancies were usually closed either when they reached the closing date, 
or as in the case below, when the submissions limit was reached.   The 
 137
following example shows the implications of this form of rationing.  Here a 
male user has brought a vacancy slip to the desk for further information. 
 
SM 13: I hate to tell you this but the vacancy has been suspended.   
Sorry. 
 
User:  Oh.   I see. 
 
SM 13: It’s just been suspended ten minutes ago. 
 
User:  I see. 
 
SM 13: I’m awful sorry about that. 
 
User:  That was the one that was most suited to my qualifications. 
 
SM 13: As I say it’s been suspended. 
 
User:  There’s not a much on my particular line.   I recently 
graduated as a mature student and the kind of work I’m 
looking for is environmental protection, air quality control, 
that kind of thing. 
 
SM 13:  The only thing is that you’ll not get an awful lot of that in this 
area. 
 138
 User:  I would go anywhere in Scotland. 
 
In this example the user was clearly very keen to find work in his area of 
expertise.   The staff member recognised that vacancies to suit him were 
few and far between but he was not able to apply for the job because it 
had been suspended only ten minutes previously.   This highlights the 
consequences of the submissions limits, which are set by employers and 
enforced by Jobcentre staff.  If the vacancy had been advertised in a 
newspaper, for instance, then the employer would have received as many 
applications as came in, but because this employer had chosen to 
advertise through the Jobcentre an extra layer of rationing was added to 
the application process with a limit being set.  This user, who may have 
stood a good chance of actually getting the job, was not allowed to apply 
for it. 
 
Matching Section 
In the particular office where this research was conducted a group of 
Employment Officers worked in the Matching Section. Unlike other parts of 
the office, staff in this section were concerned primarily with job matching, 
rather than benefit administration during interactions with users.  This 
section functioned more along the lines of a private sector job agency than 
a public service. Vacancies, and the good relations with employers 
necessary to secure them, were particularly valued because they were 
considered to be ‘good business’ (SM 24) for the Jobcentre.  This 
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framework of understanding fits within a new managerialist model (c.f. 
Clarke & Newman, 1997). 
 
Matching staff therefore served the interests of the employer first and 
foremost, rather than the interests of the majority of users.  For example, 
for certain vacancies information was strictly controlled through an informal 
system so that only a few users of a ‘high calibre’ (SM 34) were given 
information about the vacancy, which was not advertised on the vacancy 
boards.  These vacancies bypassed the formal system of notification (to 
other offices and even to other staff within the same office) until certain 
users had been submitted for the position.  The timing of information being 
entered into the computer system was crucial here.  It could imply that 
staff in other sections of the Jobcentre, and staff at other Jobcentres, were 
prevented from submitting users to these undisclosed vacancies.  Such 
‘creaming’ of users was considered to be desirable because it ‘cuts down 
on unnecessary candidates’ (SM 34).  Staff were aware that they were 
acting against official policy because ‘we shouldn’t restrict applicants, but 
we want to do what the employer wants’ (SM 34).   
 
The Matching staff held hand-written lists of users who they would put 
forward for certain vacancies.  These vacancies were often for trades 
people, with employers being keen to have someone ready to start work 
as soon as possible.   
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SM 34: It’s an occupation whereby, particularly construction, joiners, 
brickies, something like that.  They phone up and they want 
someone to start immediately, yesterday.  And that would go 
straight to Matching before going to the computer or the 
vacancy going up, because they might have people waiting.  
. . .  So that’s usually hand written and given over to 
Matching.  It’s not printed up.  Once they start getting subs 
we put them on.  Because of validation we shouldn’t put 
them on retrospectively so as soon as they start coming in I 
put them up on the system. 
 
There was an unofficial dealing in vacancies, particularly for construction 
work, which were not advertised and were only inputted into the computer 
once they had been filled.   Although  these were only a small minority of 
the total vacancies advertised through the Jobcentre it is significant that 
the system operated at all.    
 
The Matching staff held hand-written lists of users that they would put 
forward for certain vacancies.    
 
SM 24: If a labouring vacancy is put up on the board 10, 000 guys 
might apply, but you can think ‘right I’ve got 10 in mind’.   An 
employer can request non-display so we can pick and 
choose. 
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How vacancies were manipulated off the computer system is an important 
way of understanding how they were rationed and controlled by staff.   It is 
impossible to tell how many vacancies were filled in this way because the 
formal validation system only tracks vacancies after they have been filled, 
rather than evaluating the processes by which they are filled.   It is 
possible, however, to identify a significant discrepancy between the 
number of vacancies advertised on cards on the display boards and the 
official vacancy count.  This problem has also been highlighted by the 
Greater Manchester Low Pay Unit (2000).  My methodology allowed more 
privileged access behind the scenes, to understand the process by which 
the official count is arrived at. 
 
An in-depth analysis of the administration of notified vacancies within the 
Jobcentre office showed that the practice of ‘plussing up’ accounted for at 
least part of this discrepancy between the number of cards on view to the 
public and the official count.  ‘Plussing up’ was a routine staff practice for 
dealing with requests from employers to advertise multiple vacancies.  For 
instance, if an employer telephoned in a vacancy for 10 shop assistants, 
then the vacancy would be entered into the computer system as one 
vacancy rather than 10.  Then, when more people were found to fill the 
jobs, the vacancy was ‘plussed up’ in the computer.  The advantage of this 
practice was that the chances of filling all of the vacancies were increased. 
 
SM 24: Usually we only put one on for each vacancy because it’s a 
sin to cancel vacancies.  There was one guy phoned up and 
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said ’30 sales people and it’s commission only’ and I said 
(sarcastically) ‘aye right’.  They might only get one.  So I put 
that in and then the computer asks if I want to close it or put 
another one in and so we call it a ‘plus up’ and you can put  
another one in then. 
 
Each vacancy card displayed, therefore, did not represent only one 
vacancy in all cases.  Simply counting the number of cards does not give a 
reliable estimate of the number of vacancies available through a certain 
Jobcentre office. Employment Officers can decide not to advertise the 
requested number of vacancies because they  do not think that the 
employer is likely to get 10 suitable applicants through the Jobcentre, or 
because he or she knows that the vacancy is being advertised elsewhere 
(e.g. in a newspaper or through a private employment agency).  This 
means that the successful applicants would not be likely to all have been 
referred by the Jobcentre.  Jobcentre staff can only meet their targets by 
filling notified vacancies with Jobcentre users.  They gain nothing if an 
‘outsider’ gets the job.  It is the fear of having to cancel a vacancy that 
leads Employment Officers to enter vacancies onto the computer system 
for a smaller number of people than the employer actually wants.  If a 
larger number of suitable applicants apply, or staff discover that more than 
one person who was referred through the Jobcentre was employed, they 
can then go into the computer system and ‘plus up’ the vacancy – 
increasing the number of vacancies which the reference number (or card) 
represents. 
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 It was possible to calculate the extent of ‘plussing up’ during the months of 
October and November 1998.  For this research the number of vacancies 
was calculated by collecting information about the vacancy cards that 
were displayed on the vacancy boards.  This information was cross-
referenced with the Labour Market System print out of ‘live’ vacancy 
reference numbers for each day and the hand-written record of how many 
vacancies each card represented at the time it was notified to the 
Jobcentre.  The table below shows the number of vacancies counted 
during the fieldwork in comparison with the official number of notified 
vacancies (provided by the Employment Information Unit). 
 
Table One:  Extent of ‘Plus-ups’ in One Jobcentre Office,  
October and November 1998 
 
  
Official Count of 
Notified Vacancies 
 
Manual Count of 
Notified Vacancies 
 
Number of 
Vacancies Attributed 
to ‘Plussing-up’ 
 
 
October 1998 
 
360 
 
 
346 
 
14 
 
November 1998 
 
521 
 
306 
 
 
215 
 
In October 1998, ‘plus-ups’ only accounted for 14 vacancies but in 
November 1998 there were 215 ‘plus-up’ vacancies.  The high number of 
vacancies attributed to ‘plus-ups’ in November coincided with a high 
number of vacancies that were not displayed. In October, there were 25 
vacancies which were not displayed, while in November there were 49 
unadvertised vacancies which were not displayed. There seems to be a 
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link, therefore, between the number of vacancies not displayed on the 
boards and the proportion of ‘plus-ups’. This may be attributable to 
Jobcentre staff having greater control over the vacancies which were not 
displayed. 
 
Pressure 
This rationing of vacancies occurred for several reasons.  Demand for 
information about vacancies outstripped the supply of staff time to give it, 
which resulted in restrictions of access to the service.  Part of the lack of 
information was also due to restrictions imposed by employers, which 
highlights the conflict in roles between serving those looking for work and 
serving employers.  Both in the interest of employers and as a response to 
the pressures they were under, staff rationed vacancies through restricting 
access to information about particular opportunities.  A further constraint 
on staff job matching activity (along with time restrictions and emphasis on 
form-based work) was the mismatch between the types of vacancies that 
users wanted and the types of vacancies on offer.  Chapter Six provides a 
detailed analysis of the types of work that people registered unemployed 
at this particular office were seeking, compared with the types of job 
vacancy on offer.  This shows that in many cases, e.g. those looking for 
professional vacancies, staff did not make efforts to match people to 
vacancies because they knew that the vacancies held by the Jobcentre 
were not of the kind required by the user. 
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Clearly, staff members also acted in these ways because of the pressure 
resulting from performance targets for job placements, which seemed to 
have a greater influence on staff behaviour than official guidance 
documents.  Blau (1963) views such performance records as a 
bureaucratic mechanism to control workers.  ‘Bureaucratic emphasis on 
statistical records of operations, designed as a means to improve 
performance, induced officials to view making a good showing on the 
record as an end-in-itself’ (Blau, 1963: 294).  This observation of a state 
employment agency in the 1950s appears to be just as appropriate in 
describing the activities of Jobcentre workers in the UK in the late 1990s.  
The incentive of the job placement targets changed behaviour, but not 
necessarily in ways that improve service delivery.  In fact the greater the 
emphasis on specific targets, the more effort staff will make to meet that 
target, which consequently means that they will neglect other parts of the 
service because of the limitations of time.   
 
As Lipsky (1980) argues, evaluation of street-level bureaucracies is very 
difficult because of the level of discretionary decision making.  Numerical 
targets are inappropriate in measuring performance because ‘the 
behaviour of workers comes to reflect the incentives and sanctions implicit 
in those measurements’ (Lipsky, 1980: 51).  Lipsky argues that ‘surrogate 
measures then become reified and guide future performance’ (1980: 52).  
Staff make efforts to meet targets but these efforts are not necessarily of 
the kind intended by those who design the targets.   
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Each Jobcentre office has placement targets for getting people into work.  
These are broken down into targets for each section of the Jobcentre, 
introducing competition between different offices and different sections.  
What is more, placement targets in the Jobcentre lead staff not to be 
interested in just getting people into work, but getting certain people into 
certain jobs.  One staff member noted: 
 
SM 19: We’re primarily here for the registered unemployed.  We do 
keep the employed on file.  Preference goes to the 
registered unemployed.  If there’s no one suitable then 
Matching will put an employed person forward. 
 
Matching staff recognise the power they have in controlling access to 
certain vacancies. 
 
SM 24: I suppose you could say it’s discriminating.  We can decide 
who gets jobs.  If we only offer it to unemployed people we 
can keep the numbers of employed people getting jobs 
down.  There’s no brownie points for them.  Just now we 
have 23% employed placings.  That’s too high. 
 
Performance targets made disregarding the rules more acceptable, even 
to senior members of staff.  In the example above it was not only 
employed people who were disadvantaged, but also those who were 
unemployed but not registered as such, who were therefore doubly 
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disadvantaged because of their ineligibility for benefit and because they 
were unlikely to be prioritised for job matching. 
 
Targets led to competition between staff in different sections, which in turn 
led to resentment when some workers were receiving greater rewards 
than others.   Some members of staff objected to the Matching Section 
gaining a high proportion of placings.  There was evidence that the 
specific new managerialist practices of targets and competition created a 
change in the staff culture that encouraged staff to work against each 
other, rather than with each other in a way which would seem more 
conducive to helping people to find work.  The individualisation of the 
‘competitive order’ that Clarke & Newman (1997:  72) identify was 
therefore apparent in the Jobcentre.  
 
Caseloads 
Targets could operate in a way that prevented staff from doing their day to 
day user work and even in ways which were contrary to the general goal 
of the Jobcentre, i.e. to get people into work.  The Employment Service 
targets put an extra weighting onto placing long-term unemployed people 
into work.  In the Jobcentre where this research was conducted one of the 
strategies for meeting this target was the issue of ‘caseload’ lists of 10 
users who had been unemployed for two years or more (caseload 
matching).  Staff were required to make extra efforts to find work for these 
users, calling them in for an interview to discuss what kind of work they 
were looking for.  All front-line staff were given this task, including the 
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receptionists.  This meant that staff who were already working under 
significant time pressures had to neglect other users who had been 
unemployed for shorter periods of time or who did not happen to be on 
their caseload.  One of the signing staff was frustrated by this 
counterproductive situation.  Asked whether targets influenced her work 
she replied: 
 
SM 44: They’re meant to.  Now with all the (caseload) matching 
you’re meant to get them done, but you can’t because you 
have to help someone.  It’s like taking away what you’re here 
for.  We’re here to help the public and it’s taking you away 
from it.  And that’s not what it’s about.  Like if a punter comes 
in you can’t blame them if they don’t want to come back if 
somebody’s not giving them the time because somebody’s 
working on their targets.  If you want to give out the right 
image you have to have a caring attitude all the time. 
 
This relates to Lipsky’s (1980) observation that people are transformed 
into ‘clients’ by being reduced to a set of qualifications or categories in 
order for them to be processed by the bureaucratic organisation.  
Ultimately, this means discriminating against some users in favour of 
others, because time and resource constraints mean that users cannot all 
be given the maximum service.   
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The goal of assisting people to find work conflicts with serving employers’ 
needs in filling vacancies.  This has serious consequences for 
unemployed people who are not put forward for jobs.  Even the smallest 
technicality of vacancy placement, advertising of jobs and matching can 
influence a user’s chance of a job.  Staff found it very difficult to meet 
targets, which they considered to be set too high, and the target system 
was not necessarily in the interests of employers either.  The vacancies 
that were advertised in the Jobcentre were those that had been vetted by 
staff in that particular office.  The staff in a particular office could only fill 
their targets if an unemployed person got a job that was notified to them.  
There was therefore no incentive for offices to display vacancies from 
another office.  In other words, if an employer requested his or her 
vacancy to be advertised in every Jobcentre in the UK, for example, this 
would not necessarily happen.  The staff in the Jobcentre that the 
employer contacted directly might choose not to refer it to other offices, or 
other offices might choose not to display it. 
 
Example Three - The New Deal 
Official Policy 
As an active labour market policy, the New Deal presents a particularly 
interesting example of policy in practice.  In the UK the compulsory New 
Deal for 18-24 year olds (who have been unemployed and claiming 
Jobseeker's Allowance for six months or more), was the flagship of the 
government’s welfare-to-work policy announced in 1997.  There was a 
significant commitment from politicians to the New Deal, which had 
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dedicated resources, funded by a windfall tax on the privatised utilities.  
Support for the scheme came from the voluntary sector and private 
employers as well as the Employment Service itself.  The New Deal was 
billed as a new and distinct initiative and was targeted at a specific user 
group.  Many of the conditions necessary for a good fit between policy 
design and implementation (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984) were therefore in 
place.   
 
The official guidance for the delivery of the New Deal stated that young 
people ‘will receive an initial interview with their Employment Service 
personal adviser, who will explain the New Deal and remain their point of 
contact throughout’ (Employment Service, 1997: 8).  The ethos behind the 
New Deal was to provide personal, user-centred advice and support to 
enable young people to find work.  ‘Personal Advisers’ were trained and 
became involved in more ‘people-changing’ (a term coined by Hasenfeld & 
Weaver (1996) to describe modifying users’ behaviour).  In contrast to 
many forms of policy implementation (c.f. Hill, 1997), the introduction of 
the New Deal represented more than incremental change. 
 
Front-Line Practice  
When the New Deal was introduced desks were arranged in one corner of 
the office with a separate waiting area, the walls were painted a different 
colour and new signs and furniture were used.  At first the staff had small 
caseloads and were able to spend an hour or more on the first in-depth 
interview with the young user, as they were officially meant to.  The 
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personal service that was first introduced was viewed by staff as being 
productive in establishing relationships with users.  One Personal Adviser 
described one way in which advisers were able to help young people 
when the New Deal was first implemented. 
 
SM 26: If they were going to have to go to the Careers Office we 
would say ‘Oh do you know where you’re going? I’ll show 
you where it is’.  And also Fiona and I both took them out for 
interviews.  And that worked quite well because if you take 
them up and they would interview them and take them on the 
next day.  It was great.  We never got involved in that before 
so we were able to go the extra distance, so that we can 
actually help people.   
 
One of the founding principles of the New Deal scheme, which was 
praised by staff and policy analysts alike, was the personal service that it 
would provide.  Initially it allowed staff to build a rapport with users and 
discuss their backgrounds, problems and aspirations in great detail.  
However, within a very short time of the scheme running, this principle was 
eroded.  As more and more young people were referred to the scheme it 
was not possible for the in-depth personal service to continue.  Personal 
Advisers were not able to accompany young people to visits or job 
interviews.  The initial interviews for people joining the New Deal became 
group sessions (with approximately 20 people) instead of one-to-one 
interviews.  Group interviews did not provide the opportunity for personal 
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advice and some of the young people who attended group interviews did 
not participate in the discussion at all.  The service provided by New Deal 
staff was therefore re-created by staff soon after its introduction.   
 
Another example of the application of new policy within the New Deal was 
for signing on.  Here the intended in-depth personal service was again 
found to be lacking since the signing on interviews were conducted 
according to a pattern which had previously been established in other 
areas of the office (the man signing on in the example earlier in this 
chapter was a New Deal participant).  This part of the service did not 
change therefore, with staff being able to retain their existing well 
established work practices and routines. 
 
Pressure 
As the numbers of users participating in the New Deal increased staff time 
became more scarce.  As a result more limitations were imposed on the 
length of time which was allocated to each user.  Policy was therefore re-
created with users receiving a service that was less personal than had 
been intended.  This erosion of ‘client-centredness’ was also evident in the 
frequency of contacts Personal Advisers had with their New Deal users: 
 
SM 26: Young people are latching on to advisers and we do want to 
encourage that because if you’re wanting to be the punter’s 
pal then you need to see them.   But it means that some of 
them are turning up all the time when you’re trying to see 
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other people.   You cannae really say ‘You know how we 
said at the start that you can come in and see us any time?  
Well I didnae really mean that.’  We should be able to case-
manage our own diary but with the caseload building quite 
quickly it’s difficult to do that.  
 
What is more, the typical staff reaction to change was to retain existing 
work practices whenever possible.  This was justified in part by the 
constant state of flux that staff found themselves in.  They were confronted 
with two main types of change which made it difficult to keep up to date 
with what was going on.  Firstly, changes in official policy or particular 
practices encouraged by the management in the particular office.  The 
second source of frequent change was staff turnover, with workers on 
short-term contracts often coming and going and considerable internal 
change when staff were moved between sections and transferred to 
different offices.  This meant that staff could feel quite insecure in their 
working environment and were often having to learn new ways of working. 
 
Staff resisted change to daily routines that they had developed over time 
(sometimes for 20 years or more).  As the reluctant use of the term 
‘Fortnightly Intervention’ illustrated (above), changes can take time to be 
implemented at ground level and some changes will never be 
implemented at all.  Hence, new policy is not made and then simply 
imposed upon front-line staff, rather it must be accepted and absorbed into 
daily usage through a series of adjustments.  Nor is new policy completely 
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new.  It is placed on top of the old practices, which are themselves re-
created forms of old policies.   
 
Staff resistance 
Rather than being passive and impartial implementers, staff played an 
active role in assessing the viability of new policies.  Employment Officers 
had views and beliefs about a wide range of policies and initiatives and 
these interpretations affected they ways in which they administered 
policies.  Jobcentre workers could therefore actively resist new policy 
initiatives for a number of reasons and in a variety of ways. 
 
One source of frustration was the insufficient link between a particular 
policy or scheme and the nature of a problem as perceived by staff who 
experienced it in their daily work.  In the case of the New Deal, Personal 
Advisers soon found that there were young people who they could not 
personally advise because their problems were beyond the scope of the 
new policy and the Employment Service more generally.  In other words, 
some of the young New Deal users experienced barriers to employment 
which their Personal Advisers felt they could not help them with.   
 
SM 21: A lot of clients are decent people but a lot of them as well are 
people with social problems and we’re not trained to deal 
with that.  We could do more harm than good if we tried to 
dabble in it.  We’ve got a lot of sad people. 
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SM 34: At the end of the day we’re not trained to deal with some of 
the cases that come in.  So if we get training on how to deal 
with difficult situations but we’re not trained properly.  I mean 
they’re unemployed and along with that they’ve got other 
problems.  They’ve got housing problems, or . . . They could 
be single parents.  There’s alcoholism.  There’s debt.  
Gambling.  We’re not trained to deal with them 
psychologically.  We’re lay people.  This is a Jobcentre, a 
public office.  We’ve not got the time or the medical or 
psychological expertise to deal with them. 
 
Staff, whilst representing ‘the government’ did not necessarily accept the 
legitimacy of the core aims and objectives of the policy they are required 
to implement.   They could therefore be working at odds with official policy 
and were at times very critical of ‘the government’ or the ‘politicians’ who 
had designed these policies.  The fast pace of policy change was not as 
much of an issue as the concomitant philosophical underpinnings. Official 
unemployment policies have always been politicised and are designed 
with particular outcomes in mind.  One reason for resistance to new 
policies was that staff had previously had to adapt to a policy with the 
opposite types of aims, objectives and associated values.  For instance: 
 
SM 32: Now everything here is targets, targets, targets (put her head 
in her hands and shook her head despairingly).   With SBR 
you had to refer if there was the slightest doubt at all.   The 
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flavour of the month now is New Deal with different priorities.   
It’s a difficult job. 
 
SM 1: Stricter Benefit Regime came in.   Thankfully it’s been done 
away with now.   I mean legally it’s still there.   We just don’t 
implement it.   We no longer have targets for SBR.   We 
should be doing it but because there’s no targets we don’t do 
it.   It’s a good thing because it used to be used against 
people who’re the easiest to get a decision out of, rather 
than against the ones who it really should have been used 
on.   Pressure to achieve targets meant that it wasn’t used 
right. 
 
Resistance to a new policy was likely to be more marked if it would require 
Jobcentre workers to relate to users in a different way.  This is because 
the implementation process is a social process and staff are not empty 
vessels waiting to be filled with the latest beliefs and understandings about 
the people they interact with daily.  Staff seemed to rely first and foremost 
on their own values and beliefs to guide how they treated the users they 
interacted with. 
 
In the case of the introduction of the New Deal, many of the staff 
welcomed the opportunity to spend more time with users, to be more 
flexible and to help users to find the types of training and ultimately the job 
that they wanted.  The more flexible and user-centred approach struck a 
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chord with Employment Officers who had long been disenchanted with the 
restrictiveness of the assistance they could offer to enable users to find 
work (e.g. users having to wait until they are six months unemployed 
before they qualify to attend training courses). 
 
The staff reaction to the implementation of the New Deal was a mixed one. 
Some members of staff considered the New Deal to provide ‘more scope 
to help people’ (SM 23), while some workers agreed with the users who 
viewed it as a new variation of an old scheme - the same thing with a 
different name. One adviser commented: ‘New Deal?  Big deal!’ (SM 10).  
There were mixed reactions from staff about the New Deal: while some 
welcomed the scheme, others were less enamoured with what it had to 
offer users. 
 
SM 25: The options are crap.  Like that guy Fiona had in.  He said ‘is 
that just working for my Bru money?’  Well it is. 
 
SM 32: I think probably that the New Deal’s unfair.  The fact that 
New Deal people can get all that help when other people 
can’t.  If they phone up or they contact you if they’re five 
months they cannae get it. 
 
In this case the member of staff agreed with users who said that it was 
real jobs that were needed.  Another inconsistency that was pointed out as 
favouring some users over others was the difference in the options 
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available for the over 25 age group, especially since ‘25 plus is probably 
the user group that need it most’ (SM 21).  The official policy itself favours 
some users over others. 
 
There was also a great deal of confusion because staff working in the New 
Deal section were unsure about how the scheme was meant to operate 
and those in other sections of the office had very limited knowledge of 
what it was, particularly since they had received no training about it.  After 
they had received training (which was not necessarily before they started 
working in the New Deal section), the Personal Advisers had a much 
greater knowledge of the New Deal system than the management and 
therefore could not look to them for guidance. This means that new 
policies, even high profile ones like the New Deal, might only be 
understood by those who have to use it in their everyday work. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy 
can be applied to the experiences of UK Jobcentre staff and users in the 
late 1990s.  Front-line workers were engaged in processes of policy 
modification as they implemented unemployment policy.  ‘Official policy’ 
was only one of a number of forces that influenced how staff organised 
their work and interacted with users. Jobcentre staff experienced various 
pressures in their everyday work.  They responded to these pressures by 
redefining what it was they were aiming to achieve during their interactions 
with users and in this way they re-created unemployment policy.  The first 
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example showed how staff involved in signing on responded to the 
pressure of time by conducting interviews in a much shorter time than the 
official policy dictated, and by focussing on completing documents (in 
paper and electronic format), which were necessary for routine benefit 
processing.  Neither of the formal roles of policing and enabling (identified 
by Fletcher, 1997) were fully implemented.  This adds to Blackmore’s 
(2001) observation that the implementation of the policing role (in the 
example of the Stricter Benefit Regime) was not put into operation as fully 
as intended.  There is now evidence that both policing and enabling roles 
were subject to reinterpretation, since job matching tended to be the part 
of the work that was neglected throughout the full range of Jobseeker’s 
Allowance interviews.  It was the routine practice of form-filling that held 
greatest weight in determining what would actually be done to and for 
clients. 
 
The second example demonstrated how these same pressures of time 
and user demand, along with the added pressure of employer’s 
requirements, led staff to ration job vacancies.  The role played by 
performance targets in influencing staff behaviour was also highlighted, 
particularly in relation to controlling access to vacancies.  The Matching 
Section staff were predominantly serving the needs of employers rather 
than the majority of users.  When the overall goal of placing people into 
work was broken down into specific targets the aim became to get certain 
people into certain jobs, which favoured those unemployed people who 
were closest to the low paid, unskilled and semi-skilled labour market that 
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the Jobcentre served.  This process disadvantaged people who were 
perceived to be unattractive to employers, for instance, the long-term 
unemployed or those without recent or relevant experience.  In this way, 
the boundaries between role of employers and role of the state 
employment service are blurred.  Staff mediated between the state and 
the unemployed citizen and also reconciled the interests of employers and 
unemployed people.  The system of vacancy targets cut across this 
arrangement of preferences to engineer staff incentives, meaning that the 
non-registered unemployed could also be perceived as unprofitable 
targets for staff intervention. 
 
The third example highlighted the way in which staff reacted to change.  
The initial New Deal interviews were personal in-depth interviews when 
the scheme was first introduced, but as demand for the service grew it 
meant having to shift to group interviews.  Staff retained existing work 
patterns when possible, since signing on was done in the New Deal 
section in the same way as it was at signing points.  The work done by 
front-line staff was therefore structured more by the pressures of time, the 
forms, the computer system and performance targets than it was by 
statements of official policy or guidance.  Front-line workers therefore re-
created policy in their everyday work, through interactions with users.  
Active labour market policies were re-created by front-line staff to be much 
less active, in some cases even having the opposite effect of ensuring that 
certain types of user remained inactive in the labour market.  
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This analysis demonstrates a point of significant departure between the 
stated purpose of the UK Employment Service (see p62) and the 
implemented form, which is unrecognised by official evaluations of the 
service and has, until now, remained largely hidden from academic 
interrogation (important exceptions being Blackmore, 2001, Finn et al. 
2001).  In the written aim and six objectives (see p62-63), the emphasis is 
clearly on job matching.  However, this chapter has shown that 
Employment Officer’s efforts are dominated by the tasks of benefit 
processing, thereby repositioning the basic principle of service provision.  
 
This chapter has, therefore, provided an analysis of how front-line workers 
behave in the contemporary new managerialist context.  It was clear that 
new managerialism had impacted upon the bureaucratic work environment 
in a number of ways.  The pressures brought to bear upon individual front-
line workers have increased, become more individualised and more 
carefully engineered.  The quantification of performance that Lipsky 
described has been extended and devolved.  Evidence has been provided 
to substantiate Clarke & Newman’s (1997) observation that new 
managerialist practices increase incentives and individualise performance 
in ways that create competitive relations between workers within the same 
organisation.  For Jobcentre staff this presents a marked shift in culture of 
the organisation and has important consequences for users since it 
increases differentiation and guides preferential or priority treatment in 
particular directions.  Services are not provided universally for all 
Jobcentre users, but are particularised to favour those who will gain staff 
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merit in the incentive structure.  It is also acknowledged that staff were not 
entirely satisfied with this influence on their relations with co-workers and 
users. It seemed that the combination of cost-cutting, which kept staffing 
levels under strict control, and tight incentive management limited the 
scope for Employment Officers to provide the high quality customer 
service promised by new managerialist discourse.  
 
Lipsky argues that front-line staff develop discretionary practices as a way 
of dealing with the tension between serving organisation-orientated goals 
and client-orientated goals.  In the case of the Jobcentre this dilemma is 
heightened by conflicting organisational goals of job matching and benefit 
administration.   Front-line staff in the case study office managed a whole 
set of tensions by prioritising certain objectives over others, responding to 
the most immediate and necessary client demands and fulfilling the 
requirements of targets.  Contrary to Lipsky’s explanation, however, 
Employment Officers exercised discretion for reasons that were not 
entirely predetermined by the structure of their work environment.  They 
exercised independent and collective ethical and normative commitments 
in the face of dehumanising policy.  As active actors with expertise derived 
from dealing directly with unemployed people, staff assessed the problems 
and evaluated policy solutions through their own eyes.  Therefore, when 
front-line staff brought policy into being their framework of understanding 
and primary considerations were very different from those that inform top-
level policy design.   
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The next chapter examines the meanings that Jobcentre services held for 
users, comparing the discourse of customer service with how unemployed 
people actually experience the Jobcentre.  
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Chapter Six 
 
Receiving Unemployment Policy: 
Users, customers or citizens? 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter staff-user relations are examined from the user’s point of 
view in order to understand the position of users in the implementation 
process.  Chapter Five has demonstrated how staff react to official 
discourse and formal policy.  This chapter examines how users respond to 
the policy that exists ostensibly to assist them.  The aim is to understand 
the meanings that receiving unemployment policy holds for users.  This 
will then provide the basis for understanding the dynamics of staff-user 
relationships and for understanding how policy comes into being as a 
social process (in Chapters Seven and Eight).   
 
It has been argued that during the 1980s and the 1990s users of state 
services underwent a redefinition, emerging as customers in the new 
mixed economy of welfare (Clarke & Newman, 1997).  The way that this 
has influenced the Employment Service has been outlined in Chapter 
Three and the application of these principles in front-line practice has been 
elucidated in Chapter Five.  In this chapter, the intention is to demonstrate 
how users themselves relate to the process of receiving unemployment 
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benefits and services from the Jobcentre and how this compares with the 
official discourse of ‘customer service’.  This provides an aperture through 
which the features of the staff-user and citizen-state relationships can be 
viewed.  It will be argued that these relationships are distinct from market-
based relationships and that the language of customer service does not 
adequately capture the experience of claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance.  
The evidence shows that a discrepancy exists between the formal 
conception of users as customers and their own experiences of the 
service.  Users are not customers because they do not have choice, they 
do not have control and they do not have purchasing power.  
 
There are several qualifications to be made.  Firstly, customer service 
does not exist in a pure form in the marketplace and relations between 
customers and for-profit organisations (particularly monopoly providers) 
are imperfect and contested.  Neither did the finance and provision of 
social security and welfare services to the unemployed take place in an 
entirely public domain (as separate from private, occupational, familial or 
voluntary spheres) prior to the evolution of the managerial state.  It would 
be overly simplistic to compare unemployed users’ views of the service 
they receive to an idealised version of customer service, because front-
line workers in non-state-related agencies also modify policy and filter 
organisational goals, rules, procedures and management directives 
through their work practices.  Nevertheless, it is important to examine both 
the implementation of the managerialist principles of customer service and 
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staff-user relations from the user’s perspective, in order to begin to 
understand the dynamics of staff-user relationships. 
 
The focus within this chapter is on Jobcentre users, but it is important to 
note that the Jobcentre has two sets of customers.  On the one hand, 
users can be constituted as customers of Jobseeker’s Allowance and of 
the job vacancy service (the basis of their relationship being different in 
each case and the use of the particular term ‘customer’ being open to 
debate).  On the other hand, the employers who use the Jobcentre to 
advertise their vacancies are also customers of the Jobcentre.  These two 
sets of customers compete unwittingly for staff time and for influence over 
staff behaviour because they have conflicting wants and needs (see 
Chapter Three).  Chapter Five has also illustrated how front-line staff 
manage the tension between serving users and serving employers by 
favouring the needs of employers over the needs of the long-term 
unemployed.  The vacancy service can be seen as more of a service for 
employers than unemployed people, although Employment Officers did act 
to temper employers demands (for instance vacancies were not accepted 
if they discriminated against sex or ‘race’, however age restrictions were 
relatively commonplace).   
 
Lack of Choice 
Market-based customer relations imply choice.  However, Lipsky’s (1980) 
principal observation regarding the users of street-level bureaucracies was 
that they were non-voluntary.  This affects the nature and dynamics of 
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staff-user relations and has several implications for the applicability of the 
label ‘customer’ to Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants.  The following 
section explores how the notion of choice relates to the experience of 
becoming and remaining a registered unemployed Jobcentre user. 
 
Becoming a client 
Lipsky (1980) argues that when people make contact with public service 
organisations they undergo a process of transformation, from being 
citizens to ‘becoming clients’.  Such analysis is based on understanding 
staff-user relations from the point of view of the street-level bureaucrat 
whose main initial concern is with ‘people-processing’ (Prottas, 1979, see 
Chapter Seven for further details of the categorisation process).  From the 
user’s perspective, however, the process of becoming a user involves 
several other transformations in their life roles. For unemployed people, 
becoming a client, particularly for the first time, can involve the transition 
from dependence on wage labour (even if it was low-paid, temporary or 
part-time) to dependence on state provision.  The loss of paid employment 
(or the failure of an attempt at self-employment) might also be 
accompanied by changes in other life roles as sense of self and use of 
time is re-negotiated with partners, family, friends and significant others.  
Adjustments can be made in the level and type of involvement in unpaid 
labour and domestic and caring activities.  The significance of leaving paid 
work can extend beyond the loss of earned income and the social 
relations (whether positive or negative) associated with a job.  Being out of 
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work can change how people think of themselves how they relate to other 
people.  
 
Those who have been employed have changed from having a legitimate 
role as a worker and a wage earner, which was likely to have been central 
to their identity (Morgan, 1992), to that of being unemployed. This can be 
associated with a particularly keen sense of ‘loss of face’ (Goffman, 1963) 
for men if they feel their masculine role of breadwinner has been 
undermined.  There is evidence to suggest that even young men entering 
the labour market for the first time in the 1990s feel an obligation or 
expectation to provide for current or future dependants (Lloyd, 1999).  
Those who have never worked play an even more stigmatised 
unemployed role.  Having to go to the Jobcentre means adopting this 
unemployed role as well as confronting the realities of living on an income 
below the level necessary for subsistence (see Chapter Three). The fresh 
experience of being unemployed can be a raw nerve at the time when 
people present themselves to the Jobcentre.  The necessary interaction 
with front-line staff can be an emotional experience that is associated with 
self reflection and even self re-definition.   
 
Becoming a Jobseeker’s Allowance user could, therefore, be a significant 
experience, but not one that people encountered through choice.  Users 
viewed the Jobcentre as ‘a last resort’ that should be avoided at all costs.  
Amongst those interviewed, attendance at the Jobcentre was usually 
brought about by immediate economic necessity (apart from one man who 
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did not receive benefit, but registered as unemployed to claim National 
Insurance credits).  Interviewees experienced using the service as a sign 
of personal and systemic failure.  For many users, their interactions with 
staff were tainted by this sense of enforced dependency.  The loss of 
previous status associated with being a worker, or having held a particular 
position of status or respect, meant that the way they were treated by staff 
mattered a great deal to users.   
 
Most of the interviewees had negative experiences of coming to the 
Jobcentre for the first time, often finding the visit difficult and emotional.  
They referred to having felt ‘humiliated’ (UP 24), ‘embarrassed’ (UP 7), 
‘apprehensive’ (UP 32),  ‘undermined’ (UP 32), ‘scared shitless’ (UP 15) 
and ‘extremely  nervous’ (UP 19).  
 
UP 26: Coming to the Jobcentre the first time is very intimidating and 
I think it’s a bit shameful.  I felt a little bit guilty about it.  Yes, 
it’s intimidating.  It’s nerve-wracking.  It’s worrying and I think 
it’s quite depressing coming to the Jobcentre for the first time 
and not actually having a job.   
 
These feelings associated with confronting unemployment intensified for 
those who had never expected to be unemployed and who viewed their 
employer dispensing with their services as meaning they were ‘on the 
scrap heap’ or at the ‘bottom of the pile’.  Older workers, for instance, were 
all too aware that their value as a commodity in the labour market had 
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declined.  These factors combined to mean that being inside the Jobcentre 
was something that made people feel uncomfortable: 
 
UP 18: You want in and out as soon as you can 
 
The psychological costs of receiving welfare services were keenly felt by 
most of the interviewees, particularly those who had been unemployed for 
a long period of time.  
 
UP 28: You’re down when you come in and even more down when 
you leave.  . . .  At the moment, perhaps because of the way 
I’m feeling, it [coming to the Jobcentre] means to me failure 
and embarrassment.  That’s, that’s what it means to me.  . . . 
I only come in here to sign on but I always come out here in 
a, well I don’t always, come out of here in a rage.  But I just 
come out feeling ‘oh I’m glad that’s over for another two 
weeks’. 
 
The stigma of being unemployed was made worse for users by knowing 
that their unemployment was public, being flaunted to those who they 
were known to.   
 
UP 29: It’s quite sort of demoralising and just walking in and stuff 
and just waiting around.  . . .  Och, it’s just like a bit of an 
ordeal for me actually.  It’s like, oh you know, I just feel really 
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kind of useless, especially in this town where all people know 
you and stuff as well.  It’s like one time I came in and the 
woman said to me she knew my mum from years ago.  I 
mean it’s, I just can’t stand being like this – unemployed.  It’s 
like, why am I such a waster? 
 
Some interviewees did not like to be seen coming in or going out of the 
Jobcentre because their stigmatised role was made visible (c.f. Goffman, 
1963:  48).  
 
UP 25: Degradation.  . . .  I hate it.  You walk out and you feel 
people saying ‘There’s another loser.’.  You’re going in and 
you feel like ‘There’s another loser’.  They’re not but I think 
that.  It doesnae matter if they’re doing that or not doing that.  
I think that.  . . .  I walk up to the top and I sneak in that door 
as quick as I can and I sneak out as quick as I can.  I don’t 
mind being in here because the people in here are in the 
same boat as me.  But I hate coming to it because it just 
brings me down.   
 
Some users felt ashamed because the exchange relationship that they 
previously had with an employer had changed to one that had a different 
sense of reciprocity.  As Morgan (1992) argues: 
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If we see a sense of reciprocity as something which is very 
basic to human living . . . then unemployment entails the loss 
of that ability to engage in reciprocal exchange, and the 
unwelcome perception of oneself as being more of a receiver 
than a giver (Morgan, 1992: 104).   
 
Receiving benefit provided users with a small income but left them feeling 
‘useless’ because they had not exchanged their labour for it.  Within the 
walls of the Jobcentre office, unemployed people were defined as passive 
recipients of state benefits whose efforts to find work had so far failed.  
 
UP 13: It’s as if you’re coming in and you’re getting money for 
nothing.  But you’re actually looking for money, you know 
what I mean? 
 
The interviewees had a clear sense that they did not want to be 
unemployed.  They wanted to work and felt an obligation to earn their 
income though formal employment.  This lack of ability to exchange left 
some unemployed people feeling that dependence on state benefits was 
akin to begging (cf. McIntosh & Erskine, 1999).  However, unemployment 
benefits have a long history in the UK, and those who had ‘paid into the 
system’ (UP 33) through taxes or National Insurance contributions, 
personally resented being made to feel as if they were ‘asking for 
something for nothing’.  There was a strong sense of entitlement to 
benefits and a recognition that the service was funded collectively through 
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taxation, which should mean that it was there for people when they 
needed it. 
 
UP 1:  It’s, sometimes, you know, you feel as if you’re begging.  
They [front-line staff] think you’re begging.  You’ve got to 
actually fight fir yir money half the time, know what I mean? . 
. .  It’s as if you’re begging to them and it’s their money 
they’re paying out.  And it’s the governments, know what I 
mean?  They forget.  It’s no’ everybody that’s been on the 
Bru for years.  A lot of folk have been working and we pay 
our taxes and we’re entitled to it [Jobseeker’s Allowance] 
until we get a job. 
 
The citizen principle of earned entitlement therefore stands in opposition to 
the application of market-based customer relations.  This was a particular 
issue for older workers who had paid compulsory National Insurance 
contributions for the entirety of their working life before becoming 
unemployed.  Despite having paid in, they found that the state had 
reneged on past agreements.  The level of benefit and the length of time 
that they would have expected to be able to claim insurance-based benefit 
have changed dramatically, meaning the security they were promised had 
been eroded.  These workers were discovering similar broken promises in 
their occupational and state pension entitlements.  The imposition of 
market-based language can itself represent a broken promise for those 
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who expected the post-war welfare state to provide free universal services 
and a safety net to prevent poverty.  
 
The relationship that users had with the state, as mediated through the 
staff-user relationship, was not market-based. Users did not identify with 
the label of ‘customer’ that had been applied freshly to them.  Users 
conceived of themselves as ‘customers’ only in a very limited sense, for 
instance one man said that he did feel like a customer because it fitted 
with his idea of shopping ‘you’re only in to get what you need and then 
you’re back out again’.  Generally, people did not identify with being a 
customer because they did not want to have to come to the Jobcentre and 
they were deprived of control or choice about the terms, conditions, 
substance and quality of the service and benefit they received.  In this 
way, the relationship users have to the Jobcentre can be seen almost as 
the reverse of a customer relationship: 
 
UP 30: I feel a customer is, you know, you’re going in to buy 
something and like they’re there to please you sort of thing.  
Here it’s not.  It’s almost the other way about. 
 
Benefits and services for the unemployed were viewed as being controlled 
by elected and accountable government, which held irreducible meaning 
and significance. The partial marketisation of sections of service delivery 
did not separate the state from those services in the minds of recipients.  
Users held ‘the government’ responsible for the past and present ‘system’ 
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that structured the character and funding of benefits and sanctions 
(including the application of new language such as ‘customer service’) as 
well as the wider opportunities available to them.  
 
UP 9: They’re the people they should be giving us mair opportunities 
to get jobs and if they’re no’ then we’re no’ going to get jobs are 
we?  They could gae us mair opportunities and mair vacancies 
than they are.   
 
Another man objected to the term ‘customer’ because it is ‘a business 
framework which just shouldn’t apply here’.  He considered the ‘business 
ethic’ to be ‘part of the problem’ of unemployment and as such entirely 
inappropriate to be part of its solution.  
 
Customer Service 
One of the most obvious applications of new managerialist principles of 
customer service was in the improvement of the physical office 
environment.  Jobcentre users thought that the office was pleasant, 
‘cheery’ (UP 18), ‘colourful’ (UP 18) and ‘nice’ (UP 8). One interviewee felt 
that the open-plan layout and modern furnishings all ‘help[s] enormously’ 
(UP 11). It was noticeable that the Jobcentre office in question compared 
favourably with other offices that users had experienced in other areas or 
in the same office in the past. The office was open plan and unscreened.  
Interviews took place at desks, rather than the high counters of previous 
eras (that currently still exist in some Benefits Agency offices).  Both users 
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and staff felt that this was conducive to a more positive atmosphere.  This 
office was ‘brighter’ (UP 15), ‘more personal’ (UP 17) and ‘no’ as 
depressing’ (UP 18).  Ultimately, the effect was that ‘when you walk in it 
doesnae make you feel as pissed off’ (UP 15). 
 
Beyond the office décor, however, users’ views of customer service were 
less straight forward.  Many of the interviewees held the view that all, or 
the great majority of the staff were generally ‘friendly’ (UP 35), ‘helpful’ (UP 
7) and ‘nice’ (UP 4).  Certain aspects of the way users were treated by 
staff were praised, for instance staff were praised by some as ‘very polite’ 
(UP 13), ‘great’ (UP 7), ‘positive’ (UP 33), ‘very pleasant’ (UP 24), 
‘understanding’ (UP 33), ‘courteous’ (UP 13), ‘amiable’ (UP 33) and 
‘genial’ (UP 33).  One woman said that all of the staff that she had dealt 
with treated her with ‘great respect and great dignity’ (UP 10).  
 
Even some of the interviewees who had very negative feelings about 
unemployment and who were critical of the Jobcentre and the staff 
generally, did concede that some staff members treated them well.  Some 
individual members of staff were singled out for praise because of their 
local knowledge, length of service or extremely helpful and friendly 
attitudes.  Users seemed to define good service as having been achieved 
if staff devoted time to their interview (being prepared to ‘sit with you for 
any length of time and try and get you something’ (UP 25) and provided a 
personal service  (‘a wee personal touch’ rather than being ‘treated as a 
number’, UP 18).  This demonstrated that staff were ‘interested’ (UP 35) 
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and willing to ‘try their best’ (UP 25) to find vacancies that would be 
suitable.  The individual officials who received most praise were those 
whose worked in the Matching Section, whose role was assistance in 
finding work and did not involve benefit policing.  It could therefore be 
inferred that the conflicting goals of assisting people to find work and 
policing benefit claims prevented other front-line staff from offering what 
users would identify as high quality customer service. 
 
Most of the interviewees had some negative comment about the way they 
had been treated by staff.  Long-term unemployed users were more likely 
than short-term unemployed people to have very negative views of staff.  
This was a reflection of the increased compulsion that these users are 
subject to as well as their extended experience of poverty, bad feelings 
about being unemployed and declining hopes of finding work.  Officials 
can exacerbate these feelings: 
 
. . . of profound importance in this discussion of the problem 
of stigma, there is the question of the attitudes of officials 
and of the interaction between officials and claimants.  
Clearly attitudes of implicit or explicit contempt can do much 
to exacerbate the problem and it would be naive to suppose 
that such attitudes were not on occasion apparent  
(Stevenson, 1973: 22). 
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The most negative comments were made by those who had been 
unemployed for longest, who said that staff were ‘woolies’ (UP 25) who 
had treated them ‘like shit’ (UP 15). One man said that the worst thing 
about the Jobcentre was the staff. Users described various bad 
experiences as ‘frustrating’ (UP 28), ‘annoying’ (UP 34) and ‘irritating’ (UP 
16).  Another man said that some of the Employment Officers had ‘attitude 
problems’ (UP 15).  Some users felt that it was the majority of the staff that 
treated them badly, while others considered it to only be a minority.  Staff 
were criticised for being ‘a wee bit abrasive for the sake of it’ (UP 33), 
‘bitter’ (UP 33) or ‘rubbish’ (UP 25).  Seven of the interviewees did not 
think that staff were at all helpful. 
 
A few users felt that the majority of staff did not do enough to help 
unemployed people find work.  One (UP 25) man said staff did ‘nothing’ to 
help him find work which meant they were not doing their jobs properly.  
These users wanted the Jobcentre workers to ‘show a wee bit more 
interest’ and give them more help to find work, rather than focusing on the 
necessary tasks for benefit administration.  
 
Although Jobcentre users tended to view staff indifferently, or praised 
particularly friendly or helpful personal service, the general consensus was 
that the service offered by the Jobcentre was ‘a waste of time’ (UP 12), ‘a 
lot of crap’ (UP 1), ‘useless’ (UP 15), ‘shite’ (UP 9) or ‘a bit of a joke’ (UP 
33). One man said he ‘hated’ coming to the Jobcentre (UP 26), while 
another man said that it ‘irritated’ him (UP 16).  Only four of those 
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interviewed conceived of the Jobcentre in predominantly positive terms. 
Views of the service provided were linked to how people felt about being 
unemployed and the enforced dependency implied by that situation.  
Those who were most optimistic had been unemployed for less than three 
months and considered their immediate job prospects to be good.  Others 
had distanced themselves from the stigmatised unemployed role by 
working part-time (for less than 16 hours, which is allowed by the 
Jobseeker's Allowance rules) or because they were nearing retirement 
age and were able to convince themselves of the merits of early retirement 
if they could not find work again.   
 
Users often did not receive the service that they needed and wanted. The 
following sections consider some aspects of service delivery that do not fit 
within the customer service ideal.  One user explicitly criticised the 
Jobcentre for providing ‘poor standards of customer service’ (UP 11), in 
reference to lengthy waits and telephones ringing out unanswered.  
Unemployment policy has a long history and in its past and present forms 
has been intended to discipline and control people who are out of work 
(c.f. Jones & Novak, 1999).  Users are provided with income maintenance 
based on the principle of ‘less eligibility’, which does not provide for 
minimum levels of adequacy.  Jobseeker’s Allowance therefore fails to 
meet users’ needs, let alone their wants.  Punitive benefit sanctions also 
deny users the income they need. Benefit levels and regulations are 
therefore incompatible with the notion of customer service in the sense 
that good customer service means providing what customers want. 
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 The predominantly negative feelings associated with visiting the Jobcentre 
were bound up with how people felt about being unemployed and living in 
poverty.  However, there were particular ways in which users’ experiences 
of the Jobcentre created anxiety.  Foremost was the mismatch between 
the service available, and the assistance that unemployed people wanted 
in finding work.  A common complaint was that the vacancies on offer 
were inappropriate. 
 
The interviewees were keen to find work and the Jobcentre was intended 
to assist in this capacity.  However, it has already been demonstrated that 
the pressures and constraints on routine interviews often resulted in job 
matching being neglected (see Chapter Five).  There was evidence that 
access to vacancies was rationed by staff in a number of ways (see 
Chapter Five).   In this section, the focus now shifts to considering the 
quantity, quality and type of vacancy on offer at the Jobcentre.  The 
following analysis compares the type of vacancy service that users wanted 
and needed with the type of vacancies that were actually advertised in the 
Jobcentre office. 
 
User demand for vacancies  
Most of those interviewed felt that the vacancies on offer were 
inappropriate to their needs (although it should be noted that the sampling 
design excluded those who had recently found work through the 
Jobcentre).  Users usually wanted full-time, long-term employment 
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(preferably permanent) that was appropriate to their skills and 
qualifications. They did not have unrealistic expectations of the type of 
work and the levels of pay that they wanted. 
 
Many felt that the pay that most of the jobs offered was too low, with too 
many jobs being temporary and part-time. Users needed a job that would 
offer a living wage. Some users felt that poorly paid vacancies1 were 
‘scandalous’ (UP 13) and should not be advertised in the Jobcentre and 
that vacancies offering ‘commission only’ should be ‘thrown back to these 
firms’ (UP 25) by Jobcentre staff.  Some interviewees thought there was 
not enough variety in the vacancies, which were mainly service sector 
orientated. Shop work, manual work, kitchen work, security guards, 
cleaning jobs, hotel work or waiting staff, office work and telesales 
predominated in descriptions of the type  of work that was advertised on 
the boards.  Although this type of work was desirable for some of those 
interviewed,  many felt that there was a lack of ‘proper work’ (UP 3).  One 
older, semi-skilled, man commented that:   
 
UP 25: This is where people who genuinely want genuine jobs come 
and there’re no’ genuine jobs out there. 
 
Several of the interviewees thought that the Jobcentre did not have 
enough vacancies available, partly because the jobs did not exist to get 
advertised and also because Jobcentre staff did not do all that they could 
                                            
1 This fieldwork was conducted before the introduction of the National Minimum Wage. 
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to encourage employers to advertise there.  The vacancies on offer were 
considered to be limited and careers information, including details about 
voluntary work, were found to be lacking.  
 
UP 3: I mean they go through the motions here, but as I say the 
bottom line is that the jobs aren’t there.  You’ve just got to 
look at those ridiculous cards they’ve got up there, security 
men and . . .  It’s a joke really. I don’t know if there’s just no 
jobs at all or if they’re just selective in what they’ve got.   
 
Many of the interviewees were also critical of the frequency of vacancies 
changing on the boards, meaning that the turnover of vacancies was slow 
and that those advertised on the boards were sometimes out of date.  
Users felt that cards should be taken down from the boards as soon as the 
vacancy was filled because of the frustration of having to wait in a queue 
to enquire about a vacancy that was no longer available.   
 
UP 1: The boards have the same things every time you come in.  
Nothing changes with the boards.  I think it’s terrible.  
They’ve been there for months, know what I mean.  I tell you, 
I think they were up there six months ago when I was 
unemployed.  And they’re still there, know what I mean?  
There’s nae fresh stuff.  You maybe get one or two fresh 
ones up on the latest vacancies but jobs like them go quick, 
know what I mean? 
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 Staff and users alike are aware that the vacancies advertised through the 
Jobcentre are not usually applicable to professionals.  Unemployed 
professionals found this particularly frustrating because this meant that 
their visits to the Jobcentre were purely for benefit administration 
purposes, the second organisational goal of assisting people to find work 
being far removed from their needs.  The Jobcentre therefore had very 
little to offer professional people.  
 
UP 3: You say you’ve got a degree and they look at you like you’ve 
got horns on your head.  Like, ‘What are you doing in here?  
It’s a Jobcentre!’ 
 
The majority of interviewees who did not think that the Jobcentre 
presented a realistic opportunity for them to find work felt that the jobs 
advertised did not match the jobs that they were looking for. Approximately 
a third of those interviewed expressed particularly negative views of the 
quality of vacancies advertised on the boards, which was described as 
‘terrible’ (UP 1), ‘rubbish’ (UP 25), ‘absolutely ridiculous’ (UP 13) and 
‘depressing’ (UP 18). The Jobcentre was perceived to be a last resort for 
employers as well as unemployed people. 
 
Mismatch between Vacancies Sought and Vacancies Advertised 
Having explored the type of work and conditions of employment that 
interviewees wanted from the service, it is now possible to provide details 
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of the vacancies that were on offer by way of comparison.  The Jobcentre 
office where this research was conducted advertised vacancies notified to 
it directly, and vacancies from other areas.  During the three month period 
(8th September 1998 – 4th December 1998) a total of 1726 vacancies were 
counted in the office.  This number included 269 vacancies notified 
through other Jobcentre offices and 24 that were jobs in other countries. 
11% of the jobs from other areas were armed forces vacancies.  The 
following section will concentrate mainly on vacancies that were notified to 
the office where the research was conducted. 
 
There was a dramatic mismatch between the type of work sought by 
unemployed users registered at this office and the type of work advertised 
there. The type of work on offer was compared to the type of work (by 
Standard Occupational Classification Group) that job seekers using the 
office were looking for at that time, using the official claimant count and 
notified vacancy data (provided by the Employment Information Unit) 2.  
The vacancy data collected manually from the office also provided greater 
insight into the exact occupations, rates of pay, hours and length of 
contracts of a selection of vacancies. 
 
Table Two compares the type of occupation sought by unemployed people 
registered at this Jobcentre office (which of course excludes other job 
seekers who were unable to claim Jobseeker's Allowance or were in 
                                            
2 Data was not available for exactly the same period as that covered by the manual 
vacancy count.  The notified vacancy count and claimant count contained in this table 
were provided by the Employment Information Unit, ©ONS.  Any information about length 
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employment) with the type of work which was advertised there, during the 
period August to October 1998.  Overall there was a total of 1223 notified 
vacancies, compared with a total of 1713 registered unemployed people.  
This means that there was a shortfall of 490 jobs, not counting those who 
were seeking work but not registered as unemployed (either because they 
were currently in employment or because they were unemployed and did 
not meet the conditions for claiming Jobseeker's Allowance).  The 
Jobcentre is, however, only one source of employment opportunities and 
other vacancies are also advertised elsewhere, e.g. in newspapers, the 
Internet and through private employment agencies.  The data shows that 
there was a mismatch between the type of occupation sought by those 
registered unemployed and the type of vacancies available. 
 
The dark shaded boxes in Table Two show the top four frequencies for 
each column.  The most common type of notified vacancy was ‘Other 
Elementary Occupations’.  This matched with the most common type of 
work sought by all registered unemployed job seekers, the most common 
type of work sought by men and the fourth most common type of work 
sought by women3.  Unfortunately, there was approximately one notified 
vacancy for every two people looking for them in this sector.  This is a 
serious shortfall considering that this is the type of work that Jobcentres 
seem to specialise in.   
 
                                                                                                                       
of contract, flexible working hours, shift work etc. is based on the manual count for the 
overlapping period 8/9/98–4/12/98 . 
3 The proportion of men to women registered unemployed at this Jobcentre office was 
three to one. 
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The broad SOC group categories contain a very wide range of jobs. For 
instance, the ‘Other Elementary Occupations’ category covered a wide 
range of job titles, including: labourers, hospital porters, salvage collectors, 
postal workers, couriers, catering assistants, car park attendants, road 
sweepers, shelf fillers and cleaners.  28% of these vacancies were for 
cleaners and 25% were for kitchen porters or catering assistants.  Only 23 
vacancies (8.9%) in this category were for labourers.  A labourer would not 
necessarily be seeking a cleaning job based in an office. The data 
collected manually (rather than the official data used in Table Two, which 
only shows the sector and does not give further details about the jobs on 
offer) shows that 19% of vacancies in the ‘Other Elementary Occupations’ 
category were for temporary positions.  10.9% of vacancies of this type 
required the employee to be flexible with regard to working hours; 9.7% 
involved shift work and 41.6% were for part-time work.  The hours of work 
offered for positions in the ‘Other Elementary Occupations’ category 
therefore varied widely.  At least 40 vacancies for jobs in this SOC group 
were not displayed on the vacancy boards.  This was the sector with the 
highest incidence of vacancies not displayed.   
 
 
 187
Table Two:  Notified Vacancies Compared With Occupation Sought by SOC Group, 
August-October 1998 
 
 
Occupation Sought 
 
 
SOC GROUP 
 
 
Notified 
Vacancies 
Persons Male Female 
 
Corporate Managers/Administrators 
 
11 
 
71 
 
55 
 
16 
 
Managers/Proprietors: Agric/Services 
 
23 
 
22 
 
18 
 
4 
 
Science/Engineering Professions 
 
1 
 
28 
 
21 
 
7 
 
Health Professions 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
Teaching Professions 
 
0 
 
29 
 
13 
 
16 
 
Other Professional Occupations 
 
1 
 
23 
 
17 
 
6 
 
Science/Engineering Associate Profs 
 
20 
 
25 
 
17 
 
8 
 
Health Associate Professionals 
 
12 
 
7 
 
2 
 
5 
 
Other Associate Prof Occupations 
 
16 
 
77 
 
50 
 
27 
 
Clerical Occupations 
4th
115 
4th
178 
4th
103 
3rd
75 
 
Secretarial Occupations 
 
25 
 
12 
 
0 
 
12 
 
Skilled Construction Trades 
 
29 
 
67 
 
67 
 
0 
 
Skilled Engineering Trades 
 
29 
 
37 
 
36 
 
1 
 
Other Skilled Trades 
 
73 
2nd 
147 
2nd 
142 
 
5 
 
Protective Service Occupations 
 
24 
 
17 
 
14 
 
3 
 
Personal Service Occupations 
3rd  
246 
2nd 
147 
 
60 
1st
87 
 
Buyers, Brokers/Sales Representatives 
 
25 
 
21 
 
17 
 
4 
 
Other Sales Occupations 
2nd  
247 
 
120 
 
39 
2nd 
81 
 
Industrial Plant/Machine Operators, etc. 
 
14 
 
20 
 
16 
 
4 
 
Drivers/Mobile Machine Operators 
 
37 
 
127 
3rd
125 
 
2 
 
Other Occupations: Agric/Forestry/Fishing 
 
10 
 
21 
 
18 
 
3 
 
Other Elementary Occupations 
1st
265 
1st
499 
1st
446 
4th
53 
 
TOTAL 
 
1223 
 
1713 
 
1285 
 
428 
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The second most common type of notified vacancy was ‘Other Sales 
Occupations’. This was the category of work that was second most 
popular among women job seekers. The vacancies advertised were 
largely comprised of shop assistants, door-to-door sales people (often 
working on a commission only basis) and tele-sales positions. There were 
more than double the amount of ‘Other Sales Occupations’ notified as 
there were unemployed people looking for that type of work (the reverse 
picture to that of the other elementary occupations mismatch).  Vacancies 
coded as ‘Other Sales Occupations’ were often undesirable because of 
the length of contract, unsuitable working hours including unsociable 
hours, as well as the low pay (which included commission only positions).  
21% of vacancies categorised as ‘Other Sales Occupations’ were for 
temporary jobs.  This was also the category with the highest proportion 
(22%) of vacancies requiring the employee to be flexible with regard to 
working hours.  7% of the jobs involved shift work. 62% of ‘Other Sales 
Occupations’ were for part-time work, accounting for 39% of all part-time 
vacancies.  
 
The third most common type of notified vacancy was ‘Personal Service 
Occupations’.  This matched the second (equal with ‘Other Skilled Trades’) 
most common type of work sought by job seekers and was the most 
common choice for unemployed women.  Again, the broad category name 
included a wide range of job titles:  bar staff, chefs, dental nurses, care 
assistants, nursery nurses, hairdressers, caretakers and undertakers.  The 
manual count data showed that 20% of jobs in the ‘Personal Service 
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Occupations’ were for waiters/waitresses, 17% were for chefs or cooks 
and 10% were for bar staff.  Again, there were more than double the 
amount of vacancies available than unemployed people looking for that 
type of work.  12% of ‘Personal Service Occupations’ vacancies required 
flexibility on the part of the employee, 9% were for temporary jobs, 25% 
involved shift work, 34% were for part-time jobs.  At least eight vacancies 
in this SOC group were not advertised on the display boards. 
 
The fourth most common type of notified vacancy was ‘Clerical 
Occupations’.  This category had a good match with the type of work 
unemployed people were seeking, being the second most popular type of 
work for unemployed people generally, the fourth choice for men and the 
third choice for women.  This time there were fewer vacancies than people 
who wanted them, notified vacancies providing only 68% of the demand. 
This was the category that had the highest rate of temporary work, 
accounting for almost a third (29%) of all ‘Clerical Occupations’ vacancies.  
At least 10 vacancies in this sector were not displayed on the vacancy 
boards. 
 
The second choice for unemployed men was ‘Other Skilled Trades’.  This 
was an area where there was a mismatch between the type of work 
sought and the type of work available.  The Jobcentre provided only 50% 
of vacancies sought in this field.  Similarly, the third choice for unemployed 
men was ‘Drivers/Mobile Machine Operators’, but only a third of the 
number of vacancies sought was on offer. 
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 For all four of the most common types of work sought by unemployed 
women there were more jobs available than women looking for them.  The 
opposite was true for men, for whom there were almost always fewer jobs 
than unemployed men seeking them.  The only exception was ‘Clerical 
Occupations’, where there were 12 less men looking for that type of work 
than there were jobs available, but there were also 178 women competing 
for the same jobs, leaving a deficit of 63 jobs. 
 
Significant mismatches can also be noted by comparing the ratio of job 
seekers to notified vacancies for each SOC code.  In Table Two, the 
mismatch between persons seeking ‘Science/Engineering Professions’ 
(28) and number of notified vacancies (1), is underlined in black.  Similar 
ratios can be seen in other occupations.  It is notable that there were no 
notified vacancies at all for the health professions or the teaching 
profession (despite there being jobseekers looking for this type of work).  
There also seemed to be a general lack of more professional work.  At the 
top end only 15% of the sought vacancies were available in the ‘Corporate 
Managers/Administrators’ field.  Similarly, only 3.6% of the demand from 
the registered unemployed for ‘Science/Engineering Professions’ jobs was 
met through notified vacancies in that sector.  Only 4.3% of the vacancies 
sought under the ‘Other Professional Occupations’ heading were available 
through the Jobcentre. 
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 Restrictions  
Chapter Five has illustrated the ways in which staff rationed vacancies to 
Jobcentre users.  However, other factors also contributed to restrict 
access to the vacancies advertised on the boards, for instance the working 
conditions on offer.  During the period of the manual vacancy count:  
11.5% of local vacancies were for shift work, 10% included working in the 
evenings and/or weekends and 11.4% required flexibility4.  This latter 
category of flexibility usually meant that the hours of work were not set.  
Such posts included bank care assistant staff, for instance, who would be 
required to provide relief cover for holidays and sick leave.  One vacancy 
was advertised as a ‘zero hours’ contract, within which no hours were 
guaranteed but the post holder could be called on at any time to provide 
cover.   
 
Such unsociable working hours and a high degree of flexibility effectively 
excluded users with caring responsibilities from applying.  Another 
disadvantage of jobs that did not guarantee regular hours of work, 
especially where the number of hours was low, was that a situation could 
be created where people had to come off benefit and then have to reapply 
on a regular basis.  Although Jobseeker's Allowance does allow for up to 
16 hours work per week, there can be complications if someone works a 
different number of hours each week, varying between under and over 16 
hours.  This can also have consequences for Council Tax Benefit, where 
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people can experience difficulties in proving that they are still eligible to 
receive it.  These arrangements can become extremely complicated if 
someone oscillates between eligibility and non-eligibility for benefits.  A 
similar situation can also occur between claiming Jobseeker's Allowance 
and Family Credit (which has been replaced by the Working Families Tax 
Credit since the fieldwork was conducted). 
 
Local Vacancies 
During the three month period a total of 1433 local vacancies (defined as 
those which were notified directly to the office in question) were counted in 
the office.  The following sections provide an analysis of the details of 
these vacancies.  Almost all of the local vacancies stated that they were 
for positions in the local area, which meant that these were the vacancies 
most likely to be of interest to people registered at this Jobcentre office.  
One notable exception was a security guard vacancy where the place of 
work was London. Local vacancies included vacancies that were notified 
as multiple vacancies (294 or 21%) at the time of registration, training 
vacancies (44 or 3% - these have been excluded from the following 
analysis of terms of employment) and vacancies that were not displayed 
(100 or 7%5 - information about pay, hours of work and length of contract 
was not therefore available for those vacancies).  
 
 
                                                                                                                       
4 These categories were not mutually exclusive so there may be some overlap between 
them. 
5 This excludes the seven training vacancies which were not displayed. 
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Hours of work 
Chart One shows the proportion of vacancies for full-time and part-time 
work. 41% of the vacancies were for part-time work6, while 46% were for 
full-time work. The remaining 13% of vacancies did not specify whether 
the job was full or part time.   
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Chart Two shows that 72% of the vacancies were for permanent jobs and 
19% were for temporary positions.  2% of vacancies did not specify the 
length of contract.  Most of the vacancies were for permanent work, 81% 
of the part-time jobs and 80% of the full-time jobs offered a permanent 
contract.  22% of the vacancies that did not specify whether they were for 
part-time or full-time work offered only a temporary contract.  7% of all 
local vacancies were for part-time temporary jobs.  Table Three shows the 
hours of work by the type of contract. 
 
                                            
6 Defined here as:  part-time <30 hours, full-time ≥ 30 hours. 
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Table Three: Hours of Work by Type of Contract for Local Vacancies 
 
  
Full-time 
 
 
Part-time 
Hours of 
Work Not 
Specified 
 
Total 
 
Permanent 
 
 
472 
 
415 
 
105 
 
992 
 
Temporary 
 
 
105 
 
88 
 
54 
 
247 
 
Contract Not 
Specified 
 
12 
 
8 
 
13 
 
33 
 
Total 
 
 
589 
 
511 
 
172 
 
12727
 
37% of vacancies were for full-time permanent work, while only 6.9% were 
for part-time temporary work.  30% of the vacancies that specified the 
exact hours of work offered either less than 16 hours work or a range of 
hours (e.g. between 10-18 hours), which meant that the actual hours could 
be below 16 hours.  This is significant because unemployed users could 
continue to be registered as unemployed if they accepted one of these 
jobs.  The jobs advertised in this Jobcentre office did not therefore 
guarantee a route out of unemployment if the claimant count is used as 
the measure.  Those vacancies that did offer a route out of unemployment 
did not necessarily guarantee moving out of claiming benefit. 
 
Temporary Work 
Although the majority of vacancies were for permanent work, there was 
still a substantial proportion of jobs that offered temporary employment. 
Some vacancies were vaguely described as ‘casual’ or marked as 
temporary without details of the length of contract.  Other cards did give 
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details of the length of the contract, varying greatly from one day to three 
years. The structure of the benefits system is not geared towards 
temporary or part-time work and people who accept this type of work may 
be inconvenienced by form-filling and checking.  There is therefore a 
discrepancy between the assumptions that the social security system still 
works on (i.e. a of traditional model of full-time employment), and the 
flexible labour market pursued by economic policies (see p188).  For 
instance, if clients accept paid work of less than 16 hours they must 
declare it and complete a form for their earnings to be recalculated.  The 
medium for managing changing hours of work is cumbersome and can be 
particularly problematic for people who move in and out of work and 
unemployment or above and below the 16 hours of work per week. 
 
Rate of Pay 
The rates of pay for vacancies were stated in various ways - per hour, per 
week, per month or as an annual salary.  Some of the rates were very 
specific and included different levels for people of different ages, for 
weekend work and for ‘live-in’ posts.  The most common expression for 
the rate of pay for local vacancies was as an hourly rate, accounting for 
three quarters (75.6%) of jobs where a rate of pay was stated. Weekly 
rates were advertised for 5% of jobs, monthly rates for only three 
vacancies and salaries were advertised for 18.7% of vacancies for which a 
rate of pay was given.  Table Four shows the rates of pay for local jobs. 
 
                                                                                                                       
7 This excludes training vacancies.  Vacancies which were not displayed also led to 
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The majority of rates of pay advertised on Jobcentre vacancy cards were 
low. The lowest hourly rate of pay was £2.10.  This research was 
conducted just four months before the introduction of the National 
Minimum Wage. Almost half (45%) of vacancies advertised an hourly rate 
of pay were below £3.60.  This represents more than a third (34%) of all 
local vacancies for which a rate of pay was stated.  37% of full-time 
permanent local jobs which stated a rate of pay were below the Minimum 
Wage rate of £3.608. 
 
45% of weekly rates of pay also fell below the minimum wage level of 
£144.00 (assuming a 40 hour week).  Even the maximum weekly rate of 
pay, £300, fell short of the £350.30 which was the average gross weekly 
earnings in Scotland in April 1998 (National Statistics: 2000). 
 
Table Four:  Rates of Pay for Local Vacancies9
 
  
Hourly Rate 
 
Weekly Rate10
 
Monthly Rate 
 
Salary11
 
 
Minimum  
 
 
£2.10 
 
£70.00 
 
£600.00 
 
£4452.00 
 
Maximum 
 
 
£10.00 
 
£300.00 
 
£650.00 
 
£32073.00 
 
Median 
 
 
£3.62 
 
£160.00 
 
£650.00 
 
£10000.00 
 
                                                                                                                       
missing data for these variables. 
8 for adult workers when it was first introduced in 1999 
9 In the case of pay ranges the minimum has been used since an applicant was not 
guaranteed a higher rate.   
10 Weekly rates are for full-time work only.  In a few cases a weekly rate was advertised 
for part-time work.  These were converted to an hourly rate for a comparable figure. 
11 22% of the salaried vacancies were in fact for part-time work and are therefore pro 
rata. 
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7.5% of salaried positions offered less that the minimum wage (£7400.00 
assuming a 40 hour week).  97% of the salaried positions offered less than 
the average earnings of £18215.6012 in Scotland in April 1998 (National 
Statistics: 2000). 
 
Shift work, jobs involving flexible working hours and unsociable hours 
were amongst the worst paying. 16% of full-time local jobs were for shift 
work. At £3.52, the median rate of pay for shift work was lower than the 
median rate of £3.65 for all work.  The median rate of pay for work 
including evenings, nights, early mornings or weekends was £3.65 and the 
lowest paying job (offering only £2.10 per hour) included such unsociable 
hours.  The median hourly rate of pay for jobs that involved flexible 
working hours was £3.51, the lowest paying job of that type offering only 
£2.65 per hour. 
 
Thus, the advertised vacancies often did not match those sought by 
unemployed people.  Users also expressed a general preference for 
greater assistance in finding work.  Access to resources like local 
newspapers, computers for Internet and web access as well as for word-
processing and printing CVs and covering letters would have been greatly 
valued by several of the interviewees.  Others mentioned the use of 
telephones and the provision of paper and stamps as simple resources 
that would have been effective in helping them to find work.  Some users 
would also have appreciated more in-depth careers advice.  At a basic 
                                            
12 Based on average weekly earnings. 
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level many of the interviewees would have been happy to receive the type 
of service that was officially intended for them. 
 
Consequences of street-level modification of policy 
Customer service was also affected by the street-level modification of 
policy.  Users did not necessarily receive the service that was intended.  
This can be both to the benefit and detriment of users’ interests.  For 
example, if policy is re-created to be less disciplinary (see Chapter Five 
and Blackmore, 2001) then users can be advantaged.  However, if 
interviews are much shorter than intended and the basic job matching 
function is undermined (as demonstrated in Chapter Five) then users can 
be disadvantaged.  The following quote demonstrates one man’s reaction 
to the re-created version of policy that he received: 
 
UP 5: They’ve no time for you, sort of thing . . .  It was just sort of 
quickly ‘there you go, that’s you’ sort of thing, so.  I think they 
could spend a wee bit more time with people.  And try to help 
them out as much as they can, but.  They don’t seem to do 
that.  From start to finish they’ve never done that with me, so.  
I would prefer it if you came in and maybe they sat down with 
you for five minutes.  Just spoke to you and looked through 
what there was on the thing [vacancies on the computer] and 
things like that.  I mean they could help a hell of a lot of 
people if they done things like that, but they never ever do. 
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 What is interesting about this particular complaint is that that service that 
the user desires is exactly the service that official policy dictates he should 
receive. 
 
 
 
Lack of Control 
Users lacked choice in whether or not they accessed the service and in 
whether the service offered what they wanted and needed.  After having 
approached the Jobcentre, users also lacked control over how they were 
processed and the opportunities available to them.  Rather than being 
customers, users saw themselves as being subject to control.  Benefit 
recipients were compelled to behave in certain ways according to a 
complex structure of rules.  The following quote is from a man who 
resisted the customer label, describing his relationship with the Jobcentre 
as: 
 
UP 23: More of a, I don’t know, sort of ‘them’ and ‘us’ sort of thing, 
more I’m subject to their rules, to their . . .  I’ve got to behave 
in certain ways obviously to be entitled to my dole cheque.  I 
don’t have a sort of customer’s right sort of thing.  I can’t 
come to them to complain about the system, or at least I feel 
I can’t go and complain about this aspect of the service or 
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that aspect of the service cause I just don’t see how much 
difference it would make. 
 
Compulsion is a central defining feature of interactions between staff and 
registered unemployed users in the Jobcentre. Users know that staff have 
‘power to take away the only lifeline I have left at the moment, which is my 
fortnightly giro’ (UP 23).  In order to continue to receive Jobseeker’s 
Allowance, people must satisfy a series of conditions and participate in a 
range of activities.  To users this felt like officials ‘can pull the strings 
whatever way’, so if ‘the government says ‘jump’ and you’ve got to say 
‘how high?’. 
 
UP 31: If they want to see you you’ve got to go and see them.  If you 
don’t go and see them you don’t get paid.  You know.  And 
you’ve got to get money to live.  So it’s just a vicious circle.  If 
they ask you to do somersaults you’ve got to do it cause 
that’s what the system declares.  So you don’t think about it.  
They say ‘right you’ve got to be there on a certain day’.  Fair 
enough.  You go.  So. 
 
This meant that instead of feeling like customers, interviewees said they 
felt like ‘a pleb’ (UP 16), ‘a problem’ (UP 32), ‘a loser’ (UP 22), ‘a waster’ 
(UP 29) or an ‘irritant’ (UP 28).  Interviewees also had their own alternative 
descriptions of the relationship they had with staff at the Jobcentre, each 
emphasising the powerlessness of being subject to official control. 
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 UP 19: I imagine it more as a farm.  And you’re cattle coming in you 
know and you’re going through the process of filling in forms, 
going back out.  Look round, filling out forms, back out.  It’s 
like a clock going round and round in circles.  But, more of a 
cow than a customer. 
 
UP 26: It’s just an institution feeling.  It’s like being in a hospital.  You 
don’t really feel like you’re a customer if you’ve got a broken 
arm, just you’re in a hospital and you have to get things 
done.  It’s like that kind of thing. 
 
Having to wait 
A lack of control was apparent when users were required to wait.  This 
waiting reinforced the power relationship between worker and unemployed 
person.  The great majority of unemployed people who visited the 
Jobcentre regularly, and especially those who had been unemployed for 
more than six months, had had to wait for what they considered to be 
unacceptably long periods of time.  There was, however, variation in what 
people defined as an acceptable amount of time to wait.  Some users 
were willing to wait for 10 minutes, while others found this to be 
excessively long.  Some users found waiting more problematic than 
others, with a small minority of short-term unemployed people never 
having experienced long waits, whilst others considered waiting to be 
‘definitely the worst thing’ (UP 16) about the Jobcentre. 
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 Interviewees provided examples of having to wait in different parts of the 
office.  The average waiting times for each activity, e.g. making a fresh 
claim, signing on and enquiring about jobs, varied.  The longest reported 
waiting times of 45 minutes (UP 12) and 95 minutes (UP 19) were for 
interviews with advisers where there was no flexibility in the waiting time 
for. This is unlike e.g. signing on when users could go away and come 
back at any time during the one hour slot they were allotted.  Waiting times 
seemed to be lengthy even in situations where users could come back at 
another time, for instance it was not uncommon for interviewees to 
complain of having to wait half an hour to enquire about job vacancies. 
 
Many of the interviewees found waiting for long periods of time, usually 
defined as more than 10 minutes, frustrating or irritating.  The reasons for 
this being not only the boredom of waiting but also its symbolic meaning to 
users who felt that having their time ‘wasted’ and ‘sitting about doing 
nothing’ enforced their feelings of powerlessness.  Interviewees felt that 
having to wait and being ignored by staff meant that they were not 
considered to be important and that their time was not valued.  Users felt 
the attitude of staff was one of ‘you’ve got plenty time, you’re no’ working’ 
(UP 27).  Being required to wait became all the more frustrating when 
contrasted with the rigidity of the rules affecting claimants. 
 
Enforced waiting demonstrates the lack of service alternatives and also 
reinforces the point that users are non-voluntary (Lipsky, 1980).  If these 
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users really were customers in the purest sense they could seek an 
alternative service provider once waiting times had exceeded the time that 
they considered to be acceptable or the times guaranteed by the 
Jobseeker’s Charter. 
 
A similar source of discontent among Jobcentre users that highlighted the 
way they were processed and objectified was that they feel ‘shunted 
about’ (UP 11) and pushed from pillar to post. This happened, within 
different parts of the office and between different offices, usually the 
Benefits Agency and the Jobcentre but also local authority offices 
(particularly for users who were claiming Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
Benefit) or between desks of the same office.  The powerlessness of 
waiting could be duplicated in several different offices before users had 
their enquiry dealt with. 
 
Lack of Privacy 
Feelings associated with lack of control were heightened by the loss of 
privacy that making a benefit claim entailed.  Users had to trade their 
personal biographical details for the chance of claiming benefit, without 
knowing how that information would be interpreted or to what uses it might 
be put.  One user commented that ‘you’ve got to tell them your life story 
before you can get a penny out of them’ (UP 1).  Some users felt violated 
by the extent of personal information required because it symbolised a 
relinquishment of power and control. 
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UP 4: They’ve got everything about you.  [. . .]  You feel like that’s 
reaching too far into your own privacy. Even though they’re 
only doing their job it feels like as if they’re right in, knowing 
everything about you, more than you know yourself. 
 
Whilst the open-plan office layout, without screens or buffer boards, was 
generally conducive to the development of good staff-user relations, it also 
meant that privacy and confidentiality could be compromised.  Users 
complained that users and staff sitting at adjacent desks could overhear 
what they were saying and even see the computer screen that displayed 
their details.  This could be very upsetting for some users. For instance for 
a 17 year old woman whose distressing conversation regarding her 
pregnancy and poor relationship with her own parents was heard by a 
variety of staff and users who happened to be in the vicinity of the 
reception desk when she arrived for her appointment.  In his observations 
of a social work office Hall (1974) has previously observed a similar 
‘general lack of privacy for visitors when explaining to the receptionist their 
reasons for visiting the office’ (1974: 121).  These situations were 
exacerbated by the receptionists who were ‘accustomed to tales of misery 
and deprivation, were hardened to most of the stories they were told and 
failed to see the lack of privacy as a problem’ (Hall, 1974:  122).  
 
Lack of Purchasing Power 
Users lacked choice and control.  Fundamentally, they lacked purchasing 
power.  As Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants, their income was regulated, 
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the prevalence of means-testing (see Chapter Three) meaning that many 
short-term and almost all long-term Jobseeker’s Allowance users were 
living below poverty levels.  Users had very little control over their income 
and had to accept the level of benefit that was set by law.  The legacy of 
the low levels of benefit available in the UK can be traced back to the 
Nineteenth Century principle of ‘less eligibility’ associated with the poor 
laws (Veit-Wilson, 1998).  Official policy seems to have continued to be 
targeted at an image of ‘the unemployed’, who are thought to have certain 
past work experiences and particular morals and behaviours.  During the 
interaction between front-line staff and users there is a clash between the 
type of policy that is to be implemented and the experiences and needs of 
the people using the service.  In many cases, policy simply does not fit 
those it meant to be designed for. Unemployed people are a 
heterogeneous group who have various backgrounds, past work 
experiences, different skill levels and educational qualifications.  They 
relate to the implementation of policy in different ways.  This is an 
important factor in shaping staff-user relationships.   
 
Interviewees, with a few exceptions, were unanimous that the levels of 
benefit were insufficient to cover the costs of living during periods of 
unemployment. Interaction with staff was part of the ‘necessity’ of claiming 
benefit. They saw the determination of benefit levels as something that 
was outside of their control and were aware that there were therefore 
limits to what they could expect. 
 
 206
UP 13: Well there’s nae use complaining cause that’s the set rate 
and that’s the set rate, you know what I mean?  You will get 
by if you’ve got to get by.  
 
Some interviewees found that the low levels of Jobseeker's Allowance 
actually made it more difficult to find work. 
 
UP 20: I’m totally skint. I can’t get access to a computer.  Ehm, 
Jobseeker's Allowance it’s yeah.  Ehm, not a lot to live on.  
 
Low benefits had greater effects for those who lived a further distance 
from the Jobcentre, but did not qualify as postal claimants.  The cost of 
using local public transport made it very difficult for them to attend the 
office to look for jobs.  A lack of money meant that some users had to 
borrow money from friends and family, the repayment of which left them 
short on the next fortnight’s worth of benefit.  Living in poverty made life 
difficult for unemployed users.  One interviewee spoke of the difficulty of 
living on the amount of Jobseeker's Allowance money he received and the 
cumulative effect of having to miss one bill to pay another, driving him 
further and further into debt.  Certain circumstances presented people with 
dilemmas.  UP 8, for instance owned a car, which he considered gave him 
a better chance of finding and keeping work.  Without the money to run it 
and with the expense of public transport it did not know whether to sell it or 
keep it.  Similar problems of poverty and unemployment have been well 
documented for many years. 
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 Users are denied purchasing power in a variety of contexts because their 
incomes keep them below poverty levels.  In their dealings with the 
Jobcentre, they do not pay for services and cannot take their custom 
elsewhere.  They are also denied information about the financial ‘product’ 
they receive.  Jobseeker’s Allowance can only be accessed by completing 
long and complex forms, which were a source of irritation to many users.  
Precise information about how the final amount of benefit is calculated can 
be difficult to obtain. For instance, one man reported difficulties when he 
wanted to know how his means-tested benefit had been calculated 
because he had received less than he had expected: 
 
UP 2: My benefit was like, they said you’ll get this much each 
week.  And I was saying to them, well how do you work that 
out, you know.   Come on, why am I getting so little when it 
says in the booklet I should get this.  And they weren’t willing 
to tell me at first and I was saying ‘Look I don’t want to create 
a fuss I just want to know how you’ve come to this thing.’  So 
finally after about sort of quarter of an hour arguing and them 
on the phone to people upstairs I was allowed upstairs to talk 
to somebody to tell my how they calculated it!  Which was 
great cause then you knew. 
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Conclusion 
Users experienced unemployment policy in a range of different ways.  
Generally, interviewees resisted the market-based terminology of 
customer service.  At best, users could only be described as pseudo-
customers because, with few exceptions, they did not choose to use 
Jobcentre services, but depended on them as a matter of economic 
necessity.   This verifies Lipsky’s (1980) assertion that users of street-level 
bureaucracies are non-voluntary.  In becoming a benefit recipient, people 
underwent a process of transformation from being a citizen to becoming a 
user, moving from the legitimate role of formal employment to the 
stigmatised role of unemployed.  This meant that contact with the 
Jobcentre was often associated with negative experiences, a factor which 
had a significant impact upon the staff-user relationship.  Most of those 
interviewed felt uncomfortable and embarrassed in the Jobcentre office 
because they were confronting their unemployed role in a public way.  
Receiving income from Jobseeker’s Allowance also made some users feel 
like they were begging because the relationship was not reciprocal in the 
same sense as paid employment.  Despite this, users still retained a 
strong sense of entitlement to benefits because they felt that they had 
personally and collectively paid into ‘the system’ through taxes and 
National Insurance contributions.  The low rates of benefit also meant that 
users were likely to experience poverty whilst relying on JSA as their 
primary source of income.  Users did not consider themselves to be 
customers because their relationship was to the state.   
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There was much criticism of the quality of the service in the Jobcentre and 
there was a wide gap between the sort of service that users wanted and 
thought would help them find work and the service that was available.  The 
main issues were insufficient assistance in finding work, inadequate 
vacancies advertised in the office and a mismatch between notified 
vacancies and the skills, qualifications and occupational experience of 
users.  Very few of the advertised vacancies were for skilled or 
professional positions.  There was a relatively high incidence of low grade 
work and part-time and temporary vacancies were not uncommon.  This 
was a magnified reflection of the state of the current flexible labour market, 
that was inevitable because of the Jobcentre’s over-dependence on 
vacancies from the lower end of the market.  The demand from 
interviewees was overwhelmingly for ‘proper jobs’ that were paid fairly,  
full-time and long-term.  In some cases the type of service that users 
wanted was the type of service that they were officially meant to receive. 
 
Users were also deprived of choice over the service they received.  They 
were subject to a series of strict controls and had to comply with the 
regulations for benefit entitlement, which have become tighter in recent 
years and included training programmes that were considered to be 
‘useless’.  Users were therefore more likely to describe themselves as 
cattle than as customers.  The powerlessness of being denied choice and 
being made subject to control was reinforced by regularly being made to 
wait before accessing services and by a lack of privacy.  There was, 
therefore, evidence of dissatisfaction (reaching intense levels in some 
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cases).  There  did not seem to be a close correlation between what 
clients required and what was provided for them.   
 
Finally, users were not customers because they did not have purchasing 
power.  They could not take their custom elsewhere and the very nature of 
a system of income maintenance means that users depended on the 
service for their income, which represents an inversion of usual customer 
relations.  This lack of purchasing power was combined with feelings of 
dehumanisation, for instance being ‘shunted about’ between different 
sections of the office, or between different types of offices. This shows that 
despite the new managerialist emphasis on high quality customer service, 
the majority of interviewees were not impressed with the service they 
received.  Clients were for the most part powerless, and this was the 
heaviest influence on the character of their encounters with staff. 
 
The term ‘customer’ was therefore a useful tool for excavating down to 
uncover the core characteristics  of the staff-user relationship.  Aside from 
superficial improvements to the physical space in which interactions occur, 
new managerialism had not made noticeable changes to the conditions 
under which people received policy.  Whilst the introduction of the term 
‘customer’ might signal an aspiration for improvements to service delivery, 
the reality of visiting the Jobcentre did not match up.  The fundamental 
basis of service provision was experienced as involving compulsion, 
conditionality and punitive measures that restricted and dictated 
behaviour.  This means that users were represented in the official policy 
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arena by a label that did not depict the existing relationship.  The 
continued use of the term ‘customer’ therefore reinforces the multiple 
levels of powerlessness that leave unemployed people at the bottom of 
the policy-making hierarchy, despite the fact that the service is said to 
exist for them. 
 
This chapter has, therefore, provided insight into the meanings that policy 
holds for those who use the service and an appreciation of the reasons 
why users might resist or contest official definitions and policy solutions (a 
point developed in Chapter Eight).  It brings users’ perspectives to the 
forefront of understanding the policy process in ways that have been 
lacking (see Chapter Two).  Taken together, Chapters Five and Six have 
painted a double sided picture of implementation that shows how staff and 
users each relate to official policy and discourse.  This takes a step 
beyond the existing UK-based policy implementation literature, which has 
tended to focus on either one side (e.g. Blackmore’s 2001 study of staff) or 
the other (e.g. Howe’s, 1991 study of unemployed people).  This 
understanding provides the essential precursor for the analysis of how 
policy is accomplished as a two-way social process, which follows in 
Chapters Seven and Eight.   
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Chapter Seven 
 
Accomplishing Unemployment Policy: 
staff roles and the categorisation of clients 
 
 
Introduction 
Chapter Five identified the external constraints that led to the recreation of 
policy and Chapter Six established the meanings that the Jobcentre and 
interviews with staff held for users and the staff-user relationship.  This 
chapter takes the argument a step further to suggest that the implementation 
of unemployment policy in a Jobcentre is a process of interactional 
accomplishment.  Policy implementation is, therefore, also affected by the 
perceptions and beliefs that staff themselves bring to their jobs.  Rather than 
viewing policy implementation as an impartial and unilateral application of 
predefined rules, this chapter reveals the contested nature of social policy at 
the interface between those social actors who deliver policy and those who 
receive it.  In doing so it recognises the two-way nature of policy 
accomplishment at street-level, which is played out within the boundaries of a 
strict power relationship.  This accomplishment of policy takes place through 
a series of social processes, which are employed by both parties in order to 
shape the interaction.  
 213
 As the first of a pair of chapters investigating the dynamics of the staff-user 
relationship through interaction, this chapter focuses on staff perspectives on 
the accomplishment of policy.  One social process that is involved in the 
accomplishment of policy is that of categorising users in different ways.  
Employment Officers made two types of categorisations.  The first, 
‘administrative categorisation’, was the process by which citizens were 
transformed into clients.  The second, ‘moral categorisation’, was a more 
subjective process by which users were constructed in different ways and 
dealt with accordingly e.g. as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ clients.   
 
Constructions of Client ‘Types’: classification and ‘people-
processing’ (Prottas, 1979) 
Unemployment policy is accomplished at street-level through the face-to-face 
interaction of staff and users. Front-line staff did not implement policies 
uniformly, so to understand the processes by which variation occurred it is 
necessary to take a closer look at the talk between staff and users1. From the 
staff perspective, one of the primary social processes by which this happened 
was the categorisation of clients.  Categorisations were dependent upon the 
assumptions and perceptions that staff put into operation in their interactions 
                                            
1 This analysis seeks to understand the culturally specific meanings associated with the 
interaction and does not attempt an in-depth conversation analysis, better done by those 
such as Hyden (2001) and Olesen (2001) who take talk as their main focus. 
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with users. Lipsky points out that front-line staff construct clients as they 
process them bureaucratically:  
 
The social construction of the client, involving the client, others 
relevant to the client, and the public employees with whom they 
must deal is a significant process of social definition often 
unrelated to objective factors and therefore open to the 
influences of prejudice, stereotype, and ignorance as a base for 
determinations (1980:  69). 
 
Client ‘types’ provided Employment Officers with a way of distinguishing 
between the many different users that they saw every day. The role of the 
street-level bureaucrat is to transform ‘complex human beings, into 
categories/attributes that can be processed by the organisation.  It is this 
transformation that allows the organisation to fulfil its function, by providing a 
basis on which services are rendered to individuals now constituted as 
‘clients’’ (Kingfisher, 1996: 83).   
 
Two types of client categorisation could be distinguished from the way that 
Jobcentre staff processed users.  The first, administrative categorisation, was 
a necessary part of how the Jobcentre operated, which governed entitlement 
to benefits and influenced how users would be processed bureaucratically.  
The second type, moral categorisation, was based on staff beliefs and moral 
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judgements about users.  Both forms of categorisation affected the way in 
which users were treated and the type of outcomes that were possible for 
them.   
 
Administrative Categorisation:  the process of constructing clients 
Staff were required to ‘judge and control clients for bureaucratic purposes’ 
(Lipsky, 1980:  73).  It was to this end that administrative categorisation was 
designed.  This part of the categorisation process was the official way in 
which citizens became reconstructed as clients.  The person presenting him 
or herself to the Jobcentre was processed according to a standard predefined 
‘menu of existing client types’ (Prottas, 1979:  4).  The ways in which users 
were initially categorised, and sometimes subsequently recategorised, 
determined how they would be processed.  Administrative categories could 
therefore have important consequences for users. 
 
Becoming a Client 
The main point at which this categorisation happened was when a user 
registered as unemployed at the Jobcentre.  At this stage users were sorted 
into different administrative categories.  Exactly which client category a user 
ended up in depended on the negotiation process that occurred during the 
initial interviews.   
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The receptionists acted as the first gatekeepers, being in a position to either 
grant or deny access to the services on offer (Rees, 1978: 10).  It was 
possible for the receptionist to give an indication of whether someone was 
likely to receive Jobseeker's Allowance, which might cause a potential user 
not to pursue a claim because they thought they might not be eligible.  
Receptionists therefore held the key to the first administrative category - that 
of becoming a Jobseeker's Allowance user (which is similar to Hall’s, 1974, 
findings in a social service department).  This task was entrusted to workers 
who were of the lowest administrative grade, often on short-term contracts 
(only one of the receptionists had been employed by the ES for more than a 
few months), who had not received in-depth training and therefore did not 
have the detailed knowledge of the complex benefits system that would 
enable them to make an accurate decision about whether someone would or 
would not be eligible for payment.  The receptionists were aware of the 
importance of their role as gatekeepers. 
 
SM 15: First of all we assess the person and decide if they should sign 
on.  We decide which type of benefit they would qualify for.  We 
issue them with forms.  We basically assess everyone [. . .] we 
decide what’s happening for each client. 
 
One receptionist saw the scope of her role as involving more than just 
advising people about whether they will be eligible for benefit. 
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 SM 35: We make sure that they are genuine claimants.  If they’re not fit, 
actively seeking work and available for work then they shouldn’t 
be claiming.   
 
Coaching Users 
What the receptionists did in this initial part of the claiming process was not 
confined to collecting information.  At the reception stage workers could 
coach users in on how to fill in the claims forms.  In this way the receptionists 
influenced how users were categorised and therefore the way in which they 
would be treated later.  One example of coaching a user in their interest 
concerns a user who left her second last job voluntarily: 
 
SM 35: (To user) It has to go to the Adjudication Officer because we’re 
not allowed to make any decisions about that.  If you just give 
me some more information about why you left that job.  So just 
say it was for a better job and that. 
 
The receptionists had the opportunity to make the claiming process either 
more or less difficult for people.  During the same interview above the staff 
member reassured the user, telling her: 
 
SM 35:   So don’t worry too much about it. 
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 The receptionist could also influence how a user completed the claim forms, 
which in turn determined both how they would be processed and what they 
could be compelled to do later.  One example of this was in a user’s choice of 
work they are looking for. 
 
SM 35: What type of work is it that you’re looking for? 
 
User:  Outdoor work. 
 
SM 35: Is that general labouring, or . . .? 
 
User:   Well, countryside ranger. 
 
SM 35: Right.  Well, you’d have to obviously think about other types of 
work because country ranger work is few and far between.  So it 
might be like a trainee position or something that you could get 
with that.  Is there any other type of work that you would 
consider? 
 
User: Well, temporary work till next year, ‘cause I might be going to 
college. 
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In this example the older female receptionist persuaded the young male user 
that it was unreasonable for him to only look for jobs in the main occupation 
that he was interested in.  Receptionists were also required to check the 
information provided by users.  This involved querying availability for work, 
during which users could be persuaded to amend their forms to what the 
receptionist regarded as ‘reasonable’ hours of availability, usually persuading 
users to comply with maximum availability for work.  
 
SM 35: Could you do a Saturday or Sunday? 
 
User:  Well, usually I go away with the cadets at the weekends. 
 
SM 35: It’s just because shops usually open on a Saturday and a 
Sunday.  The employer would probably expect you to work 
then.  Would you be willing to work Saturdays and Sundays? 
 
User: Yes. 
 
These tactics were also used by management grade advisers during Fresh 
Claims interviews.  They ensured that users could be processed more easily 
and categorised more clearly for administrative purposes.  Miller (1991) and 
Anderson (1999) describe such persuasion strategies as ‘witcraft’, 
emphasising the ways in which state employment agencies lead users to fulfil 
 220
particular goals.  Jobcentre advisers also used ‘witcraft’ to persuade users to 
take certain courses of action during other types of interviews, for instance to 
convince users to participate in training courses. 
 
Occupational classification and previous work experience 
During the Fresh Claim interview, advisers converted the information 
provided by the user on the application form (and vetted by the receptionists) 
into a series of entries in the Labour Market System (LMS) computer system.  
One part of this was to enter Standard Occupational Classifications (SOC) 
codes for each client.  These codes were then used to search the computer 
system for job vacancies that would suit the user. Staff used a smaller sub-
section of SOC codes in their everyday use than the full range available to 
them, which is an example of one of the simplifications adopted to make the 
job more manageable (Lipsky, 1980:  83).  The information entered by the 
adviser determined how the user would be treated later. These 
categorisations could mean the difference between a user having an 
opportunity to apply for a job and not having that opportunity, the 
consequences of which may mean getting work or remaining unemployed.  
 
Occupational classifications influenced the attempts that front-line staff would 
make to match users to vacancies.  Despite job matching being an officially 
dictated part of every signing on interview, staff were more likely to carry out 
job searches for some users than others, varying according to the type of 
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work they were looking for.  If front-line staff considered there to be very few 
vacancies in certain occupations (e.g. teaching or forestry) they developed a 
habit of not conducting vacancy searches for users seeking those types of 
work unless specifically requested by the user.  Similarly, occupational 
categories like SOC code 990  ‘Other Elementary Occupations’, for which 
there was a large proportion of vacancies, also signalled non-action for staff.  
This time Employment Officers were unlikely to check for vacancies because 
there were almost twice as many unemployed people seeking this type of 
work than there were notified vacancies (statistics from the Employment 
Information Unit © Office for National Statistics). 
 
SM 6: It’s because we’re time-bound.  It’s like: ‘You’re a labourer.   Oh 
right.  Sign on the dotted line.’  Then they’re out of here.  If we 
had more resources we could do a lot more. 
 
Employment Officers also excused their lack of job searching activity for 
users because there are too many jobs to check through.  They considered it 
to be a ‘hassle’ (SM 20) to search through long lists of vacancies in areas like 
clerical work where there were a relatively large number of vacancies, which 
would take too much time.  Occupational classification therefore influenced 
the level of job matching that staff would conduct. 
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Users were required to make different types of effort to find work according to 
how they had been classified by staff.  At the Fresh Claims stage there 
seemed to be a trend towards graduates or professionals being required ‘to 
do more than just check the papers’ (SM 40).  This might include contacting 
employers speculatively, using the Internet or visiting their university careers 
service.  In contrast, skilled workers might only be asked to look in the local 
newspaper.  There seemed to be a greater expectation that users who had a 
degree qualification, or had previously done professional work, would be able 
to find another job more easily than other job seekers, whereas those who 
were less skilled could be expected to be unemployed for longer.  This can be 
partly explained by the difference in the type of work that the users were 
looking for, but it seemed that graduates or professionals were being required 
to pursue many more avenues than skilled or unskilled workers are. 
 
What was required of certain people was also related to the type of work they 
were seeking: 
 
SM 10: If it was maybe clerical work or something we would probably 
ask them to contact the Jobcentre three or four times a week 
because we get quite a high turnover of that type of work. 
 
Another example of the use of information collected at the Fresh Claims 
stage was in the case of previous work experience.  Front-line staff played an 
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important role in controlling access to the vacancies advertised in the 
Jobcentre.  Employment Officers rationed vacancies by being selective about 
which users they would allow to apply for vacancies and this varied according 
to administrative categorisation. There were also examples of access being 
denied to certain vacancies on the grounds of age and sex.  Previous 
experience of a particular type of work was often viewed by staff as a 
prerequisite for applying for positions, whether the employer had specified 
this or not.  
 
SM 20: This is the people we’re getting in this afternoon (pointed at 
files).  The first one there is a labourer so there was nothing for 
him.  The second one’s a waiter, but he hasn’t done any waiting 
so there’s no point putting him forward for anything because an 
employer wouldn’t want him. 
 
In this case the Employment Officer did not check the LMS to see if there 
were any vacancies that she could suggest to the user (despite there being 
live vacancies for waiters on the system) simply because he did not have any 
previous experience.  Although vacancies were usually advertised on the self-
service boards in the office, a user might assume that if the worker did not 
mention a suitable vacancy then nothing was available.  So although there 
was another way of finding out about vacancies, staff did limit access to 
information based on an assumption about what employers would want in 
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relation to an administrative category.  They did not view this as 
discrimination against the long-term unemployed, but as a rational decision 
that an employer would have made anyway.  A similar tendency was 
identified by Anderson (1999), who demonstrated the ways in which US 
employment agency staff used a variety of strategies to influence users’ 
decisions about whether to apply for jobs or not, persuading some to apply for 
jobs they did not want and deflecting others from opportunities that they were 
keen to pursue. 
 
Moral Categorisations:  constructing ‘good’ and ‘bad’ clients 
Moral categorisations differed from administrative categorisations in that they 
were less precise and were characterised by some degree of ambiguity.  
These constructions of clients were made subjectively, based on judgements 
about users’ attributes, behaviour or attitudes (also noted by Cooper, 1985). 
Lipsky (1980) suggests that this process of distinguishing between different 
‘types’ of client is necessitated by the constraints of working within a public 
service bureaucracy. Within this framework the behaviour of front-line staff is 
presented as being determined according to the organisational arrangements 
and subject to the availability of resources.  He seems to imply that were staff 
not under these constraints they would act otherwise.  Making judgements 
about ‘types’ is therefore presented as being a rational reaction to a specific 
work environment.  The data described here, however, suggest something 
qualitatively different – that rather than being a product of a bureaucratic work 
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environment, distinctions about ‘types’ were much more prevalent.  The 
evidence shows that users also make judgements about staff and that staff 
made these kinds of judgement about social actors who were not users.  
 
The initial moral distinction made by staff was between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
clients, which was similar to the constructions of clients found by Kingfisher 
(1996) and the importance of ‘moral character’ identified by Giller & Morris 
(1981) and Hasenfeld (1987), particularly in relation to the categories of 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ (Howe, 1990).  The type of treatment that users 
received depended upon the moral judgements made by front-line staff.   
 
‘Good’ Clients 
Many unemployed Jobcentre users were thought to be ‘good’ clients, the 
great majority having been deemed indifferently as ‘all right’ (SM 14). Staff 
demonstrated a preference for compliant clients and praised those who made 
their jobs easier, for instance users who brought their CV with them to Fresh 
Claim interviews, or those who did exactly what was expected of them.  This 
user compliance made processing a quick and uneventful matter of routine.  
Being ‘keen’, ‘smart and presentable’ and even ‘nice looking’ (SM 30) 
counted in a user’s favour. Users who were deemed to be worthy or 
deserving of the service offered by staff were thought of as ‘good’ clients and 
‘decent people’ (SM 21).  Employment Officers identified genuine cases as 
those who were willing to work. The ‘really nice ones’ (SM 44) might secure a 
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better standard of service in terms of more staff time and effort.  Staff were 
more sympathetic towards certain types of clients and they would make 
concessions or bend the rules for them.    
 
Moral categorisations could have the power to overrule administrative 
categorisations, for instance some users were thought of as deserving even if 
they did not meet the criteria to receive the service offered, e.g. users who 
had previously claimed Incapacity Benefit but who were now required to claim 
Jobseeker's Allowance despite being unable to work because of a health 
problem.  Older users were often seen as more deserving, particularly since 
they had ‘paid in all of their life’, pointing to the prevailing recognition of 
earned entitlement to benefit.   
 
SM 32: You know the genuine ones.   There are some men in their late 
40s or early 50s who’ve been employed for years.   Then they 
get made redundant.   That’s very difficult.   You really feel for 
them.   They’re just not going to get work again.    
 
The most likely reason for users to be constructed as deserving was if they 
showed a willingness to work. ‘Good’ clients were thought to be unemployed 
through no fault of their own, their lack of employment being explained in 
terms of external circumstances rather then individual failings.  Commitment 
to the work ethic was demonstrated by those who worked hard at finding 
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work. In fact being ‘keen’ to find work was the one characteristic that could 
override other negative attributes.  In the following quote the adviser praised 
her long-term unemployed user for his willingness to work. 
 
SM 21: One thing that I’m sure of is that he does want to work.   He’s 
got a criminal record and he’s a bit simple so it makes it hard. 
 
It was possible for users to make the transition from being perceived by staff 
as a ‘bad’ client to being accepted as a ‘good’ client, particularly if they began 
to demonstrate a willingness to work.   One New Deal Personal Adviser 
described a process akin to character reform. 
  
SM 32: That guy that Audrey was talking to is a cheeky wee monkey.  
He had a bad attitude when he first came along but after a 
while, once I got to know him a bit better . . .    The other week 
he was filling in an application form and I was really surprised at 
how well he filled it in.   He said ‘aye well I’ve got to get a job 
haven’t I?’.   And I’m sure he will go for that work trial.   I’ve 
seen a big change in him. 
 
Staff were particularly sympathetic towards certain users who they viewed as 
vulnerable.  In the following example the first worker made special efforts to 
comfort a user who was in distress.  The user was constructed as particularly 
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deserving because she had a disability, which meant that the member of staff 
thought she should not have had to claim Jobseeker's Allowance. 
 
SM 44: There’s one wee girl that comes in and she’s that frightened.   
She’s disabled and her mum won’t let her go on Incapacity 
Benefit.   She has to claim Jobseekers.   You see her 
sometimes and she looks really frightened, especially if it’s 
really busy and there’s big huge queues. 
 
SM 19: Aye, sometimes you have to keep talking to her when you go by 
just so she doesn’t burst into tears. 
 
SM 44: Aye, she was in the other day and I actually had to go over to 
her and go (half hug) ‘it’s all right, you’re fine’.   She’s all right 
with me now.   She has a laugh with me and everything but it’s 
a shame. 
 
The ideal user would therefore be one whose case was administratively 
straightforward, whose circumstances were ‘deserving’, whose behaviour was 
compliant and whose attitude was keen and respectful.  Staff also 
appreciated users who were well-humoured, that they could ‘have a good 
laugh with’ (SM 42), which demonstrated some positive aspects to staff-user 
relations.   
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 ‘Bad’ Clients 
There was greater variation in the range of ‘bad’ client types constructed by 
staff, although they were usually non-compliant in some sense.  ‘Bad’ clients 
were often thought to be undeserving of the service provided by staff.  Moral 
constructions of clients were to some extent fluid and overlapping, with 
individuals often fitted into more than one category.  This section outlines 
some examples of client types that were constructed in negative terms. 
 
‘Wasters’ 
Constructing ‘bad’ clients was similar to constructing ‘good’ clients in that 
willingness to work was one of the key defining moral criteria.  There was 
criticism of users who were thought to be unwilling to work or not actively 
seeking work.  These users were sometimes referred to as ‘wasters’ (SM 25).  
Being a ‘waster’ was related to various individual failings of behaviour and 
attitude.  For instance, one New Deal Personal Adviser referred to one of his 
users as a ‘lazy big shite’ (SM 26) and another senior Employment Officer 
remarked that ‘if they’re any good they should have a job’ (SM 24).  ‘Wasters’ 
were those who wanted something for nothing.  
 
SM 44: I think there is 1% that you get in all walks of life that are not 
wanting to work and are just wanting to sponge the system. 
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One New Deal Personal Adviser described how she reacted to users who 
were not well motivated and expressed a preference to work with keener 
clients who she admitted she would help more. 
 
SM 32: You’re supposed to spend more time on them than I do.   That’s 
terrible isn’t it? If they sit down and they’re like (made fed-up 
face and shrugged) I’m like ‘why should I bother then?’.   It’s a 
terrible attitude.   One guy wanted to do construction.   I 
arranged a job for him and he got work boots and everything.   It 
was meant to start on Monday.   Did he turn up?  No he did not.   
I was fizzing.   Fizzing.   I said ‘you’ve not seen my anger yet, 
but you will’.   He’s not been in yet.   He was meant to come in 
but he didn’t show.   He’s got another appointment for next 
week.   He’s probably too scared.   It was only for six to eight 
weeks right enough, but it’s a foot in the door.   That was £25 
for nothing.  If they’re keen I help them more.   
 
The level of motivation displayed by a user was therefore a key factor in 
determining the level of help they would receive from staff.   Those who were 
disadvantaged most were likely to have least motivation and were therefore 
likely to receive less help from staff.   This means that staff behaviour could 
compound the difficulties already faced by some users (Handler, 1992). 
 
 231
Although staff did often recognise the barriers that made it difficult for users to 
get work, welfare dependency appeared in these explanations alongside 
sympathy. 
 
SM 17: People don’t want to work because they wouldn’t get as much 
money because they get their rent paid and their Council Tax 
[Benefit] and that.   I think a lot of them have become dependent 
on the system.   It’s a shame.    
 
Although these users were breaking the conditions for claiming benefit they 
were often able to avoid penalties for various reasons.  Staff were reluctant to 
take action to stop a user’s benefit because it required a lot of effort on their 
part to complete the paperwork. 
 
Young men were often felt to be ‘wasters’ since ‘a lot of them can’t be 
bothered working’ (SM 37) or that they ‘dinnae ken how to work’ (SM 44).  
Staff expected these clients to be less compliant, and particularly unlikely to 
attend appointments, especially early morning appointments. 
 
‘Young lads’ could also present a challenge in other ways.  The Employment 
Officer who conducted interviews for those 16 and 17 year olds claiming the  
Severe Hardship version of Jobseeker's Allowance described why: 
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SM 7: A lot of them are a bit cocky and think they’re a hard man 
because they’re in here signing.   Either that or they’re very 
quiet and they just say ‘aye’ and ‘no’ and again it’s just with 
coming straight out of school.   They don’t have any experience 
of stuff like being in an office and the job environment and how 
to act.   Sometimes they sit and look about and you’re trying to 
talk to them and they’re just looking about.   The way people 
react is quite different from an adult or however you want to put 
it. 
 
In this example there are several characterisations of young clients, relating 
to how they react to the Jobcentre environment and how they accomplish 
their interaction with staff.  For some young people this was a very difficult 
process that are not able to negotiate easily.  In the case of the type of client 
referred to as ‘cocky’ or a ‘hard man’, attending the Jobcentre was related to 
a sense of self.  The staff perception in this case was of a young man 
exerting his masculine identity within a challenging context. 
 
The Unemployables:  ‘They’re useless some of them’ 
‘Wasters’ were a closely related category to ‘unemployables’.  ‘Wasters’ were 
those who would not work, whereas ‘unemployables’ were those who could 
not work.  Staff made critical assessments of users’ employability according 
to a range of criteria including appearance  (e.g. ‘she’s a bit fat and she’s got 
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a ring in her nose’ (SM 32)), mental and physical health, personal hygiene 
and habits like time-keeping, alongside evaluations about work experience, 
qualifications and relevant skills for the job.  Unemployable users were almost 
always categorised as long-term unemployed for administrative purposes.  
The category of long-term unemployed could also be understood in moral  
terms. 
 
SM 13: With the long-term some of them are unemployable, not that the 
Department will admit to it, but they are.   [. . .]  If we sent all the 
riff raff we would lose the employers.   They’re useless some of 
them.   Because of their lack of qualifications, or lack of skills, 
their background, their age even, they’re unemployable.    
 
Staff therefore accepted that there were users who would never work again. 
Long-term unemployment was much more readily linked with blame than 
sympathy as an emotional response.  The long-term unemployed were also 
seen to have ‘got into a bad habit’ (SM 44).  From the staff perspective there 
were only a limited number of logical explanations for long-term 
unemployment: 
 
SM 10: They’re either not looking for work or they can’t work. 
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The only other option identified by staff was that long-term unemployed 
people were already working and claiming benefits fraudulently.   
 
A small minority of users had their unemployable status legitimated by staff 
who took no further action when they were officially meant to do so.  Part of 
the reason for allowing this to pass was that workers knew there was no other 
benefit option for users in this position. 
 
SM 26: I’ve got one long-term I passed over because I saw him twice 
and realised I was wasting my time.  He was a 58 year old 
alcoholic.  I wasn’t going to get anywhere with him. 
 
On the other hand, there were clients who were categorised as unemployable 
but who were still pressured to find work. 
 
 SM 13: I’ve got one girl.   She’s unemployable.  There’s a lot of them 
like that.  I did tell her she’d have to make more of an effort to 
find work or she’d get her benefit stopped.   . . .  I feel even 
more sorry for the ones that want to work and you know that an 
employer will take one look at them and not want them.    
 
Some of the long-term unemployed users had been unemployed for a 
number of years and these clients were often referred to as the ‘hard core’ 
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(SM 18), who were ‘not a choice group’ (SM 24).    In some cases there were 
extra years that had not been officially calculated as unemployment if, for 
instance, they were claiming Incapacity Benefit, had been in prison or had 
been full-time carers.  These clients were difficult to process because staff 
had ‘no idea what to say to them’ (SM 40) and it was thought to be impossible 
to ‘market’ this type of client to an employer.  Some officials felt that users 
had needs that were beyond the scope of the Employment Service to help 
with. 
 
SM 25: You don’t know what you’re going to be dealing with when they 
sit down.  I had one the other day that was a murderer.  He said 
to me ‘no-one will ever employ me’.  I said ‘I’m sure we’ll be able 
to get you something’.  He said ‘I’ve served a life sentence for 
murdering the wife’.  Just like that, matter of fact. 
 
This meant that even measures that had been specifically designed to target 
long-term unemployed clients could be viewed by advisers as ‘just going 
through the motions’ (SM 10). Staff viewed their work with these users as 
futile, their time being better spent on those with a keener attitude or a greater 
probability of finding work.  This meant that even the most active labour 
market policy could become an empty bureaucratic process as a result of 
moral categorisations made by staff.   
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A very small minority of users were classified administratively as 
unemployable at the Fresh Claims stage.  It was a very rare occurrence, but 
the Fresh Claims supervisor explained how it was possible for a user to be 
exempted from an occupational classification. 
 
SM 2: Clients are categorised into ‘work ready’ and then assigned to a 
caseload. . . .  We like as many as possible to be in at least one.  
There is the odd client that isn’t put into a caseload, if they’re 
‘not job ready’.  Maybe if it’s a person with a violent nature, or 
people we know have had problems in the past, health 
problems or mental health problems, so they’re not suitable for 
vacancies.  They still qualify for work.  We would dispute that. 
 
The examples used by the supervisor are interesting in that many of the 
reasons given for allowing a ‘non-work ready’ categorisation, were grounds 
on which Jobseeker's Allowance claims could be disallowed, e.g. health 
problems.   
 
‘Nutters’ and ‘Numpties’:  the benefits and costs of  non-compliance  
Staff were agreed that ‘the odd one or two’ (SM 18) of their clients were 
‘nutters’ (SM 41) and ‘numpties’ (SM 15).  At the extreme end of this category 
were alcoholics, drug addicts and those with prison records for violent crimes.  
These were the true ‘nutters’.  ‘Numpties’ were a milder version of ‘nutters’, 
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constituting a nuisance to staff rather than a distinct danger. These labels 
were applied to users who challenged the workings of the Jobcentre 
bureaucracy or displayed discontent, anger or a reluctance to comply. 
‘Nutters’ and ‘numpties’ were often, but not always, male.  However, among 
the most notorious of the ‘nutters’ to visit the office was a young woman who 
had served a prison sentence for stabbing another local woman.  ‘Nutters’ 
were also likely to be long-term unemployed.  These were the clients who 
were ‘really abusive’ (SM14) or ‘always in causing hassle’ (SM 32). Behind 
the scenes, they were in turn likely to be referred to derogatorily by staff using 
such terms as ‘wee bastard’ (SM 32), ‘pain in the arse’ (SM 3), ‘cunt’ (SM 32) 
or ‘arsehole’ (SM 44).  The dynamics of the staff-user relationship were 
therefore very different for these clients than for the compliant, keen, ‘nice 
ones’.   An examination of how staff dealt with conflict from these types of 
clients reveals some of the power relations that lie just beneath the surface of 
routine interactions. 
 
‘Nutters’ and ‘numpties’ varied in their attitudes towards paid employment.  It 
was not necessarily the case that ‘nutters’ and their less dangerous 
counterparts ‘numpties’ did not want to work.  But  they were unlikely to be 
considered as employable.  In fact, one reason for this classification could be 
because the user was making excessive demands for staff assistance in 
finding work.  Being keen to work therefore had an optimum level.  
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‘Nutters’ could represent a danger to staff, particularly because the Jobcentre 
office was open plan and unscreened, which was conducive to a more 
friendly environment but also meant that staff had to take greater risks with 
users who could be violent.  A small number of users had their files marked 
‘PV’ for ‘potentially violent’ as a warning that they could be dangerous.  
However, some Employment Officers felt that this labelling might have a 
detrimental effect on staff-user relations.  Secondly, a criminal record made it 
more difficult for users to get a job. 
 
Controlling Clients 
Staff dealt with trouble in different ways.  Some Employment Officers took a 
pre-emptive approach in the belief that users would respond better if they 
were spoken to respectfully and given as much assistance as possible.  
Others chose to be more confrontational in approach, which was in breach of 
the official guidance and training:  
 
SM 14: I just swear at them.  I make sure there’s nobody else around 
and nobody else can hear me then I tell them to ‘fucking stop 
giving me shit’.  If they complain I would just deny it.     
 
Although Employment Officers embodied government to the users they dealt 
with, they did not see themselves as part of ‘the system’ or ‘the government’.  
One strategy they used in dealing with difficult clients was to deliberately 
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depersonalise the interview, deferring to ‘the rules’ as the reason for their 
action.   
 
SM 48: You do get some hiedbangers that nothing can stop them.   
What I do if they get a bit out of hand is say to them ‘look this 
isn’t personal.   It’s not between me and you.   I’m just the 
person that has to speak to you about this.   If you tell me what 
you’ve told me then I have to go by the rules and write a report 
to my supervisor, otherwise I’ll get my arse kicked.’  Because 
they think that it’s you that makes up the rules and it’s up to you 
whether or not they get their giro.   If you make it not personal 
then they usually calm down.   ‘It’s not me.   I have to do this or 
I’ll get my arse kicked.’   
 
One strategy used by Employment Service workers to manage potentially 
difficult situations was to tell users that decisions were not made by the 
adviser themselves, but by a separate faceless decision-maker in a far-off 
office.   This served to distance the staff member from the decision and to 
distance the user from those who make the decisions.   This sometimes 
happened to such an extent that staff lied to users about who made the 
decisions that affected them, which in turn had consequences for any trust 
established between them.  It removed responsibility from the shoulders of 
the adviser and saved any personal recriminations.  One example came from 
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an adviser conducting a Fresh Claim interview for a young woman who was 
applying for the Severe Hardship version of Jobseeker's Allowance for 16 and 
17 year olds. 
 
SM 7: (To user) The only thing we’ll need to do is contact your 
parents.   Once we’ve done that it goes to the Severe Hardship 
Unit in Glasgow.   Once it goes to them they can make a 
decision more or less straight away.   So you come in and sign 
on on Monday anyway. 
 
After the user had gone away he told me: 
 
SM 7: We tell them that the form goes to the Hardship Unit.   Usually 
that’s not the case.   I make the decision but I don’t tell them 
that, so that they don’t think that I made the decision. 
 
Another response to rule-breaking or trouble was to seek to control or punish 
users.  Users were the subject of control and being a client involved this 
realisation.  Staff could punish users by imposing the rules more strictly, for 
instance by making users wait (Kingfisher, 1998) or by closely scrutinising the 
‘Looking for Work’ diary during signing on interviews.  This became more 
likely if users persisted in their rule-breaking or if their behaviour or attitude 
annoyed the official dealing with them.  A clear example of the imposition of 
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control and punishment was in the case of a ‘numpty’ who had irritated a 
signing clerk by making what she considered to be excessive demands for 
information about the New Deal and by being aggressive.  The user was a 
man in his late 30s who had been making various efforts, both within the 
Jobcentre office and through other means in his own time, to find out if he 
was eligible to participate in the New Deal for Musicians.  The woman dealing 
with him had very little knowledge about the New Deal and was unable to 
answer his questions even after enlisting the help of New Deal staff.  The 
user made an appointment with the New Deal receptionist to find out more 
but did not turn up for it. The user became frustrated and agitated.  Between 
his signing on days he telephoned his MP and also tried to complain to the 
Jobcentre manager.  The latter course of action presented further frustration 
when he was told that the manager would not speak to him unless he made a 
complaint in writing.  The user recognised the costs of his assertive action. 
 
UP16: It’s like now it’s a personal vendetta with her you know.  And 
that’s purely because I couldn’t get information and she said I 
was being aggressive.  ‘Well tell me how I’m being aggressive 
and explain to me why I’m being aggressive?’  ‘Just by your 
attitude.’  ‘Well what do you think is causing my attitude?  
Because people like you are not dealing with my enquiry.  You 
laughed at me when I said I’d heard something on Radio One’. 
[. . .]  You know it’s like she’s going to scrutinise every form I 
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bring in. [. . .]  But you know now that I’ll have to be here every 
time between nine and ten to sign on.  [. . .]  I just want to 
guarantee that I get my giro when I’m supposed to get it.  [. . .]  
Now if I irritate this woman any more, and I appear to be an 
irritation with her, I could almost, I’d be better off asking to be 
signed at another time somewhere else because like I feel it’s 
just a personal vendetta with the woman now.   
 
At first this user’s response to the situation might seem extreme, but the 
Employment Officer in question concurred with the user’s assessment of the 
situation. 
 
SM 13:  He came in and he was difficult and aggressive.  And I’ll tell 
you, I will be giving him a hard time.  I’m no’ putting up wi’ that.  
The next time he comes in I’m going through his Jobseeker’s 
Agreement with him.  He’s a music promoter, well if he’s that 
good why is he unemployed?  He’s no’ looking for work.  His 
form had on it ‘Looked in Jobcentre’.  ‘November’.  ‘Nothing.’  
Not even a proper date.  Just November.  I said to him ‘have 
you not got any contacts in the music business Mr. Carpenter?’  
‘Of course I’ve got contacts.’  ‘Well are you telling me you’ve not 
spoken to any of them in the last week, or the last month?’  ‘Of 
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course I have.’  [. . .]  He will complain about me but I’m not 
standing for that. 
 
The punishment exerted by the Employment Officer was decided upon 
because the client was a ‘numpty’.  He was categorised morally because he 
was aggressive and made what the official considered to be extreme 
demands.  The punishment was also an emotional response because the 
user’s behaviour had annoyed the member of staff and she wanted to assert 
her authority over him.  This is an example of the range of factors that 
influenced how staff dealt with clients and of the possible effects of a ‘bad’ 
moral categorisation.  
 
Another example of how users could be punished was through the allocation 
of appointment times.  Users who had inconvenienced staff by being late or 
missing an appointment could be given the first appointment of the day.   The 
paperwork provided by users at signing on times could be  interrogated by 
staff members who want to put pressure on users who have complained 
about them.  These tactics could also be used to test for users who were ‘at 
it’. 
 
SM 32: There’s another guy, Mr Iqbal.  I’ve called him in for a couple of 
interviews but he hasn’t turned up.  But I reckon that he’s 
working.  Just out of pure badness I arranged his next 
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appointment for one o’clock because I knew if he was working 
along at the Alhambra then he wouldn’t be able to make it back 
along for that time.  And sure enough he didn’t make that 
interview.  And he said for his next interview could we make it 
for first thing in the morning or last thing at night.  So I’m sure 
he’s working. 
 
Time was therefore a significant resource which could be manipulated by staff 
and users.  Despite a general reluctance to refer users for fraud investigation, 
staff members acted on the judgements they themselves made.  These 
judgements about client types were used as a basis for applying informal 
penalties and rewards.   
 
When users wasted staff time they momentarily reversed the roles between 
themselves and staff because workers were kept waiting and had to depend 
on the user arriving.  Young clients and those who signed on by post were 
more likely to be thought of as time wasters by virtue of their moral or 
administrative categorisation. Non-attendance, or late attendance, at 
interviews influenced staff perceptions of particular clients and reinforced 
prejudices about certain groups of clients. 
 
The tensions of these encounters were highlighted by one adviser, who 
described signing on interviews with difficult clients as ‘a battle of wits’. 
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 SM 10: It’s like a game to them.  You’re taking a lot of anger and a lot of 
the abuse.  At the end of the day you’re just a face.  It’s not you.  
It’s the system. 
 
The ‘Hoity-Toity’ ‘Snooty’ Ones 
Some of the users that staff found difficult to deal with were those that were 
better qualified, middle class or professional. Employment Officers often got 
the impression that the ‘snooty ones’ felt that visiting the Jobcentre and being 
processed as a client was ‘a bit beneath them’ (SM 35).  The ‘professional 
people’ were contrasted with ‘normal folk’ (SM 42).  These ‘hoity-toity people’ 
(SM 17) could make staff feel intimidated or ‘a bit out of your depth’ (SM 18) 
because they had attributes that shifted the balance of power in the staff-user 
relationship.  One adviser said they made her feel like ‘a silly little girl’ (SM 
37).  It was these ‘posh’ (SM 37) or ‘well-to-do’ users that were most likely to 
be described as arrogant or snobby.  One particular user who fell into this 
category was referred to as ‘an arrogant shite’ (SM 13).   
 
One implication of these feelings that staff had about more qualified users 
was that ‘hoity-toity ones’ could evade close scrutiny of their job search, 
especially since the Jobcentre was unlikely to advertise vacancies for 
professional positions. The following quote was taken from an informal 
interview with a Fresh Claims Adviser directly after his interview with a 
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professional user.  During the interview SM 10 had been less probing with a 
company secretary than he would been with someone of a more usual 
occupation because he was afraid that his lack of specialist knowledge would 
be revealed. 
 
SM 10: Sometimes you get different ones, like that guy [previous user] 
who was a company secretary.   Once I had a minister in and I 
didn’t know what to say to him.   We’re not like the careers 
service.   We don’t know about jobs and we don’t know about 
pay either.   One time I had a GP in who put her minimum 
expected salary down as £60,000.   And I mean I don’t know if 
that’s reasonable or not.   Because I don’t know what GPs get 
paid.   There was another guy that came in.   He was a 
company director.   And his minimum was £60, 000 as well.   
And I said to him:  ‘You’ve put down your minimum expected 
salary as £60, 000.’  And the guy said:  ‘Aye that’s half what I 
got.’  And so when that guy was in, the company secretary I 
wanted to ask him what a secretary did.  . . .   I didn’t want to 
ask him cause I didn’t want to feel daft. 
 
There was, therefore, a shift in the balance of power in the staff-user 
relationship.  Unlike ‘nutters’ or ‘numpties’, these users could be intimidating 
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even without realising it, by virtue of their more privileged socio-economic 
position. 
 
The ‘At it’ Label 
Some users were labelled as being ‘at it’ (SM 17), meaning that they were 
involved in some aspect of benefit fraud (although the actual term ‘fraudster’ 
was very rarely used by staff).  ‘Wasters’ were usually thought of as lazy or 
passive, whereas those who were ‘at it’ were actively abusing the system.  
Being ‘at it’ was a source of criticism but did not necessarily cause staff to 
take the officially warranted action for reasons outlined earlier in this chapter. 
Making a moral judgement was therefore not necessarily linked to taking 
action on that categorisation. Certain client types, like those who lived in rural 
areas and signed on by post, were thought to be more likely to be ‘at it’. 
Those signing on by post were suspected of fraud because their infrequent 
visits to the office meant they could not be the subject of close surveillance. In 
this case an administrative category coincided with a moral one. 
 
Ambivalence and the categorisation process  
The moral categorisation process was rarely straightforward.  There was 
evidence of ambivalence, particularly if staff were unsure as to whether a 
client was ‘deserving’ or ‘at it’. Staff were involved in a constant assessment 
of the validity of the information proffered by users. It seemed to be more 
difficult for this set of Jobcentre workers to apply clear cut negative labels 
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than positive ones, which is in contrast to Kingfisher’s finding (1996) that 
negative labels were more usual.  There was a deeper ambivalence about 
bad moral categorisations. 
 
One example of this was in the case of a male user who telephoned the 
Jobcentre on a Friday to say that he had not received his benefit cheque.  He 
had given the receptionist ‘a right earful on the phone’ (SM 17) and therefore 
risked being constructed as a ‘bad’ client.  It was also possible that he could 
be defined as a ‘nutter’ because it was anticipated that when he came to the 
office he would ‘probably go ballistic’ (SM 17).  The source of his anxiety was 
the fact that without his Jobseeker's Allowance he would not be able to 
provide the basic necessities for his six children over a bank holiday 
weekend.  On this count he was seen as deserving.  The initial suspicions 
raised by staff were that he had received his benefit cheque but had cashed it 
unofficially through a pub or a shop.  Different staff members (and the same 
workers over time) fluctuated between belief of his story, in which case he 
was ‘a poor soul’ (SM 17) and it was ‘a shame for him’ and disbelief, in which 
case he was ‘at it’.  As the day went on it was discovered that the user had 
previously had two benefit cheques replaced (i.e. he was given another 
payment because he said he had not received the first) and that he was being 
investigated by the Benefits Agency Fraud Investigation Officer.  This further 
heightened suspicions that his claims were not genuine, although staff were 
still keenly aware of the possible effects on his children if he was telling the 
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truth.  On attending the office the man’s distress became apparent when he 
started to cry during his interview with the supervisor.  He was not given 
another benefit cheque but staff remained ambiguous about his moral 
categorisation. 
 
Staff seemed to go through a process of becoming accustomed to the difficult 
circumstances in which some users found themselves.   In this way ‘people 
work’ de-humanised the staff as well as the users who were part of the 
bureaucracy.    
 
SM 17: You get hardened once you’ve been here for ages.  When you 
first start you think:  ‘That’s a shame.’  After a couple of months 
you’re like:  ‘He’s at it.’  And they probably aren’t!   
 
SM 10: You start off like that, trying to help people, but it gets flung back 
in your face so you stop bothering. 
 
In order to function as street-level bureaucrats the workers had to distance 
themselves from their emotional responses to user’s circumstances and 
requests.    
 
SM 33: We get irate clients.  We get courses on how to deal with it.  I 
mean, there’s a time when I would have burst into tears about 
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things, but you get hardened to it and you know how to handle 
it.  You realise that it’s not you personally it’s the system.    
 
Conclusion 
It has been demonstrated that unemployment policy is accomplished at 
street-level through the face-to-face interaction between staff and users.  The 
main focus for this chapter was the categorisation process that staff imposed 
on users.  Administrative categorisations were made as a necessary part of 
the ‘people-processing’ (Prottas, 1979) function of the Jobcentre as a welfare 
bureaucracy.  The implications of the administrative categorisation procedure 
were potentially far-reaching.  Even those seemingly bland classifications of 
occupations and previous experience influenced how users were treated 
differentially by staff in immediate and future encounters.  Administrative 
categories could determine which opportunities would be open to users (e.g. 
job searches were conducted more frequently for certain SOC codes than 
others) and could be decisive in setting the precise activities that users would 
have to meet to satisfy job search activity conditions for the receipt of benefit. 
 
Moral categorisations were made subjectively by staff according to their own 
value judgements about the attributes, behaviour and attitudes of users.  The 
main distinction was between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ clients, who could secure 
different levels and types of service according to the way they interacted with 
staff.  The process of distinguishing between morally deserving and unworthy 
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users was identified by Lipsky (1980) as an exercise of discretion based on 
bias or prejudice.  This study has provided empirical evidence to support the 
theory that front-line staff operate an informal discretionary system of 
rationing that apportions rewards, punishments and costs on the basis of 
moral judgments.  Kingfisher (1996) made a similar observation of good and 
bad client types in her study of welfare workers and recipients in the US.  
Kingfisher found that staff constructed clients in predominantly negative ways, 
as deceitful or manipulative, lazy or unclean.  She argues that these were 
‘negative traits typically associated with recipients of public assistance – 
specifically with the ‘undeserving poor’ (Kingfisher, 1996: 111).  However, the 
Jobcentre workers in this study tended to view most users as averagely good.  
The ‘bad’ client type provided an example of the ambiguous and contested 
nature of policy accomplishment.   
 
The processes of administrative and moral categorisation were distinct but 
also interrelated.  Administrative categories were open to negotiation.  At the 
early stages of administrative categorisation, clients had to co-operate in 
order to gain access to JSA.  The gatekeepers of administrative categories 
were often low grade, temporary front-line workers.  Despite their lack of 
training and knowledge, these workers could also engage in the ‘rhetorical 
strategy’ (Miller & Holstein, 1995) of ‘witcraft’ (Billig, 1996), usually associated 
with more senior or experienced members of staff.  Moral categorisations 
could still be made at the earliest stages of a user’s contact with the 
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Jobcentre.  This could influence their administrative categorisation.  
Administrative categorisation could also lead to an increased chance of 
certain moral categorisations, for instance those ‘postals’ who lived in remote 
areas and did not have to attend the office to sign on, were often suspected 
of being ‘at it’ because they were physically removed from immediate staff 
scrutiny to a greater degree than other users who had to visit the office 
regularly.   
 
The likelihood of categorisations being constructed and used as a basis for 
policy application seemed to be amplified by the volume of users, the lack of 
time and the pressure to meet performance targets.  Just as Employment 
Officers responded to policy according to their own autonomous and 
collective interpretations of the policy ‘problem’ (see Chapter Five), so they 
responded to the people they dealt with in ways that were neither 
predetermined, nor predominantly influenced by their work environment.  As 
human service workers their reactions could just as easily be emotional as 
objective.  Categorisations, and the outcomes that followed from them, were 
rational in as much as they held an internal logic, but as informal processes 
they were not transparent and could not be independently scrutinised.  There 
was a very real risk that workers could base categorisations on prejudices 
that could lead to either direct or indirect discrimination, even in the forms of  
sexism, ageism or racism. 
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This is significant because staff mediate between citizen and state.  They do 
so not as empty vessels of policy delivery, but as social actors who have their 
own deep-seated understandings and belief systems. Staff might not have 
used all the powers they could to regulate behaviour or punish people, but at 
the same time they were able to use their power and position to punish 
people or regulate behaviour in ways that were unintended and unrecognised 
by official regulations.  The move towards official policy being aimed at 
increased compulsion perhaps does not recognise the significant amount of 
control and punishment that is already exerted by staff in their dealings with 
users.  The process of policy implementation not only involves the re-creation 
of policy, but its accomplishment.   In Weber’s ideal type, bureaucracies are 
said to operate ‘without regard for persons’ (1991:  215).  It has been 
demonstrated that in practice the Jobcentre bureaucracy operated ‘with 
regard for persons’.   
 
Until now, the notion of interactional accomplishment has been furthest 
developed in the US literature.  A body of work has emerged that 
acknowledges the ‘social construction of reality in street-level bureaucracies’ 
(Anderson, 1999:  236) and investigates the ‘rhetorical strategies’ employed 
by front-line workers in health (Holstein, 1993), welfare (Spencer & McKinney, 
1997) and employment agencies (Anderson, 1999, Miller, 1991).  These 
analytical developments have tended to focus on the management of 
disputes in ‘social problems work’ (Miller & Holstein, 1995) and the varieties 
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of persuasion tactics that are utilised to steer users into accepting particular 
courses of action or intervention.  It is perhaps unsurprising, given the 
residual and coercive nature of the US welfare programmes under study, that 
these authors assume inherent resistance on the user’s part.  The evidence 
provided in this chapter moves the analysis of interactional accomplishment 
forward along two main tracks. 
 
Firstly, the arguments presented here refine understandings of processes of 
categorisation that were identified by Lipsky (1980).  The US social problems 
literature tends to divide users into ‘regular clients’ and ‘difficult clients’ 
(Anderson, 1999:  229), all being basically non-voluntary and resistant.  An 
alternative binary division between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ users has 
dominated British accounts of client categorisation (Cooper, 1985, Dean, 
1991, Howe, 1990), a distinction that has arisen from the historical 
antecedents of present day policy design. This chapter has cut the cake at a 
different angle, identifying the primary division as being between 
administrative and moral categorisation.  In this case ‘deserving’ and 
‘undeserving’ users were present in both administrative and moral categories.  
Front-line staff were shown to react to clients in different ways according to 
how easily they could be processed.  The moral basis of decisions were 
found to be finely graduated.  The fluidity of categories and possibility of 
movement between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and within subcategories, distinguishes 
the analysis presented here from existing accounts in the US and UK 
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literature.  It raises the possibility of uncertainty and ambivalence in front-line 
workers’ responses to users, which highlights the intersubjectivity of policy 
implementation. Decisions were made on a number of different grounds (i.e. 
not solely on external characteristics e.g. type of claim, age or gender), then 
reinforced or altered during interactions.   
 
Secondly, this chapter builds on the foundation laid by Kingfisher (1996), in 
encompassing both sides of the staff-user encounter within the notion of 
interactional accomplishment.  Policy implementation is recognised as a 
social process that involves the interaction of two sets of actors, who are 
positioned differently in relation to interpersonal power dynamics and the 
hierarchy of the policy process.  This therefore addresses a gap in the UK 
policy process literature, which has tended to approach the study of 
implementation by focusing on the role of front-line staff, without fully 
integrating the corresponding social processes that users are engaged in 
(although these have been documented separately elsewhere, e.g. Howe, 
1990).   This part of the analysis will be further developed in Chapter Eight by 
elaborating upon the processes of policy accomplishment from the user’s 
perspective, to show that some users were aware of categorisation processes 
and could employ strategies (whether conscious or not) to influence how they 
are treated.   
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Chapter Eight 
 
Accomplishing Unemployment Policy: 
users’ roles in compliance, contestation, negotiation and  
co-production 
 
 
Introduction 
Chapter Seven has shown the ways in which front-line staff differentiate 
between the users they process as clients in their daily bureaucratic work, 
illustrating some of the ways that policy can be said to be implemented 
differentially, according to administrative and moral categorisations.  This 
chapter builds on the insights from Chapter Six to extend the investigation 
into the accomplishment of unemployment policy in a way that 
encompasses the roles played by users in their face-to-face interaction 
with staff.  Here, Jobcentre users are represented as active agents in 
policy accomplishment, rather than as passive policy recipients.  The 
implementation of policy can then be seen as a two-way social process. 
 
This chapter begins by outlining the idea of policy accomplishment as a 
two-way process, focussing on the ways that users comply with and 
contest policy through their interaction with officials.  The actively seeking 
work condition then provides evidence of the ways in which policy can be 
accomplished and negotiated, using the examples of the Jobseeker’s 
 257
Agreement and the Looking for Work form.  Finally, the concluding section 
examines examples of the co-production of policy in relation to users who 
were categorised by staff as ‘good’ and ‘bad’.   
 
Policy accomplishment as a two-way process:  compliance 
and contestation 
The accomplishment of unemployment policy involved a complex process 
of interaction between staff and users.  Jobcentre users, like officials, 
influenced the ways in which policy was applied and the patterns of 
distribution of benefits and sanctions.  Users varied in their approaches to 
dealing with staff. Howe (1990) distinguished between ‘reluctant’ and 
‘assertive’ claimants in his study of unemployment in Northern Ireland in 
the 1980s.  Reluctant claimants were those who submitted themselves to 
being processed by the bureaucracy on the terms set by members of staff, 
regardless of whether they agreed with particular decisions or courses of 
action.  Alternatively, assertive claimants were those who sought to 
change the terms of reference of the interaction, or to have a more direct 
impact on the outcome.  Howe (1990) describes ‘assertive’ claimants in 
the following way: 
 
such claimants become sensitised to the fact that their 
relationship to the staff is not predetermined but can be 
manipulated.  When, or if, this happens, these claimants 
begin to perceive the situation in a new light, and become 
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aware that, within limits, it is possible to play a more 
active and ambitious role (Howe, 1990:  140). 
 
The majority of Jobcentre users who participated in this research were 
similar to Howe’s reluctant claimants in being compliant and acquiescent 
(see Handler, 1992). They co-operated with staff during their face-to-face 
interaction to accomplish policy.  Those who exerted their agency in more 
deliberate ways, like Howe’s assertive claimants, were engaged in 
negotiation, and in certain cases the co-production, of policy (this will be 
explored in greater depth later in this chapter).  Both co-operation and 
negotiation involve interactional accomplishment, but the latter is a more 
active form.  
 
Complying with policy 
Jobseeker’s Allowance users generally complied with policy and the 
street-level practice imposed by front-line staff.  As Chapter Six has 
shown, they had little choice in this respect if they wanted to continue to 
claim benefit.  It was also argued in Chapter Six that Jobcentre users had 
very little control over the policy they were subject to.  Even compliant or 
‘reluctant’ (Howe, 1990) users were aware of this, but they yielded to the 
bureaucratic demands and continued to do anything that was necessary to 
protect their much-needed benefit income. Accomplishing policy amounted 
to having to ‘show face’ (UP1) or ‘go along with’ what staff wanted them to 
do (see Chapter Six).  The two-way nature of the interaction necessary to 
accomplish policy was recognised by some users: 
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 UP 12: The staff are quite friendly though when you’re actually 
willing to work with them they are friendly.   
 
Interaction could come to be regarded as ‘a game’ by both staff and users.   
 
UP 3: I’ll just play word games with them.  It becomes a game, to 
anybody that’s got regular experience of the place anyway.   
 
Contesting policy 
Although Jobcentre users often comply with policy and street-level 
practice, it was also evident that policy in general and particular staff 
practices or decisions were contested.  Users saw policies as involving 
surveillance and control, rather than being concerned primarily with the 
promotion of their well-being.  Policy was often viewed as being 
inappropriate to the needs of those receiving it and users could be very 
sceptical of new policy initiatives. Jobseeker's Allowance, for instance, 
was described as a ‘government con’ that was the ‘latest thing the 
government come up with to try and keep the figures down’.  Alterations to 
official policy were interpreted as developing against the interests of the 
unemployed. 
 
Staff reaction to problems or complaints 
Some interviewees were of the opinion that the tasks of the Jobcentre 
could be accomplished satisfactorily if there were no complications, but 
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that if there was a problem the staff presented a united front and used the 
administrative rules and regulations to defend their action.  Users 
complained that staff just ‘quote the rules’ (UP 31) and that there was ‘no 
leeway’ (UP 31). 
 
UP 31: If it’s straight forward there’s not a problem but if you seem to 
have a problem you seem to hit a barrier and all they’ll do is 
quote rules and regulations.  And that’s, that’s it.  And unless 
you know what they’re talking about that’s you.  You’re 
snookered. 
 
Interviewees spoke of being faced with inflexibility when they had a 
problem.  Even when the mistake was made by a staff member it could still 
mean that users are left without the money they need (UP 25). 
 
Trouble 
Some problems culminated in incidents of trouble.  The interaction that 
often ran smoothly was sometimes disrupted by problems that led to 
heated exchanges.  Such instances of trouble have been considered by 
those like Miller (1983), Spencer & McKinney (1997) and Hasenfeld & 
Weaver (1996) who have interpreted them from a staff point of view.  
Hasenfeld & Weaver (1996) consider the conditions under which conflict is 
likely to happen to be when staff in welfare organisations are dealing with 
users who do not want to be there but are compelled to attend and are 
dependent on resources which far exceed availability (cf. Lipsky, 1980). 
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These conditions are also present for some users during routine signing 
on times.  
 
Many of the interviewees spoke of instances of trouble, either that they 
had observed or that they had been directly involved in. One man 
described an extreme example of trouble that he had observed in another 
Jobcentre office. 
 
UP 23: I was just sitting down filling out the endless forms when this 
guy came bursting out of one the interview rooms 
threatening to stab the guy.  Sort of screaming at the security 
guard and stuff.  
 
Instances of trouble were not common, and there were examples of 
varying degrees of ‘bust ups’. The most serious involved raised voices or 
physical threats to staff.  As discussed above, such behaviour led to users 
being labelled by officials as ‘nutters’ (see Chapter Seven).  Staff and 
users were in agreement that trouble usually happened when a user had 
not received his or her benefit payment at the expected time and came to 
the office to find out ‘where’s my ‘f’ing money?’ (UP 18).  One man blamed 
‘the younger ones nowadays’ (UP13) for causing trouble. 
 
UP 13: The younger ones nowadays they want, when they want 
something they want it right away, you know what I mean. 
It’s a sort of well, they think these people here have got a 
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magic wand maybe sometimes that they can get them 
whatever it is that they’re needing.  
 
Accomplishing and negotiating the ‘actively seeking work’ 
condition 
Anyone wishing to claim Jobseeker’s Allowance must satisfy the 
conditions for claiming benefit (see Appendix Six).  The recent active 
labour market policy agenda has placed greatest emphasis on the ‘actively 
seeking work’ condition.  Accordingly, users must sign a Jobseeker’s 
Agreement to specify their availability for work and the steps that they will 
take to find work.  Users must then sign a fortnightly declaration that they 
are actively seeking work and they are continuing to comply with the 
activities outlined in their Jobseeker’s Agreement.  In addition to this, 
users are also required to complete a log of their job seeking activities, the 
‘Looking for Work’ form, to be presented to Employment Officers when 
they sign on.  Although the interviewees were in broad agreement that 
those claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance should be expected to be active in 
looking for work, the methods of putting this principle into practice were 
contentious.    
 
Almost all of the unemployed interviewees were very keen to assert their 
willingness to work and the lengths they had gone to in pursuit of 
employment.  As Chapter Six has shown, the interviewees internalised the 
dominant expectation that labour should be exchanged for income. 
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UP 21: I’ve been trying for jobs and that like.  I just want to be a hard 
worker, you know?  That’s what I want to be. 
 
UP 31: You know, I do actually come in looking for a job and am 
eager.  You know, I’m intelligent.  I have qualifications.  I 
should be in work, you know?   
 
However, when they came to the Jobcentre they were confronted by a 
system designed by elite politicians and civil servants who assumed that 
unemployed people had the opposite type of motivation and behaviour - 
that they were ‘spongers’ who needed to be cajoled and threatened before 
they would look for work.  The consensus was that the system was 
designed to deal with those who were work shy or fraudulent but this 
operated against the interests of ‘genuine people’ (UP31).  A tension 
therefore existed between the level of compulsion that the Jobseeker’s 
Allowance regulations dictated and the level of compulsion that users’ felt 
necessary in their own case.   
 
This tension was further complicated by users’ views of other unemployed 
people.  There was some agreement that a minority of ‘scroungers’ and 
‘skivers’ who were ‘not interested in working’, had ‘never ever had a day’s 
work in their life' and ‘know how to get every single penny out of the 
government that’s going’ did exist.  Users were very keen, however, to 
contrast to their own role as a deserving worker with the negative 
stereotype of the undeserving unemployed person (Howe, 1990, found a 
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similar tendency in his Northern Irish study).  ‘These people’ were often 
talked about but rarely identified as an actual individual. 
 
UP1: It’s no’ everybody that’s been on the Bru for years.  A lot of 
folk have been working.  . . .  maybe half of them need 
pushed.  Half of them arnae even interested in a job.  But 
they dinnae realise that half them are interested in a job. 
They just cannae get you nane here.  And they cannae get 
you one outside either ‘cause its hard, especially this time of 
year, ken? 
 
This image of the undeserving unemployed was on a par with Kingfisher’s 
(1996) notion of  ‘bad-people-exist-but-I’m-not-one-of-them’, which was a 
discursive tool employed by US women welfare recipients to define 
themselves as deserving.  Kingfisher describes this in the following way: 
 
The strategy entailed acknowledging the existence of 
‘bad’ individuals – individuals who were lazy, who lied and 
cheated – while simultaneously claiming that they 
themselves did not belong to this undeserving category 
(1996: 58).   
 
When this was related to the actively seeking work condition, Jobcentre 
users were often resistant to compulsion in their own case, but felt that it 
should be applied to the mythical undeserving unemployed person (c.f. 
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Dwyer, 2000).  The following sections explore the ways in which the 
actively seeking work condition was contested, accomplished and 
negotiated in the examples of the Jobseeker’s Agreement and the 
‘Looking for Work’ form. 
 
The Jobseeker’s Agreement  
At the Fresh Claims interview, users and staff were expected to co-
operatively produce a Jobseeker’s Agreement, based on the forms that 
had already been completed and a discussion during the interview.  Once 
printed out and signed by the user this becomes a legally binding 
agreement of the activities that he or she will undertake each week to 
satisfy the ‘actively seeking work’ condition for entitlement to Jobseeker’s 
Allowance.  Creating a Jobseeker’s Agreement therefore provides an 
example of the accomplishment of policy.   It also marks an important 
stage in the ‘people-processing’ (Prottas, 1979) function of the Jobcentre 
bureaucracy, representing the point at which someone becomes a user (if 
their benefit claim is accepted).  It is during the Fresh Claims interview and 
the accomplishment of the Jobseeker’s Agreement that users become 
slotted into client types. 
 
For users, creating the Jobseeker's Agreement could present difficulties, 
because the complexities of their previous work experience, future plans 
and aspirations had to be distilled down into three simple categories that 
would later be used for the purposes of job matching (therefore structuring 
the assistance it would be possible for them to receive from staff).  The 
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interviewees sometimes also had several different jobs that they had done 
in the past or were looking for now.  People might no longer be prepared 
to look for the type of work that they once did or could be willing to accept 
various types of work that they would not necessarily specify.  Some of the 
interviewees also had very vague notions of the type of work they would 
want to do, which could be related to a lack of experience in some cases.  
One young man had never worked since being at school and was 
interested in finding a trade. 
 
UP 9: I’m looking for anything.  In general I’m looking for something 
that . . .  a trade, like joinery, mechanics, plumbing.  
Something that’ll just give me a trade so that I can continue. 
 
To the user, this was a rational attempt at flexibility.  However, the 
Jobcentre bureaucracy was designed to deal only with three specific job 
titles.  Unfortunately, in this case the man quoted above had little chance 
of being able to find such a position through the Jobcentre because of the 
limited vacancies available and staff insistence on having relevant 
experience before applying for positions  (see Chapter Five).    
 
Graduates and professionals encountered particular problems in the 
administrative classifications used by the Employment Service workers to 
categorise clients.  Specialised professions were not always included in 
the SOC codes, one interviewee (UP 20), for instance, was told that 
environmental management did not have a code. Specific job titles can be 
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confusing for staff members who have not have careers training, leading 
them to offer people inappropriate vacancies.   
 
Users viewed completing the Jobseeker’s Agreement as a condition that 
they had to comply with in order to qualify for benefit.  They were therefore 
resigned to the necessity of the task.  The following quote demonstrated 
policy accomplishment through compliance: 
 
UP 21: Just sign that you know just give me my money and that.  It’s 
just three options or some stuff like that and what you want 
to dae and I think mines a joiner and mechanic and 
something else.  I mean that was it.  Sign.  You’re agreed 
basically.  It’s just keeping the government happy isn’t it?  
 
On the other hand, the compilation of a Jobseeker’s Agreement could 
involve contestation.  Whether they agreed with the requirement or not, 
Jobcentre users had to complete the agreement before they would be 
entitled to claim benefit.  One man reflected on his past experience of 
negotiating an agreement.  
 
UP 23: The way the guy conducted the interview was as if he was 
drawing things out of me and he was using it out of context, 
in the interview sheet.  So at the end of the interview he 
asked me to sign the thing and I said ‘well wait a minute I 
didn’t actually say that’.  He was sort of going, he was asking 
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this that and the next thing and I was saying ‘well I’ll be 
certainly looking for jobs, I’ll be looking for as many a week’. 
And he was saying ‘well like how many?’.  ‘Well as many as I 
can I don’t know maybe 12 a week out the papers or 
something like that.’  You can’t always find 12 a week but 
now I’m supposed to sign this and be under obligation to 
provide evidence that every two weeks I’ll apply for 12 jobs in 
the papers.  Which sounds easy enough to start off with but 
you find yourself applying and applying for the same jobs. 
 
In this example the staff member was attempting to use ‘witcraft’ to lead 
the user to agree to active job seeking activity.  In this case the user was 
able to negotiate the requirement to allow him to apply for fewer 
vacancies. The creation of the Jobseeker's Agreement was one area in 
which users, as well as staff (cf. Anderson, 1999), could exercise a limited 
degree of control or ‘witcraft’ in the interaction.  
 
By managing how they exchanged information, users could present their 
biographical details and previous work experience in misleading ways.  
This limited room for manoeuvre allowed some users to be more active in 
negotiating their administrative categorisation and the particular actively 
seeking work conditions that they would be subject to.   For instance, 
users could choose not to mention certain types of work that they had 
previously done or would be prepared to do because they did not want to 
be forced to accept them later.  This course of action, however, had 
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consequences that could be against the user’s interest because some 
opportunities may be missed because staff cannot match to codes for jobs 
that have not been entered into the computer system.  Deliberately 
influencing the actively seeking work conditions in the Jobseeker’s 
Agreement could be a risky strategy because these users could be open 
to suspicions of fraud.  By controlling the information submitted to staff, 
users could maintain a degree of control over how they were processed.  
 
UP 23: I wasn’t 100%, I don’t know if honest is the right word, but 
basically my main concern is wage. Ehm, so I put down 
clerical work as my first choice because that is the higher 
wage. 
 
UP 27: I just put down for driver, labourer cause I dinae really want 
to go back on the forklift, but cause I’ve got my ticket and 
that but it’s . . . I can dae the building trade and driving jobs, 
anything like that.  It’s, I’m qualified for it really, so.  Ken I’ve 
got the forklift but I didnae tell them that yin.  I mean you’re 
sitting in that for eight hours depends on what building site.  
It’s awfy uncomfortable up there.  But I’ll maybe have to go 
for it again I think.   
 
The element of compulsion implicit in dealings with benefits for 
unemployment also influenced users in their choice of which jobs to put 
down.  This young woman was a graduate who was looking for a 
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professional position but was willing to accept cleaning or waiting work as 
a temporary measure.  It was not always clear to users which of the 
activities were requirements and which were voluntary. 
 
UP 29: It’s just like to put that on your Jobseeker's Agreement it’s 
just like really bad.  You don’t want to do that.  And like I just 
put sort of graduate trainee and stuff on this one.  But I was 
confused, like you know if you put waitressing and stuff, you 
could get a waitressesing job but you don’t want one, but will 
you be forced to take one?  
 
Some users were strategic in their choice of occupation sought.  Some 
used different job titles for what was ostensibly the same work, or used job 
titles that were very similar within the same sector.  Others thought that the 
job titles had to be completely different.  Users could also choose types of 
work that they considered to be easier to find. 
 
UP 33: Ehm, yeah I mean it’s easier now.  I mean before, a couple 
of years ago I put down jobs I thought would be easy to get, 
but now I put down jobs that I think I’m qualified for and jobs 
that I think I’m mature enough to do.  So I don’t see why I 
should put my name down and ask for . . .  You have to put 
down sort of four or five job titles so they can see what you’re 
looking for.  It’s easy enough. 
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Widening the job search 
The requirements to actively seek work became stricter the longer the 
claim for benefit went on.  A key point was the 13 Week Review.  In 
addition to participating in various schemes and programmes, users were 
also required to widen their search for employment beyond the initial three 
job titles specified in their Jobseeker’s Agreements.  Approximately a third 
of interviewees said that they did not mind being required to state three 
types of work that they were looking for.  For some this was because they 
felt that it was in the interests of the unemployed person to be looking for 
more than one type of work, regardless of the Jobseeker's Allowance 
regulations.  Others were sympathetic with quite wide job search 
requirements because they foresaw how a narrower seeking work 
conditions could be abused.  Many of those who did not object to stating 
three different types of work found it easy to do. 
 
UP 32: I think it’s fair enough in as much as you could put down that 
you were a gas lamp lighter and you know it would be 
virtually impossible.  . . .  I think it’s great that they give you 
an initial chance of not being flexible because I think at the 
end of the day you have to be flexible because somebody’s 
paying for it. 
 
Some held the view that there were jobs available and so people should 
take any type of work, especially after 13 weeks, which was seen to be a 
reasonable period of time to look only for a main occupation. There were 
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only a few people who thought that restricting the job search to one main 
occupation should be allowed for a longer period of time, but that in 
principle it was fair to expect unemployed people to look for more than one 
type of work after that. 
 
Others would have rather done work that was not their first option than 
remain unemployed.  Some people, however, had different ideas about 
what widening their job search would mean for them.  This woman was 
prepared to look for other types of work, but the other occupation that she 
was considering was also an attractive option to her.  Unemployed people 
who were not highly educated or skilled did not have the same options 
open to them so widening their job search meant a much lower grade of 
work than this woman was considering. 
 
UP 28: To be honest I don’t have a problem with that. . . . The type 
of background I’ve got there are maybe three or four different 
avenues I could take but I’m quite prepared to take 
something else on.  Even now before my 13 weeks are up, 
although it is just about to be up.  Ehm, but that’s easier said 
than done because employers I don’t think are happy to take 
you on.  But to be honest I don’t want to come in here every 
two weeks.  I would much rather be out there working. So if it 
means becoming a driving instructor tomorrow then that’s 
what I’ll do.   
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At the 13 Week Review one user who had been allowed a permitted 
period, during which time he only looked for work in his usual occupation, 
was asked to give other job titles for work that he would look for.  The user 
did not mind this. 
 
UP 18: I was considering looking for something else.  They said 
you’re going to have to start looking for something else.  He 
wasnae pushy or anything.  I did a course in car valeting  so I 
put that down. 
 
There was an attitude amongst a few of the interviewees that they would 
just say what they thought the Employment Officer wanted them to say ‘to 
keep the people upstairs happy’ (UP 18) and that this compliance would 
allow them access to what they wanted, which in this man’s case was only 
National Insurance contributions, rather than a cash benefit. 
 
UP 14: Well there again it doesn’t really interest me.  If they said you 
need ten then I’d just stick ten in. 
 
There were interviewees who thought that it was reasonable that everyone 
receiving Jobseeker's Allowance should be forced to widen their job 
search after 13 weeks. 
 
UP 12: If you’re being fussy it’s your own fault. If you’re not willing to 
work you shouldn’t get any benefits. 
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 Some who said that they did not mind the arrangements for specifying 
which types of job they wanted, and the widening of the job search at 13 
weeks, changed their view when professional work was considered and 
said that they would mind then (UP 14). How reasonable it was to have to 
look for jobs outside your main area of work depended on what the 
occupation was. 
 
UP 24: I think it depends.  To consider, it depends on what you are.  
If you were an unemployed nurse you know I think it maybe 
would be quite unfair to have somebody like that to start 
considering anything else.  I think it depends on how skilled 
you are in some ways.   
 
This was a particular issue for those who had previously been 
professionals or who were highly educated. 
 
UP 30: Ehm, depends what it would be.  If a job came up like 
waitressing or something like that and they said ‘well go for 
that’.  Then no.  I don’t think that’s very fair cause I don’t 
think you should, when you’ve been to college, university 
and all that to train for something and then they expect you 
to go out, do you know what I mean?  No.  I don’t think that 
would be very fair.  But then it depends.  Some people don’t 
want to find jobs so they won’t, you know.  
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 Widening the job search was another area in which users had some 
limited room for manoeuvre.  Users who agreed to certain job titles but 
then did not look for work in those areas used ‘witcraft’ to accomplish their 
interaction with staff and ensure their on-going benefit entitlement. 
 
UP 15: Well according to them you’re only supposed to keep a 
limited amount of work for six months and then you’ve got to 
diverse. So you just bullshit that tae.  Aye, I’ll be a labourer 
nae problem.  Huh watch me! 
 
9 of the 35 interviewees objected to having to widen their job search 
beyond their main occupation.  One objection was that the demand for 
labour was not sufficient to provide a job for everyone.  Requirements to 
widen the job search were therefore seen as being hard on people who 
had made concerted efforts to find work. 
 
UP 31: I mean if you’re no’ diversified enough what can you do, well 
the only thing is retrain.  I mean if they cannae find you work 
fair enough.  I mean you cannae help it if you’ve done 
everything that you’ve agreed to.  So basically it’s just as a 
say it’s a vicious circle in here.  (Sigh)  It’s back to them. 
 
The barriers to looking for different types of work were also highlighted by 
those who objected to widening their job search. 
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 UP 4: If they say you can look for any kind of work, every work is 
looking for time served, or experience or a car, somebody 
that drives, whereas an awful lot of people haven’t got that.  
They’ve just got the practical skill.  And its no’ fair saying ‘just 
go for any job’ cause you don’t want any job.  You want a job 
that you’re going to be happy in and you’ve got the 
qualifications for or the experience in, no’ for just any job at 
all.  
 
A few interviewees spoke of being pressured to apply for certain 
vacancies. One interviewee had had this experience and accepted the job 
only because he ‘wanted them off my back’ (UP 1).  Another young 
woman (UP 4) had refused a job in a café that a staff member had 
suggested to her.  The situation ‘worked out okay’ because she 
participated in a Training for Work course instead but she did observe that 
‘they’re kind of wary about if you knock back a job you’ve got to have a 
reasonable explanation for it’ (UP 4).  A painter and decorator (UP 18) 
also had been encouraged to apply for a cleaning job paying £2.50 an 
hour.  He objected because as a tradesperson he expected at least £5.50 
an hour for his labour.  He considered being offered this work as 
‘degrading your work’.  A small minority of the interviewees were so 
resolute in their views that they would be prepared to lose benefit rather 
than accept a job that paid too little or meant that they had to do work that 
they considered to be demeaning.  
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 The ‘Looking for Work’ form 
The second example of accomplishing the ‘actively seeking work’ 
condition is the ‘Looking for Work’ work form.  This form, otherwise known 
as the Jobseeker’s Diary, was a document that registered unemployed 
people were required to fill in and produce for inspection every fortnight to 
show what efforts they had made to find work.  Staff were able to compare 
the ‘Looking for Work’ form with the user’s original Jobseeker's Agreement 
to judge whether the agreement was being met and if users were 
satisfying the condition of actively seeking work.  Failure to meet the 
actively seeking work condition warranted a benefit sanction.  Chapter 
Five has already demonstrated the pressures and constraints that 
impacted upon regular signing on interviews.  Inspection of the ‘Looking 
for Work’ form was one part of the interview that was meant to occur but 
was not always implemented.  In this respect, the action necessary to 
prove compliance with the ‘actively seeking work’ condition was subject to 
policy re-creation. In this section, the preparation and inspection of the 
‘Looking for Work’ form provides evidence of how the ‘actively seeking 
work’ condition was accomplished as a two-way social process, through 
the face-to-face interaction between staff and users. 
 
Users were usually aware that the completion of the ‘Looking for Work’ 
form and its presentation during the signing on interview were 
requirements for the processing of their benefit.  Users recognised this 
practice as a bureaucratic simplification of the policy objective.  For policy 
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accomplishment, it was the written evidence that was important, not the 
actions that the document represented: 
 
UP 20: They kind of give you the impression that if you don’t write 
down that’s it.  You know, you’ve not been looking for work.  
 
Interviewees were divided in their views about having to complete the 
form.  A minority of the interviewees said that they did not mind having to 
fill the ‘Looking for Work’ form out.  They concurred that it was ‘not a big 
deal’.  One or two interviewees even said that they found completing the 
form helpful for their own records.  As one man put it, it ‘keeps me right 
tae’ (UP 1).   
 
However, the majority of the interviewees did object to having to fill in the 
‘Looking for Work’ form every fortnight.  The process was condemned as 
‘total rubbish’ (UP 25), ‘nonsense’ (UP 13), ‘ridiculous’ (UP 16), ‘a bit 
tedious’ (UP 29) and ‘a nuisance’ (UP 6).  To some users, the form-filling 
seemed entirely ineffectual as a test of actively seeking work.  They 
reasoned that those who were looking for work kept records anyway and 
that those who were not looking for work would just lie. 
 
UP 6: I think it’s just a waste of time. It’s just; I suppose it’s just 
their way of knowing that you’re looking for work.  They don’t 
check it up, phone up some company and say ‘oh did so and 
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so phone up about a job’.  They don’t know if you did it or no. 
What’s the point? 
 
This meant that filling in the forms was ‘basically a waste of time’ (UP 15), 
‘really silly’ (UP 33) and ‘just absurd’ (UP 20).  One woman said that she 
minded having to fill it in ‘immensely’ (UP 19):   
 
UP 28: Because as I say they should treat me as an individual and if 
I tell them I’m looking for work then that’s exactly what I’m 
doing.  And mine’s is very repetitive.  It’s every Friday ‘looked 
in Herald.  Looked in Scotsman.’  You know.  Every single 
Friday.  ‘What did you do next?’  Threw the papers in the 
bucket.  You know.  It’s the way the thing is worded.  It’s so 
annoying. . . .  But they should take me at face value.  If I say 
that I’m job hunting I am.  I shouldn’t have to record my every 
movement. 
 
Many of those interviewed fundamentally disagreed with the requirement 
to write down what they had done to find work. ‘Pointless’ form filling did 
not help them to find work.  For most users, the ‘Looking for Work’ form 
was merely a surveillance tool that reminded them of their dependency 
and enforced a sense of individual failing. The purpose of the ‘Looking for 
Work’ form was interpreted as being to ‘check up’  ‘to make sure you have 
been doing things’ and to ‘keep tabs on you’, the sentiment of which 
aggravated some users.  Users therefore felt watched and disciplined, as 
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if they had to ‘report in’ for ‘naughty person time’.  This was an 
acknowledgement of the power relations that existed between staff and 
users that meant users were compelled to complete the diary of job 
seeking activity, whether they objected to it or not.  Completing the form 
was an empty bureaucratic process that very quickly became a matter of 
routine. 
 
UP 27: It’s just repeating itself every week tae.  It’s, cause after a 
wee while, cause the only place you can look is local, unless 
you’ve got transport.  It’s just repeating and repeating.  So I 
could copy it out the noo for the next time I’m in, cause I ken 
what I’m going to be doing. 
 
An important factor in shaping unemployed people’s views of the ‘Looking 
for Work’ form was the reaction that they received from staff when they 
presented the log to them.  Employment Officers varied in their level of 
inspection. Interviewees talked about some staff members who ‘read it 
through’ (UP 19), while others ‘don’t bother looking at it’ (UP 7). There was 
a general sense that little time was dedicated to inspecting the ‘Looking for 
Work’ form.  This was equated with staff being ‘just not interested’ in its 
contents or the unemployed person’s job search. 
 
UP 16: The woman here just signs it.  They don’t even look at it.  I’m 
not blaming the women but they don’t say ‘well okay I see 
you’ve contacted there’.  You know.  And all these ones I’ve 
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filled out over two years.  Once they’re filled they throw them 
away. Cause they’re finished with them.  Cause no one says 
‘okay we’ll keep that on file and look at your progress and 
see how you’ve done.’  All they do is sign it.  Even if you’ve 
forgotten it.  It doesn’t matter.  
 
Some users learned which staff would scrutinise their form and which 
would not, highlighting the way different staff members enforced the 
administrative rules. 
 
UP 6: Well, they just have a look at it and then they sign it.  When I 
first signed on aye they did go through it, but then after that 
you got to know the faces that didnae check it.  There’s two 
young boys don’t check it. They just go ‘oh right’ and then 
sign it: ‘Right there you go’.  And away you go.  The older 
ones will look through it with you and say ‘well how did you 
get on wi’ that one or that one’. But how are they to know if 
you’ve actually went for that job or phoned up for that job or 
anything?  
 
Many of those interviewed would have welcomed a greater proportion of 
staff time being devoted to inspecting their ‘Looking for Work’ form, 
particularly if it encompassed a constructive discussion of their job search. 
As Chapter Five demonstrated, the re-creation of policy meant that the job 
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search part of many of the routine interviews was either shortened or 
omitted because of the pressures of time and the queue of people waiting:  
 
UP 3: They just go like this (glanced over).  They open it up and 
they don’t even read it.  It’s a joke.  Of course if she wants to 
take this and check it over seriously she’s giving herself 
more work obviously and it’s more hassle.  And there’s a big 
queue.  Clear the queue, clear the queue.  It’s cosmetic.  It’s 
all cosmetic.  It’s only to show they’re concerned.  That’s the 
main thing. 
 
The following quote is from a long-term unemployed man who also 
attributed the lack of staff effort in enabling him to actively seek work as a 
lack of interest.  When he came to this realisation, he altered his own 
behaviour in response and began falsifying his form, despite the fact that 
he was regularly making very active efforts to find work. 
 
UP 25: They don’t, they’re not interested.  They just put it away.  I 
just put Jobclub, papers.  Tell a lot of lies cause they’re no’ 
really interested in what I’m daeing.  They’ve got 3000 
people unemployed.  Are they going to say ‘what papers do 
you use?  How often are you at the Jobclub?’  They’d have a 
queue out the door, waiting to come in.  So it’s ‘that’s you.  
That’s you.’  I come in there and forgot that.  ‘That doesnae 
 283
matter, doesnae matter.’ No’ interested.  (Sarcastically) Full 
of enthusiasm.  Dying to get you a job, you know? 
 
Other users also developed their own strategies for accomplishing the 
actively seeking work condition. These strategies are examples of user 
‘witcraft’ and are used to exert some control or as acts of resistance. 
 
UP 21: I make my writing that atrocious that they cannae read it 
anyway.  I deliberately dae that, but they dinae even look.  
They just go round and stamp it and that’s it.  
 
This action was seen as justifiable because staff did not inspect the form.  
Users also considered it to be safe because there was no proof of whether 
or not they had done what they said they had.  One man felt that falsifying 
the ‘Looking for Work’ form was necessary because of the lack of jobs to 
apply for.  This also highlighted a misconception shared by some users 
that they had to specify particular vacancies they were applying for, rather 
than just what efforts they had made to find suitable vacancies.   
 
There were important differences in the way that users expected to be 
treated.  Also as Chapter Seven has shown, staff treated users according 
to ‘types’, meaning that some users were more likely to be closely 
scrutinised than others.  One of the interviewees did not receive benefit, 
but continued to be registered as unemployed so that he could receive 
National Insurance credits.  This man took documenting his job search 
 284
even less seriously than he might otherwise have because he felt that 
there was little to lose. 
 
UP 7: I mean  I don’t get any money.  I don’t think I should have to . 
. .  They don’t pay me nothing.  I don’t see why I should then 
produce documentation of looking for work.  I mean they see 
me here every second day.  They know that I’m looking for 
work.  But they want it down in black and white.  I don’t think 
that’s right, nut. I mean I don’t get money, so it doesn’t 
matter what I do.  I mean the state’s not paying me. So.   
 
Low levels of staff knowledge about professional vacancies and 
recruitment practices,  placed highly skilled and educated unemployed 
people in a stronger position of power than those without qualifications. 
 
UP 2: It’s funny but I don’t think they’re anywhere near geared up 
for coping with people that have come out of uni.  Cause a 
few times last time they were out, completely out, of their 
depth.  They were basically just accepting what I was telling 
them at face value, cause I sounded convincing.  
 
Co-producing Policy 
In Chapter Two the concept of co-production was introduced.  Although 
co-production was originally used by those like Witaker (1980) to refer to a 
particular mode of service delivery that required users to work with staff to 
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develop and provide services, it will be developed in this section in a 
rather different way.  Co-production is used here in a similar sense as 
Kingfisher (1998) intended when she described the interactional 
accomplishment of policy between co-workers.  I use co-production to 
describe a particular form of policy accomplishment that occurred between 
front-line staff and users.  The previous sections have offered examples of 
the ways in which policy can be said to be accomplished and negotiated 
through the face-to-face interaction between staff and users.  The notion 
of co-production develops this argument to suggest that in certain cases 
users influence their interaction with staff to secure different policy 
outcomes.  The following paragraphs provide examples of the co-
production of policy in relation to different moral categorisations developed 
by staff (outlined in Chapter Seven). 
 
An example of co-producing policy with a ‘good’ client was the case of a 
59 year old woman who had worked in a bank for the past 22 years.  At 
her Fresh Claims interview she had been able to insist that she should 
only be expected to give one type of work that she was looking for, rather 
than the usual three.  This in itself was reasonably common.  What was 
not, was that when she came to her 13 Week Review interview she was 
able to continue with only one occupational code on her Jobseeker's 
Agreement.  As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, official policy was for 
users to widen their job search at the 13 week stage and this was the 
usual practice, even for users who had limited their search initially.  In this 
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case the ‘good’ client was very near to retirement and had been 
successful in demonstrating her willingness to work, as she explained: 
 
UP17: Well, I think obviously I can prove that I have been actively 
seeking work.  I mean I’ve been unemployed for 13 weeks 
and I’ve applied for 18 jobs. 
 
Similarly, it was possible for users to have their rule-breaking endorsed by 
officials if they could secure a ‘worthy’ moral categorisation and elicit 
sympathy from an Employment Officer.  Despite rule-breaking usually 
being a source of irritation or inconvenience to staff, it could be condoned 
in certain circumstances if Employment Officers conspired with users to 
outwit the system.  
 
SM 24:  There was another guy that I had one time years ago and he 
was signing on but I’d had an employer on the phone down 
at a building site saying that he just needed somebody for 
the day.   It was £50.   So I said to the guy.   I told him where 
it was and said ‘Just go up and you’ll get your money and 
that.   But if anybody finds out, I knew nothing about it.’.  [.  .  
.]  So he went and did the job and I signed him as usual and 
overlooked the whole thing. 
 
‘Bad’ clients could also co-produce policy, using different discursive 
tactics.  For instance, when users who were labelled as ‘wasters’ they 
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were often able to continue claiming Jobseeker's Allowance because they 
paid lip service to the labour market conditions they were required to meet. 
 
SM 44: I hate it when you get the guys that come in and they’re 
stinking of cigarette smoke and it’s obvious that they’ve just 
come down from the pub.   They think that you’re not going 
to realise that they’re going straight back up there again as 
soon as they’ve signed on.   ‘Are you looking for work?’  ‘Aye’ 
(indignant tone). 
 
It was possible for ‘nutters’ and ‘numpties’ to exercise slightly more control 
over their interaction with staff by being intimidating.  This could help them 
to get what they wanted, which might be a quick and painless processing 
of their claim, or alternatively to command a greater amount of time and 
effort from staff.  When users asserted themselves in this way it was 
possible for parts of policy to be co-produced.  In the following example 
the young administrative grade worker described how he adapted policy 
as a response to the demands of a ‘nutter’. 
 
SM 22: He’s mental like.   . . .   He comes in here and he’s sitting 
tapping his fingers while you’re getting the vacancy up on the 
screen for him.   Sometimes you’re not supposed to give out 
the employer’s details and that, their address and telephone 
number.   But he’s like ‘and just give me their number as 
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well.’  And you’re like ‘okay there you are’.   . . .  He can be 
really scary! 
 
There were instances of trouble when users were not compliant with the 
rules of the bureaucracy (c.f. Lipsky, 1980).  This is an example of the 
ways in which social policy is contested.  Lipsky himself sees 
individualised policy conflict in front-line services as parallel with the 
organised policy conflict conducted by pressure groups (1980:  xii, also 
see discussion in Chapter Two).  Trouble was usually caused by those 
labelled as ‘nutters’ or ‘numpties’, which was part of the reason for that 
label being applied to them.  Users who had not demonstrated any other 
problematic behaviour but had become agitated or irate because of the 
particular circumstances in which they found themselves also caused 
trouble.  One of the primary reasons for conflict was if a user had been 
denied access to the benefit that they needed.    
 
Conclusion 
Chapter Seven demonstrated that front-line staff were active in influencing 
the way policy was implemented differentially, by treating users according 
to categorisations, as opposed to dealing with people uniformly.  In this 
chapter, the main point was that users themselves were active agents in 
policy accomplishment, and therefore in the policy implementation 
process.  Policy cannot happen or be brought into being without their 
involvement.  As active social agents, the ways that users interacted with 
staff influenced the character of the service and could change the outcome 
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of the intervention.  Users were active agents who had differing responses 
and coping strategies to the situation they found themselves in.  Some 
users were more active than others in complying with, contesting, 
negotiating and co-producing policy.  All were engaged in the 
accomplishment of policy through their face-to-face interaction with staff. 
To say that policy is accomplished, and even co-produced in some 
instances is, therefore, not to imply that staff and users are engaged in a 
harmonious joint venture, indeed, in one way or another, conflict was 
frequently a feature of interactions between staff and clients. 
 
Users were usually compliant with the demands made of them, regardless 
of whether they agreed with the general policy objectives or the particular 
regulations that were invoked in their case.  This demonstrated the power 
dynamics of that staff-client relationship and users’ enforced dependency 
on the state. However, there was also evidence of users contesting policy, 
most notably in instances that had the potential to culminate in ‘trouble’.  
The actively seeking work condition, as translated into front-line practice 
through the Jobseeker’s Agreement and the ‘Looking for Work’ form, 
provided evidence of both policy compliance and contestation.  In 
particular, the examples discussed above highlighted the ways in which 
policy was accomplished.  They showed how users’ experiences of the 
Jobcentre were influenced by their own predetermined views of the 
service, as well as by the ways in which staff dealt with them and delivered 
a version of policy that had been filtered through their street-level practice.  
Finally, the co-production of policy was illustrated through several 
 290
examples in which users were able to be active in persuading or 
intimidating officials into acting in ways that secured different outcomes 
from those that were officially prescribed. 
 
The ‘social problems’ literature acknowledges the non-voluntary nature of 
user involvement in state services and views users as resistant.  Anderson 
(1999) makes the distinction between ‘regular clients’, who are resistant 
only to a certain degree and ‘difficult clients’, who attempt to usurp the 
usual patterns of the worker’s routine in order to get what they want (which 
was usually the opportunity to apply for a job that the employment adviser 
did not want to them have).  These sorts of accounts of the roles played by 
users have been primarily concerned with the management of conflict and 
the uses of linguistic strategies of persuasion on the adviser’s behalf.  
Users’ contributions to interactional accomplishment have been viewed 
from the staff perspective, predominantly in terms of ‘trouble’ and users’ 
agency has been typified by accounts of dishonesty and manipulation.  
This chapter counterpoises the analysis by providing evidence of how 
users view their interaction with staff, how they  respond to policy (both in 
its official and modified versions) and how they exercise agency.  It 
acknowledges that there are several possible roles for clients to play, 
some being more closely associated with ‘good clients’ and some with 
‘bad clients’.  Foremost, is the progression of the use of interactional 
accomplishment to explain the intersubjectivity of the social construction of 
policy between both users and staff (see Chapter Seven).  Four distinct 
but overlapping themes have arisen:  compliance, contestation, 
 291
negotiation and co-production.  These are all forms of interactional 
accomplishment, but some more active than others. 
 
Compliance does not equate with a lack of conflict or resistance.  As 
Chapter Six has pointed out, users felt powerless and subject to control.  
This chapter has developed this idea to show how users’ frustrations in 
their attempts to complain could result in an acceptance that fundamental 
alterations to the conditions under which benefits and job vacancies were 
administered were outside of their sphere of influence.  Such a realisation 
usually led to compliance.  However, in some cases users reacted in ways 
that attempted to alter the power differentials of the interview, or were able 
to construct the interview more on their own terms than those of the 
agency, and secure alternative outcomes.  Compliance could include 
attending courses that were thought to be ‘useless’, going for job 
interviews or even accepting work that was not of the type sought e.g. a 
cleaning job for a graduate.  Acquiescent interactional accomplishment 
was associated with ‘showing face’ or ‘working with’ staff, which could be a 
conscious strategy rather than a sign of passivity.   
 
It was also clear that policy was contested and that users often held 
negative views about the purposes of unemployment policy and the 
practices that influenced their routine interactions with Jobcentre staff (see 
Chapter Six).  Users identified a discrepancy between the purposes and 
implicit assumptions that were built into the design of unemployment policy 
and their own experiences and behaviour.  Users found it disturbing to be 
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processed as if they were workshy, when their intense job seeking efforts 
had been frustrated, either by a lack of appropriate vacancies (signally a 
mismatch between demand and supply in the local labour market) or 
because they had been unsuccessful at interviews.  Users contested the 
requirement to prove that they were ‘actively seeking work’ through the 
completion of the Jobseeker’s Diary, which was seen as ineffectual, 
inappropriate and patronising.  Users therefore employed a range of 
strategies for contesting the policy.  They either resisted the process by 
using bad handwriting or deliberately writing exactly the same entries 
every week, or chose to present it to members of staff who were unlikely to 
scrutinise it, or falsified the form because it was not inspected. 
 
Their contestation of policy did not necessarily mean that they felt the 
rules should not apply to others.  Indeed there was a reasonable degree of 
ambivalence in users’ attitudes towards real or imagined unemployed 
others, which was most evident with regard to seeking work.  What had 
been a chief factor in determining the basis of staff categorisation of 
clients (see Chapter Seven), was also a key concern to users in assessing 
the applicability of policy responses involving compulsion.  Whilst 
compulsion was thought to be entirely inappropriate in their own case, it 
was defended in principle for those who were perceived to be made of 
different moral fibre (a finding supported by Dwyer, 2000, Howe, 1990 and 
Kingfisher, 1996).  Users were enmeshed in the same popular discourses 
as those that  staff drew on, absorbed or precipitated.  In their efforts to 
demonstrate their own deservingness, users could actually paint a more 
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dramatically contrasting picture of the deviant other (the ‘scrounger’ or 
‘skiver’) than was represented in the daily discourse of Employment 
Officers. 
 
Negotiation is a broad term, that has been used in this chapter mainly to 
encapsulate the process of bargaining that can take place during 
interviews.  Users could present their work experience or biographical 
information in ways that would affect how they were categorised, because 
they were aware of the potential uses of this information and the likely 
consequences, for instance users might omit a particular job title from their 
work history because they did not want to be compelled to look for that 
sort of work.  Similarly, it was possible for users to assert themselves in 
negotiations surrounding the construction of their Jobseeker’s Agreement.  
In some cases these were deliberate strategies to assert influence over 
administrative categorisations, that would affect how they were treated in 
the short- and possible long-term.  This example also highlights a risky 
tactic, because attempted manipulation of an administrative category 
could result in being morally classified as bad, particularly as ‘at it’.  This 
might lead to the application of an informal punishment or a test of 
honesty, or it might raise serious suspicion that could lead to a formal 
fraud investigation.  It was also evident that some users had greater 
knowledge and were better prepared to challenge or ‘the system’ and 
were more competent or adept at outwitting bureaucratic procedures that 
they viewed as pointless. 
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This chapter has also provided examples of the co-production of policy, in 
cases where interactional accomplishment was particularly active and 
effective on the user’s part.  In essence, the co-production of policy hinges 
on the user’s awareness that they are, or have, noticeably influenced the 
outcome of a staff decision or non-decision.  Co-production could be 
created through compliance and contestation.  The defining feature is that 
the process is active and conscious, involving both user and official.  
Attempts at co-production were not necessarily always successful.  Co-
production was just as possible for ‘good’ clients who traded on their 
compliance as it was for ‘bad’ clients who were intimidating.  For the staff’s 
part, they could participate in co-production either reluctantly, in the case 
of intimidating ‘numpties’ or willingly, in the case of ‘good’ clients.  This 
notion of co-production is similar to Kinfisher’s (1996) usage of the term, 
but she uses it to describe active processes of policy definition between 
co-workers.  The analysis presented in this chapter has developed this 
idea to include both sides of the policy implementation interaction.  
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Chapter Nine 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
This thesis has provided a micro level analysis of unemployment policy in 
practice.  It has offered empirical evidence to determine the extent of 
policy modification and its consequences both for the staff who worked in 
the case study Jobcentre office and the users who relied on the service 
they provided.  The implementation process has been taken as the central 
focus and it has been argued that this process must be understood 
primarily as a social process of interaction.  The analysis has been based 
on the premise that policies do not exist independently from their 
implemented form.  Consequently, the focus has been on the interaction of 
social actors, rather than the role of institutions, with the objective of better 
understanding how policies are constructed and what they mean to 
people.  This thesis has brought an innovatory approach to the study of 
UK social security implementation, by studying both sides of the staff-user 
relationship simultaneously1.   
 
The first contribution of this thesis is to present an account of active labour 
market policies as they operate in practice in comparison and contrast to 
their official formulation.  This strengthens the existing UK unemployment 
policy literature, which has so far had to depend on official policy 
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statement and evaluations, or interview data as a basis for critique2 (c.f. 
Finn, 1998, Millar, 2000, 2002, Trickey & Walker, 2000, Theodore & Peck, 
1999, Tonge, 1999).   This thesis has shown that the delivery of policy is 
shaped by a series of pressures and constraints that mean that front-line 
workers cannot comply entirely with the formal goals and guidance 
documents of the Employment Service.  Staff time and effort was 
distributed unevenly between the dual roles of vacancy matching and 
benefit administration.  Despite the emphasis on active labour market 
policies, workers prioritised benefit administration above job matching.  
Interviews were typically shorter than the recommended length and job 
search activities were either omitted or truncated in many instances.  It 
was the pressure of time, the queue of people waiting, the structure of the 
forms and computer system, along with a preference to retain existing, 
well-established, work practices that shaped the construction of most 
interviews.  Employment Officers did, therefore, modify policy as they 
implemented it.  Although they did not re-create policy afresh, they did 
develop their own routines and simplifications to make their jobs possible.  
These work habits had important consequences for those using the 
service.   
 
In particular, staff invented informal rationing systems in an attempt to deal 
with the conflicting requirements of employers and job seekers, under the 
increased pressure of placement targets.  Here the organisational 
objective of enabling people to find work was converted into the more 
                                                                                                                       
1 This technique has been used in the US by Kingfisher (1996, 1998) 
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manageable goal of assisting certain users into certain vacancies.  
Officials managed the tensions between the interests of employers and 
the interests of unemployed people in ways that tipped the balance in 
favour of employers rather than the unemployed (for whom the service is 
said to exist).  In this respect, the actions of Employment Service staff 
reinforced existing inequalities in the labour market.  This process was 
influenced by new managerialist individualised performance incentives, 
which changed the way service was provided and the way Employment 
Officers related to their co-workers.  When combined with the effects of 
cost-cutting, it seemed that this sort of incentive structure had the to 
potential to undermine the ethic of high quality customer service for all.   
 
This analysis has, therefore, contributed to the policy process literature by 
demonstrating that Lipsky’s (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy still 
provides a useful explanation for the administration of unemployment 
policy in the new managerisalist context.  This is significant because the 
discrepancy between official policy and the implemented form actually 
resulted in a repositioning of the principles upon which the service was 
provided.   
 
These factors combined to increase pressure for staff to invent discretion.  
This much was recognised by Lipsky (1980).  However, the analysis 
presented here sees front-line workers as active agents who have 
independent and collective interpretations of policy problems and 
                                                                                                                       
2 With the exception of Balckmore (2001) and Finn et al. (2001) these have been one-
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solutions.  It was not just the bureaucratic work environment that 
influenced how discretion was applied, as Lipsky (1980) suggests, but also 
front-line staff’s own beliefs and emotional responses to policy and users. 
 
The ultimate consequence of the decisions and actions of street-level 
bureaucrats is that they will combine to ‘structure and delimit people’s lives 
and opportunities’ (Lipsky, 1980: 4).  Unemployed people have been 
subject to a series of policy changes that have resulted in increased 
compulsion, whilst benefit has become worth less, more likely to be 
means-tested and available on an insurance basis for a shorter period of 
time.  The 'actively seeking work' condition has been tightened, particularly 
with the international vogue (Clasen, 1999) for active labour market 
policies (applied mainly in the UK case through Jobseeker's Allowance 
and the New Deal programmes), which have created harsher sanctions for 
non-compliance.  Those registered as unemployed have had to make 
more effort to prove their availability for work and to provide evidence of 
the steps that they have taken to find work at a time when the labour 
market has become much more lightly regulated and restructuring has 
resulted in a prevalence of part-time, temporary, low-paid work.  In effect, 
unemployed people are being compelled to accept temporary low paid 
work (in some cases state subsidised through the New Deal and Working 
Families Tax Credit) as an alternative to benefits that trap them into 
poverty (Forde & Slater, 2001).  Crucially, these jobs do not necessarily 
                                                                                                                       
sided accounts.  
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provide a route out of poverty and might result in a quick return to 
unemployment.   
 
It was argued that Jobcentre users experienced policy in a range of ways, 
but that generally the new managerialist label of 'customer' was resisted.  
Users could not be described as customers because they did not have 
purchasing power.  The very fact that they needed to depend on a system 
of income maintenance was evidence that the dependency of usual 
customer relations had been inverted.  Most of those interviewed were 
surviving on incomes below a level necessary to meet basic needs.  Their 
exchange relationship with those administering the system was therefore 
very different from usual customer relations.  These users were committed 
to earning money through the wage relationship.  Having been denied that 
opportunity, they were forced to depend on unemployment benefits, which 
made them feel powerless.  This was further complicated by a cross-
cutting experience of reciprocity, which meant that those who had paid tax 
and National Insurance felt that they had contributed to a system that they 
should now be able to claim from without feeling stigmatised.  In fact it was 
this stigmatised role as unemployed that was the basis of much of the 
negative feelings that interviewees had about the Jobcentre and the 
service they received from staff.  Users also resisted the customer 
terminology because they were denied choice and control.  They 
considered the vacancies that were advertised to be of too low a quality 
because they were often part-time or temporary positions that did not offer 
a living wage.  This perception was borne out by a detailed analysis of the 
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vacancies available in the office during a two month period.  Marked 
discrepancies were identified in the type of work sought by those 
registered unemployed and the type of work available.  This mismatch 
meant that in almost every case there were many more registered 
unemployed people seeking a particular type of work than there were 
vacancies available.  Users often framed their experiences of the 
Jobcentre in reference to benefit administration.  Very few of those 
interviewed felt that they had received meaningful assistance to enable 
them to find work.  A contradiction therefore exists between the promises 
of high quality service and customer-orientation made by new 
managerialist discourse and the design and implementation of 
unemployment policy.  This conflict originates in the differing models of 
user behaviour that new managerialism and unemployment policy adopt. 
 
The argument then moved on, to demonstrate some of the ways in which 
unemployment policy was accomplished through face-to-face interaction.  
Front-line staff were seen to engage in a process of client categorisation, 
of which there were two varieties.  The first, administrative categorisation, 
was necessary for processing people (Prottas, 1979), transforming 
complex people into more simplistic client types.  This process of 
categorisation could have important consequences for Jobcentre users, 
particularly in relation to job matching.  The second type of classification, 
moral categorisation, based on good and bad types, could be more 
significant in determining the type of service and treatment that users 
would receive from officials.  This analysis has similarities to Kingfisher’s 
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(1996) study of US women welfare workers and recipients.  However, the 
users in Kingfisher’s study were constructed almost entirely as bad, 
whereas the majority of Jobcentre users were seen as ‘all right’.  Moral 
categorisation was not based on official categories, but constituted the 
development of ‘routines and simplifications' (Lipsky, 1980) invented by 
staff to make their jobs more manageable.  Lipsky (1980) and Prottas 
(1979) did point to the ways in which street-level bureaucrats could bias 
treatment and act according to stereotypes.  This thesis has shown that 
the categorisations made by Jobcentre staff were more fluid  and subtle 
than clear-cut stereotypes or binary divisions between ‘deserving’ or 
‘undeserving’ clients (Cooper, 1985, Dean, 1991, Howe, 1990); 
categorisations were not hard and fast (as those identified by Kingfisher, 
1996, seemed to be).  Users could also move between categorisations 
depending on circumstances and changes in behaviour.   
 
Front-line staff therefore implemented policy differentially and developed 
strategies for rewarding, disciplining or punishing users according to 
subjective moral categorisations.  This is significant because staff mediate 
between citizen and state, but they do so as active social agents, rather 
than impartial implementers.  Users therefore receive a form of policy that 
has been modified by staff as they re-create it in practice and that policy is 
applied differentially according to judgements made during interaction.   
 
It was demonstrated that the interactional accomplishment, by which 
policy emerges in practice, involves users as well as staff.  Even the most 
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junior of staff were seen to employ the sorts of ‘rhetorical strategies’ (Miller 
& Holstein, 1995) that Miller (1991) and Anderson (1999) observed in use 
by more senior employment advisers.  In addition to this, users, like staff, 
held preconceived ideas about the Jobcentre and the people they would 
deal with there.  The meanings and understandings of the social situation 
were not static, but could shift and change in relation to the other party 
involved in the interaction.  Unemployment policy was contested at the 
interface between citizen and state.  Although many unemployed people 
did co-operate with the requirements made on them to continue their 
benefit claim, this did not mean that they agreed with the policy or the 
specific practices that were imposed.  Whether acquiescent or 
troublesome, Jobcentre users interacted with officials to accomplish policy.  
As Howe (1990) observed, some users were more active than others in 
seeking to influence the outcomes of their interviews with staff.   
 
Rather than simply viewing users as non-voluntary (Lipsky, 1980), this 
thesis has given serious consideration to the ways that individuals 
construct meanings about their experience of unemployment and their 
contact with the public employment agency.  It has moved beyond the 
characterisation of benefit recipients as docile welfare subjects and has 
instead presented them as active agents of policy accomplishment.  This 
extends the scope of the users’ perspectives literature, which has been 
skewed towards understanding how users view services, rather than how 
they experience the receipt of cash benefits (see Beresford, 2002).  The 
analysis has illustrated the juxtaposition between the powerlessness of 
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unemployed people to influence the formal political processes of policy 
design and their active contestation, compliance, negotiation and co-
production of policy at street level.  Implementation is, therefore, not just 
something that users are subjected to, but something that is achieved 
through a joint endeavour.  Again, this has advanced the analysis of how 
users engage with policy in practice (particularly in the development of the 
term co-production, which draws on Kingfisher’s, 1998, earlier usage of 
the concept)and how they respond to a policy design that is out of kilter 
with their experiences of work and unemployment, perceptions of self, 
motivations and behaviours.  This recognises not only that users have 
agency, but demonstrates exactly how that agency is enacted in relation to 
the implementation of unemployment policy. 
 
Anderson (1999) used the term ‘interactional accomplishment’ to describe 
the social construction of social service work in the US from a worker’s 
perspective.  This thesis has developed his concept to argue that it is in 
fact policy that is accomplished through the interaction between staff and 
users.  This is to say that what a policy is depends on both how it is 
officially conceived and how it is interpreted and put into operation by 
those who deliver policy and those who receive it.  This analysis has 
advanced the street-level bureaucracy approach and forged a stronger link 
(particularly in the UK context3) between interpretivist sociology and 
mainstream social policy literature.  The work of symbolic interactionists 
like Goffman (1959, 1963) has therefore come to bear a greater influence 
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on understandings of the policy process.  This has emphasised the 
intersubjectivity and interdependence of the strategies employed by staff 
and clients in their accomplishment of policy.   
 
The strength of the approach of this thesis has also been its weakness.  
By focusing on what happens at street level, causes and consequences 
(and therefore possible solutions) have been understood largely within the 
single office context.  This has detracted explanatory interest from those 
more powerful social actors, politicians and civil servants, who ultimately 
control and define the broad conditions under which policy can take place.  
Front-line staff do make policy through their interaction with users, but 
however divergent their interpretations, however great their intentions and 
however creative their actions, they can only manoeuvre within or in 
relation to the framework that has been centrally determined by 
government.  Since top-level policy design is itself accomplished through a 
process of interaction and negotiation, it is influenced by the beliefs and 
interests of a set of privileged social actors (Levin, 1997).  Like front-line 
staff, policy designers are active agents who work within a set of 
constraints, traditions and priorities.  However, the reality of the policy 
problem as experienced by users and understood by front-line staff is at 
times far removed from the interpretations and discourses drawn on by 
policy designers when exerting influence over the direction, priorities, 
resources and management method of services and benefits for 
unemployed people.  Such high-level decisions are shaped by ideological 
                                                                                                                       
3 Those like Miller (1991) and Anderson (1999) have applied such a framework more 
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preferences, personal or group interests and beliefs about how unknown 
unemployed others are motivated to behave (Levin, 1997). 
 
Implications for Recent Policy Developments 
There have been several policy changes since the data presented here 
were collected.  This section demonstrates the significance of both types 
of research findings (outlined above) for these recent policy developments. 
 
The policy trajectory in the UK is now firmly established, placing emphasis 
on the links between welfare and work by making claiming benefits 
conditional upon looking for work. The Jobcentre model has been the 
basis for the new Jobcentre Plus service, thereby dominating the street-
level implementation of social security in the UK.  This means that the 
findings of this research might have a wider relevance than originally 
anticipated.  Since this research was conducted, there have been several 
significant policy developments along the activation line.  ONE, the single 
work-focussed gateway, was piloted in 2000 and 2001.  Under ONE, users 
applying for a wide range of benefits were required to participate in an 
interview that not only established their claim for benefit, but also explored 
their work availability.  The crucially important aspect of this reform was 
that it represented a redefinition of who could be expected to seek 
employment (although users were not compelled to take particular action 
unless they were claiming JSA).  Unpaid workers, like lone parents with 
full-time caring responsibilities for young children, and people deemed 
                                                                                                                       
readily to their empirical studies in the US than those analysing UK social security policy. 
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incapable of work, because of sickness or disability, have been 
reinterpreted as potential workers within a discourse that affords little 
legitimacy to anything but the wage relationship.  Their previous right to 
claim social assistance without any work-related conditions was 
undermined by this new system of interviews.  The supporting system for 
this emerging system of work-based welfare has included the twin strategy 
of ‘making work pay’ and ‘making work possible’ (Millar, 2002).  This has 
amounted to the establishment of the National Childcare Strategy in 1998, 
the introduction of the National Minimum Wage in 1999 (which has 
remained at a very low level, particularly for younger workers) and the 
extension of the tax credit system (first through Working Families Tax 
Credit and Disabled Persons Tax Credit then through the Child Tax Credit 
and Working Tax Credit). 
 
The development of ONE was superseded by the dramatic announcement 
in July 2001 that parts of the Department of Social Security were to join 
with sections of the Department of Education and Employment to form the 
new Department for Work and Pensions.  The Jobcentre and the Benefits 
Agency have amalgamated to staff Jobcentre Plus4, a new organisation 
intended as a ‘one-stop shop’ for all benefit claimants, based on the 
Jobcentre model.  Jobcentre Plus extends the requirement for a wide 
range of users to attend compulsory work focussed interviews, both before 
they can make a claim for benefit and at regular interviews throughout the 
duration of their claim.   
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 The Pathfinder offices have been well funded and much effort has gone 
into promoting visible improvements to customer service through the 
creation of a more pleasant office environment, without observable queues 
of people waiting, and incorporating vacancy advertising through touch-
screen computers (rather than boards of cards).  Jobcentre Plus advisers 
are to emulate the personal and in-depth approach of the New Deal 
Personal Advisers and part of their role is to involve referral to New Deal 
programmes.  
 
Nevertheless, Jobcentre Plus reinvents the same tensions that Jobcentres 
did before them.  Encompassing a wider range of users within the 
activation aim is likely to bring the pressures on staff time the unresolved 
dilemma of whether to dedicate effort to benefit administration or vacancy 
matching more sharply into focus.  Benefit administration has become 
significantly more complex as front-line workers are expected to have in-
depth knowledge of a wider range of benefits and programmes.  
Additionally, increasing numbers of users will be urged to chase a limited 
number of low grade vacancies.  One consequence is likely to be 
increased competition for staff to meet placement targets, which have 
become more detailed and specific.  This would exert more pressure 
rather than relieving the need for vacancy rationing as a practical solution. 
This, in turn, may actually lead to greater inequalities of opportunity within 
the user group, disadvantaging those with the least chances of attaining 
                                                                                                                       
4 It had originally been anticipated that the new organisation would be known as the 
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bureaucratically defined success.   
 
The higher profile of front-line advisers, who are equipped with an 
increased capacity for discretion and the threat of tougher sanctions, has 
increased the emphasis on one-to-one interaction.  These developments 
can be interpreted as positive for users in as much as they formally 
represent a greater dedication of staff time and effort.   However, it is 
possible to predict a situation in which users categorised as ‘good’ fare 
well, while those deemed as ‘bad’ are, at least, ignored and, at worst, have 
their disadvantage punished and compounded.    
 
The success of any system of work-based welfare depends largely on the 
work that it is based upon.  The unemployed cannot take jobs that do not 
exist.  The supply-side measures that have constituted the UK approach to 
active labour market policies have done little to address the problem (King 
& Wickham-Jones, 1999, Peck, 2001, Theodore & Peck, 1999, Tonge, 
1999).  The designers of Jobcentre Plus cannot be held accountable for 
the health of the economy in the UK as a whole and in its constituent 
regions, or for the restructuring of the labour market.  However, it is 
evident that Jobcentre Plus staff must secure a larger proportion of the 
vacancy market (I would personally advocate compulsory notification of all 
vacancies) and develop expertise in employment advice and counselling if 
they are to be effective in enabling people to find work.  The advancement 
of this task and the development and enhancement of these skills depend 
                                                                                                                       
‘Working Age Agency’ (Clasen et al., 2001). 
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on the provision of resources of time and finance.  I also echo the findings 
of the 1998-99 Select Committee on Education and Employment (House 
of Commons Education and Employment Select Committee Publications, 
1998b) in calling for a radical reorganisation of performance incentives for 
job matching in order to prevent the situation in which people who want 
work are discouraged from applying for certain vacancies.   Any public (or 
quasi-public) system of job matching should be primarily concerned with 
helping unemployed people find work, rather than helping employers to fill 
their vacancies. 
 
Services to the registered unemployed and other job seekers should be 
based on the principle of making job and training applications as simple 
and effective as possible.  Users should not be restricted in the number of 
vacancies they can apply for at any one time.  Unemployed people should 
not have to wait for six months before they become eligible for training 
courses to assist them to find work.  Immediate training and access to 
resources would go some way to preventing the problem of long-term 
unemployment for some users.  Application forms should be easily 
available.  A range of resources should be provided, including a seated 
area where people can look for work in local newspapers, a wide range of 
recruitment newspapers and magazines and the Internet.  Ideally, 
computers, printers, paper and envelopes should be provided, along with 
on-line resources to help people apply for jobs. I believe that if these basic 
job seeking essentials were provided free of charge, then the need for 
compulsion and harsh sanctions would be greatly reduced.  Without 
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dedicated investment in enabling people to find work, Jobcentre Plus is 
likely to become a residual system existing only to force hard to place 
users into low paid insecure employment. 
 
On the other hand, benefit administration cannot be seen simply as 
something that detracts from assisting people to find work.  Active labour 
market policies do not eliminate the need for social security (Sinfield, 
2001) and trends towards the individualisation of welfare have not yet 
eclipsed the need for collective provision.  Whilst welfare-to-work policies 
might have some success in certain regions when the economy is strong 
and unemployment is low, they are incapable of dealing with the problem 
of unemployment in a downturn of the cycle (King & Wickham-Jones, 
1999, Peck, 2001, Theodore & Peck, 1999, Tonge, 1999).  There is a 
strong case for increasing the level of UK benefits to ensure that those 
who cannot work in the short or long term are provided with a level of 
income that allows them to maintain ‘the types of diet, participate in the 
activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are 
customary, or are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies 
to which they belong’ (Townsend, 1979:  31).  Not least of all because this 
will allow a more effective job search.   
 
The efforts of those staffing the new Jobcentre Plus system should 
rightfully be directed at guaranteeing fast and accurate benefit 
administration as well as enabling people to find work.  However, it is 
important that benefit administration is expanded to ensure advice and 
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guidance as well as dealing with the nuts and bolts of processing claims 
forms.  Previous research has highlighted serious concerns about the 
capability of advisers to provide broad-based benefit advice (see Foster & 
Hogget’s, 1999, study of an earlier Benefit Agency one stop shop pilot and 
the evaluation of ONE, Kelleher et al., 2001).  Advisers will need both time 
and expertise in a wider range of benefits.  The existing information 
systems are insufficient for this purpose.  There is, therefore, potential for 
the development of an accessible system of welfare rights advice, which 
might be most usefully supplied in an electronic form. 
 
This thesis has therefore contributed to understandings of British 
unemployment policy in practice.  Alongside the work of Blackmore (2001) 
and Finn et al. (1998), it forms the basis of a growing body of literature that 
is concerned with UK policies as they are, rather than simply as they 
should be.  This work therefore supplements, updates and extends the 
earlier work of Cooper (1985) and Howe (1990).  
 
Emerging Research Agenda 
The implications of this research have been outlined and their importance 
is clear.  However, this thesis is based only on one case study office in the 
UK.  A valuable development for future research would be to replicate the 
study in other UK offices, to compare, for instance, a busy inner city office 
with a rural office. This might highlight variations in the time allowed for 
face-to-face interviews and the emphasis placed on enabling people to 
find work, which might create different opportunities and outcomes for 
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users.  In particular, it would be interesting to conduct an in-depth 
examination of the implementation of the new Jobcentre Plus agenda in a 
small number of the Pathfinder areas.  The focus would be on the nature 
of the interaction between front-line staff and a range of different users.  
This would allow an investigation of the constraints and incentives 
affecting workers and how they continue to manage the tension between 
benefit administration and job matching when faced with the very different 
experiences and circumstances of users who are unemployed, lone 
parents, carers and sick and disabled people.  Examining the Pathfinder 
offices would also reveal how the mixture of staff work together, with those 
from previous Benefits Agency and Jobcentre backgrounds having come 
from separate work cultures where they had established work practices.  
For instance, how have BA staff adapted to the unscreened Jobcentre 
style environment (an issue pertinent in the wake of union disputes over 
the matter)?  And of course, it would be essential to look at how users 
have adapted to the new system and whether it meets their needs, causes 
increased inconvenience or creates new opportunities and assistance.  Do 
Jobcentre Plus users accomplish, negotiate, contest and co-produce 
policy in similar or different ways to those presented in this research?  Is 
customer service now a more meaningful term to them? 
 
It is also clear that much could be gleaned from cross-national research, to 
develop theory and to assist policy learning.  Here the key variant would 
be the arrangements for benefit administration and job search assistance.  
It would be very interesting to compare and contrast the street-level 
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implementation of single gateways in different countries (building on the 
work conducted by Clasen et al. 2001, for instance), considering the 
different patterns of funding and delivery.  It would be valuable to 
understand some of the complexities and tensions of a partly or wholly 
privatised system of vacancy matching, such as in Australia (cf. Finn, 
2002, Eardley, 2001), as an example of implementation in a liberal welfare 
regime (drawing on Esping-Andersen's, 1990, typification).  For instance, 
how is the citizen-state relationship reconstituted when the representative 
of government policy is not directly employed as a civil servant?  This 
could be compared with Jobcentre Plus and the new Employment Zones 
in the UK, where the social democratic form of centralised bureaucracy is 
undergoing a transition towards the more diverse type of delivery 
arrangements associated with neo-liberal values.  Recent developments in 
Sweden would provide a third point of reference.  Sweden is interesting 
because it is the archetypal social democratic welfare state, in which a 
system of compulsory vacancy notification still exists within a regionalised 
system of workfare.  A street-level study of these three countries might 
usefully illuminate differences in approach, ideology and values (for 
instance there might be variation in attitudes towards the long-term 
unemployed) as well as understanding the practical constraints that 
influence the structure of the system and its implementation.  
Comparisons could be made about the extent and effectiveness of people 
processing (Prottas, 1979) and people changing (Hasenfeld & Weaver, 
1996) that street-level workers engage in.  The roles played by users in 
the accomplishment of policy might also differ in certain regions or nations. 
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 In conclusion, this thesis has contributed to understandings of the policy 
process.  Lipksy’s (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy has informed 
and focused the study, which has applied and developed his arguments.  
It has been demonstrated that street-level bureaucrats play an active role 
in policy making in the case of the unemployment policy in the 
contemporary British managerial state.   
 
Accomplishing policy involves a range of social actors in different times 
and places, who are situated in different places within the organisational 
hierarchy and the social structure.  At the top level, politicians and civil 
servants accomplish policy design through interaction and negotiation 
(Levin, 1997).  Policy in its written form is therefore shaped by the 
interests, beliefs, ideological positions and practical considerations that 
matter to the privileged social actors who hold key positions. But the story 
of policy coming into being does not finish with the creation of legislation 
and official documents of various kinds.  Policy making continues as long 
as social processes are involved, which reaches beyond the delivery 
stage.  Social policy exists because of and through social interaction.  This 
interaction is how implementation happens and where the influences, 
constraints, personal preferences, prejudices and habits of social actors 
continue to determine the character and outcomes of policy.  What 
constitutes any particular policy is a matter of interpretation.  The type of 
policy that service users experience depends on how it has filtered 
through a series of work practices and social processes and how it 
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emerges through the face-to-face interaction that the user has with front-
line staff. 
 
The exploration of these processes of interaction in this thesis has 
advanced Lipsky’s approach.  Front-line policy accomplishment involves 
two sets of social actors – service users and staff.  I have presented 
evidence to support the argument that both play active roles in 
accomplishing policy and shaping policy outcomes.  This also holds wider 
implications for the citizen-state relationship.  This work reinforces the 
need to study policies as they are implemented, as well as policies as they 
are designed and written.   
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Appendix One 
Staff Interviews 
Work 
• Explanation of your job. 
• Do you like your work'? Why? 
• What is good about it and what do you find frustrating'? 
• How long have you worked for the Jobcentre? 
• What is your background (within the JC e.g. UBO or JC if been working for ES for long time or 
outwith JC if not worked in JC for long)? 
• Why did you want to work for the Jobcentre? 
• What are the pressures you are under? 
• What are your targets'? 
• What do you think about targets? Do you think they are a good idea? 
• How far do targets influence what you do in your day to day work'? 
• Have you, or close family/friends, ever been unemployed? If so what are your reflections on the 
Jobcentre from a clients' perspective and has it influenced the way you do your job now? 
• Would you say a lot of your work is routine? Probe: conveyor belt, saying same things to people. 
Interaction with Clients 
• What do you think about the interaction with clients e.g. is it difficult or awkward or does it run 
smoothly? 
• What do you think about the clients you see'? 
• Do you prefer to work with some clients rather than others? If so why/can you typify that`? 
• How do you feel when you're dealing with clients'? 
• How do you think the clients feel? 
• Do you find that clients open up to you and tell you a lot of things? 
• How are you getting on with your caseloads of long-term unemployed? What do 
you think about long-term unemployed people? 
• Do you think a lot of people that you see are `at it'? Do you think people try to mislead you or lie to 
you? Do you think people that you deal with are trying to defraud the system'? 
•  How do you view Adjudication referrals and benefit sanctions'? Do you refer people for Adjudication? 
• Do you think some clients are unemployable? 
• Do you think some clients lack motivation? Do you find it easier to help clients who are more keen? 
What might you do for someone who's keen that you might not for someone who isn't? 
• Do you think some of the clients have social problems? How does that relate to what you can do for 
them? 
•  Do you think there are some people who shouldn't have to sign on? Probe: Incapacity Benefit. 
Decision Making 
• What decisions do you make about clients or for clients in your work? 
• How do you make these decisions? 
Jobcentre and Services Provided 
• What do you think about the services provided by the Jobcentre? 
• JSA 
• Special programmes e.g. JobClub, New Deal, Programme Centre 
• mandatory element 
• job vacancies 
• What do you think could be done to improve the Jobcentre for staff and for users? 
New Staff
•  What were your expectations of the Jobcentre? Probe: clients, benefits, job vacancies. 
• What are your initial impressions of the Jobcentre as a staff member? 
Personal Details 
• Age/age-group 
• Sex 
• Length of time in job. 
Appendix Two 
Interview Schedule for Jobcentre Clients 
Introduction 
• Purpose of research for PhD. 
• Not a member of ES staff and will not pass information on to them. 
• All information confidential and anonymous, don't even need name or address. This office will 
not be identified. 
• I will be the only person to hear the tape. 
• What you tell me will be used for the thesis that I will write at the end of my PhD. 
• Give university headed letter explaining research. 
Unemployment 
• Autobiographical account of experiences of unemployment. Probe: length of time 
unemployed, different phases of unemployment. 
• Classed as long-term unemployed? 
• What type of work looking for? 
• Postal signer? 
The Jobcentre and Services Offered 
• How often do you come to the Jobcentre? 
• What do you do when you come to the Jobcentre? Probe: vacancies, just sign, New Deal? 
Which point do you sign on at? 
• What do you think of the Jobcentre? What's good about it and bad about it? 
• If you remember back to your first visit to the Jobcentre was it a negative or positive 
experience? How did you feel? Did you know what to do? Was it confusing? Was it how you 
expected it to be? 
• How do you feel when you come to the Jobcentre now? 
• What do you think of the vacancies available here? 
• Have you participated in any special programmes e.g. New Deal/JobClub/Programme Centre 
etc? If so, were they compulsory'? What did you think of it/them'? 
• Do you receive Jobseeker's Allowance? What do you think of it? Did you mind having to have a 
Jobseeker's Agreement and having to specify more than one type of work? 
• What do you think of the compulsory element to some of the services e.g. that you 
have to look for more than one type of job or at the end of the 4 month Gateway 
on New Deal you have to take one of the options? 
• Have you ever heard of the Job Matching Service? Have you ever used it? Did you like it? 
Was it helpful? 
Meetings/interactions with Staff 
• What kind of meetings have you had with staff? (Might have already been covered in 
previous sections.) 
• What do you think about the way you have been treated by staff? Do some staff members 
treat you differently from others'? Can you give any examples? Probe reception, new 
claims, just signing, RDV, 13 week interviews, 6 month interviews, Matching. 
• If you have been called in for an appointment do you know why it is? Do staff explain 
what's going on? Do you know what's going on'? 
Personal Details 
• Age/age-group 
• Sex 
Appendix Three 
 
Appendix Four
  
FORTNIGHTLY JOBSEARCH REVIEWS – STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
STAGE CONTENT 
l. Greeting. Hello; Good morning/afternoon; apologies if kept 
waiting; good eye contact;smile; ice breaker. 
2. Aim/Purpose. Explain purpose of interview (not necessary every 
time - depends upon client); check client 
Jobsearch; undertake LMS Jobsearch. 
3. Access Client Record. a) Check personal details - address; telephone no., 
contact no., status eg. health, LTC; action 
hotspots; 
b) Check "conversations"; 
c) Check "More" box; 
d) Check "Actions" box. 
4. Review Client JSAg. a) Check JSAg - job goals, minimum weekly 
action; 
b) If required book ad-hoc interview with Adviser. 
5. Evaluate Client Jobsearch activity. a) Check "Hist." box; 
b) Has client heard from previous submissions?; 
c) Collect LLMI (Jobleads) - workflow to 
appropriate officer(s). 
d) identify and take RE action 
6. Conduct LMS Jobsearch. a) Check JSAg, SOC etc. 
b) make quality submissions; 
c) Endorse "Conversations" if no suitable 
vacancies found. 
7. Close Jobsearch Review. a) Recap with client; 
b) Thank You  
8. Payment Activity a) Collect LMU - excuse yourself. 
b) ES24 action - declaration, dates, signature; 
c) Input dialogue 470 to JSAPs; 
d) Confirm payment processed; 
e) Refer all non straightforward payment enquirie! 
to BA - send client to BA. 
9. Close Intervention. a) If submission made ask client for feedback; 
b) If no submission remind client about Jobsearch 
responsibilities; 
c) Remind client that our job display changes 
daily; 
d) Goodbye. 
 
Appendix Five
  
 Example of a Typical Vacancy Card 
 
 MAN OR WOMAN
Title: Cleaner 
 
District: Anydistrict 
 
Wage: £3.62 
 
Hours: Mon-Fri 5pm-7pm 
 
Duration: Permanent 
 
Details: P/T cleaner required to clean office areas.   
Duties will include dusting, polishing, 
emptying bins, hoovering and other tasks as 
specified. 
 
Ask For: ANYTOWN12345 
 
 
 
  
Appendix Six 
 
 
Conditions of entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance in 1998 
 
To get JSA you must: 
 
• Be unemployed or working (on average) for less than 16 hours a week.  
If you are married or cohabiting and claiming income-based JSA, your 
partner must also be unemployed or working (on average) for less than 
24 hours a week; and 
• Be capable of work; and 
• Satisfy the ‘labour market conditions’. This means that you must: 
- be available for employment; and 
- be actively seeking employment; and 
- have a current Jobseeker’s Agreement with the Employment 
Service; and 
• be below pensionable age.  Pensionable age is currently 65 for men 
and 60 for women; and 
• not be younger than 19 and still at school or college on a non-advance 
course; and 
• be in Great Britain. 
• For Contribution-Based JSA, have been claiming JSA for less than six 
months and satisfy the contribution conditions. 
• For Income-Based JSA, pass the means test. 
(Barnes et al., 1998:  5-6) 
 
